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VOLUME  1  
SOURCES  OF  POWER  AND  RESTRAINT  
  
[Insert  UNF  p.  1-1  here]  
  
³-XVWDVWKHVHSDUDWLRQDQGLQGHSHQGHQFHRIWKHFRRUGLQDWHEUDQFKHVRIWKH)HGHUDO
Government  serve  to  prevent  the  accumulation  of  excessive  power  in  any  one  branch,  
a  healthy  balance  of  power  between  the  States  and  the  Federal  Government  will  
UHGXFHWKHULVNRIW\UDQQ\DQGDEXVHIURPHLWKHUIURQW´  
²JUSTICE  SANDRA  DAY  2¶&ONNOR,  WRITING  FOR  THE  COURT  IN  GREGORY  V.  
ASHCROFT  (1991)  
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CHAPTER  ONE  
THE  SUPREME  COURT  IN  THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  SYSTEM  
  
[Insert  UNF  p.  1-2  here]  
³,WLVHPSKDWLFDOO\WKHSURYLQFHDQGGXW\RIWKHMXGLFLDOGHSDUWPHQWWRVD\ZKDWWKH
law  LV´  
²CHIEF  JUSTICE  JOHN  MARSHALL,  WRITING  FOR  THE  SUPREME  COURT  IN  MARBURY  V.  
MADISON  (1803)  
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Scott  v.  Sandford  (1857)  
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INTRODUCTION  
The  U.S.  Supreme  Court  is  the  leading  actor  on  the  stage  of  American  constitutional  
law.  While  other  courts  (federal  and  state)  have  occasion  to  interpret  the  U.S.  
Constitution,  they  can  be  and  often  are  overruled  by  the  Supreme  Court.  Unlike  the  
decisions  of  other  non-specialized  courts,  Supreme  Court  decisions  have  authoritative  
nationwide  application.  Accordingly,  the  Supreme  Court  occupies  a  position  of  
preeminence  in  the  American  constitutional  system.  
The  Supreme  Court  operates  within  an  elaborate  framework  of  legal  principles,  
precedents,  and  procedures.  Because  of  its  institutional  status  as  an  independent  
branch  of  government,  and  the  fact  that  the  legal  questions  it  addresses  often  involve  
important  issues  of  public  policy,  the  Court  is  both  a  political  and  a  legal  entity.  The  
&RXUW¶VSROLWLFDOUROHLVKLJKOLJKWHGHYHU\WLPHWKH&RXUWDGGUHVVHVD  controversial  
public  issue  such  as  abortion,  school  prayer,  gay  rights,  affirmative  action,  or  the  
death  penalty.  On  occasion  WKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQVKDYHLPPHGLDWHLPSDFWRQWKH
political  process  itself.  Such  was  the  case  in  Bush  v.  Gore  (2000),  in  which  the  Court  
effectively  decided  the  outcome  of  a  presidential  election  (for  further  discussion  and  
an  excerpt  of  this  remarkable  decision,  see  Chapter  8,  Volume  II).  
Because  the  Supreme  Court  is  at  once  a  legal  and  a  political  institution,  an  
understanding  of  the  Court  and  its  most  significant  product,  constitutional  
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interpretation,  requires  knowledge  of  both  law  and  politics.  In  this  book  we  attempt  to  
enhance  both.  In  this  first  chapter  we  examine  the  Supreme  Court  as  an  institution²
its  practices,  powers,  and  procedures.  We  explain  how  constitutional  cases  reach  the  
High  Court  and  how  they  are  decided  once  there.  Most  importantly,  we  describe  the  
origin  and  development  of  judicial  review,  the  crux  of  judicial  power  and  the  principal  
means  by  which  constitutional  law  develops.  We  examine  the  exercise  of  judicial  
review  and,  just  as  important,  the  constraints  on  the  exercise  of  this  power.  Finally,  
we  examine  the  behavior  of  the  Court  from  the  standpoint  of  modern  political  science.  
  
>%HJLQ³&DVHLQ3RLQW´  box  here]  
C ase in Point
A Supreme Court Decision B rings Down a President

United States v. Nixon (1974)
This case stemmed from PresidHQW1L[RQ¶VUHIXVDOWRFRPSO\ZLWKDsubpoena

duces tecum obtained by Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski. The subpoena
directed President Nixon to produce the infamous Watergate Tapes on which were
recorded conversations that took place in the Oval Office between President Nixon
and his advisers. In refusing to honor the subpoena, President Nixon argued that the
WDSHVZHUHSURWHFWHGE\H[HFXWLYHSULYLOHJH,QGHHGWKH3UHVLGHQW¶VFRXQVHODVVHUWHG
that executive privilege is absolute and not subject to subpoena. The United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, which had issued the subpoena, rejected
WKH3UHVLGHQW¶VDUJXPHQWVDQGRUGHUHGKLPWRSURGXFHWKHWDSHV7KHPresident sought
review by the Court of Appeals, but before the Circuit Court could act the Supreme
Court granted Leon Jaworski¶V petition for certiorari, citing the great public
importance of the matter and the need for prompt resolution of the conflict. On the
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merits, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Special Prosecutor. Writing for a
unanimous Supreme Court, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (a Nixon appointee)
FRQFOXGHGWKDW³ZKHQWKHJURXQGIRUDVVHUWLQJSULYLOHJHDVWRVXESRHQDHGPDWHULDOV
sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law
LQWKHIDLUDGPLQLVWUDWLRQRIFULPLQDOMXVWLFH´3UHVLGHQW1L[RQUHOXFWDQWO\FRPSOLHG
ZLWKWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQVXUUHQGHUHGWKHLQFULPLQDWLQJWDSHVDQGUHVLJQHG
as President. United States v. Nixon is generally regarded as a vindication of the rule
of law over political power and a fundamental reaffirmation of our constitutional
democracy.

>(QG³&DVHLQ3RLQW´  box  here]  
  
THE  COURTS:  CRUCIBLES  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  
Constitutional  law  evolves  through  a  process  of  judicial  interpretation  in  the  context  
of  particular  cases.  These  cases  may  arise  in  either  federal  or  state  courts.  The  federal  
courts  are  those  established  by  Congress  to  hear  cases  arising  under  federal  law  and  
certain  disputes  where  the  parties  reside  in  different  states.  State  courts  are  those  
established  by  each  of  the  fifty  state  governments  within  the  United  States.  Most  cases  
in  state  and  federal  courts  do  not  pose  constitutional  questions.  But  when  they  do,  the  
FRXUWV¶GHFLVLRQVLQWKRVHFDVHVFRQWULEXWHWRWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOODZ  
  
[Insert  Figure  1.1  here]  
  
State  Court  Systems  
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Each  of  the  fifty  states  has  its  own  court  system,  responsible  for  cases  arising  under  
the  laws  of  that  state.  These  laws  include  the  state  constitution,  statutes  enacted  by  the  
state  legislature,  orders  issued  by  the  governor,  regulations  promulgated  by  various  
state  agencies,  and  ordinances  (local  laws)  adopted  by  cities  and  counties.  But  state  
courts  also  have  occasion  to  consider  questions  of  federal  law,  including  federal  
constitutional  questions.  
Although  no  two  state  court  systems  are  identical,  all  of  them  contain  trial  and  
appellate  courts  (see  Figure  1.1).  Trial  courts  make  factual  determinations  based  on  
the  presentation  of  evidence  and  apply  established  legal  principles  to  resolve  disputes.  
Appellate  courts,  on  the  other  hand,  exist  to  correct  legal  errors  made  by  trial  courts  
and  to  settle  controversies  about  disputed  legal  principles.  Both  trial  and  appellate  
courts  are  called  on  from  time  to  time  to  decide  questions  of  constitutional  law.  Each  
state  has  a  court  of  last  resort,  usually  called  the  state  supreme  court,  which  speaks  
with  finality  on  matters  of  state  law.  To  the  extent  that  a  state  supreme  court  decision  
involves  a  question  of  federal  law,  however,  its  decision  is  reviewable  by  the  U.S.  
Supreme  Court.  
  
[Insert  Figure  1.2  here]  
  
The  Federal  Court  System  
The  national  government  operates  its  own  system  of  federal  courts  with  authority  
throughout  the  United  States  and  its  territories.  Federal  courts  decide  cases  arising  
under  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  and  statutes  enacted  by  Congress.  In  
addition,  the  jurisdiction  of  these  courts  extends  to  cases  involving  executive  orders  
issued  by  the  president,  regulations  established  by  various  federal  agencies,  and  
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treaties  and  other  agreements  between  the  United  States  and  foreign  countries.  
The  court  of  last  resort  in  the  federal  judiciary  is,  of  course,  the  U.S.  Supreme  
Court.  The  Supreme  Court  sits  atop  a  hierarchy  of  appellate  and  trial  courts,  as  
GLVSOD\HGLQ)LJXUH$UWLFOH,,,RIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQSURYLGHVWKDW³>W@KHMXGLFLDO
Power  of  the  United  States,  shall  be  vested  in  one  supreme  Court,  and  in  such  inferior  
Courts  as  the  Congress  PD\IURPWLPHWRWLPHRUGDLQDQGHVWDEOLVK´%HJLQQLQJZLWK
the  landmark  Judiciary  Act  of  1789,  Congress  used  this  authority  primarily  to  create  
and  empower  the  federal  court  system.  Over  the  years  Congress  has  expanded  and  
modified  the  system,  giving  us  the  three-tiered  structure  we  have  today.  
  
U.S.  District  Courts    The  U.S.  District  Courts  are  the  major  trial  courts  in  the  
federal  system.  These  courts  are  granted  authority  to  conduct  trials  and  hearings  in  
civil  and  criminal  cases  arising  under  federal  law.  Normally,  one  federal  judge  
presides  at  such  hearings  and  trials,  although  federal  law  permits  certain  exceptional  
cases  to  be  decided  by  panels  of  three  judges.  According  to  figures  compiled  by  the  
Administrative  Office  of  the  U.S.  Courts,  during  the  twelve-month  period  ending  on  
September  30,  2008,  approximately  267,000  civil  and  71,000  criminal  cases,  totaling  
approximately  338,000  cases,  were  filed  in  the  federal  district  courts,  down  slightly  
from  349,000  for  the  twelve-month  period  ending  on  March  1,  2005.      
  
[Insert  Figure  1.3  here]  
Section  2  of  the  Judiciary  Act  of  1789  created  thirteen  District  Courts,  one  for  
each  of  the  eleven  states  then  in  the  Union  and  one  each  for  the  parts  of  Massachusetts  
and  Virginia  that  were  later  to  become  the  states  of  Maine  and  Kentucky,  
respectively.  From  the  outset,  then,  the  District  Courts  have  been  state  contained,  with  

Stephens  and  Scheb  1-7  

Congress  adding  new  districts  as  the  nation  has  grown.  Today,  there  are  ninety-four  
federal  judicial  districts,  each  state  being  allocated  at  least  one.  Tennessee,  for  
example,  has  three  federal  judicial  districts  corresponding  to  the  traditional  eastern,  
PLGGOHDQGZHVWHUQ³JUDQGGLYLVLRQV´RIWKHVWDWH&DOLIRUQLD1HZ<RUNDQG7H[DV
are  the  only  states  with  four  federal  judicial  districts.  
  
U.S.  Courts  of  Appeals    The  intermediate  appellate  courts  in  the  federal  system  are  
the  U.S.  Courts  of  Appeals.    With  the  exception  of  a  short-lived  measure  creating  six  
separate  courts  of  appeals  in  1801,  these  courts  were  not  established  until  passage  of  
the  Judiciary  Act  of  1891.  Prior  to  that  time,  appeals  from  the  decisions  of  the  District  
Courts  were  heard  by  the  Supreme  Court  or  by  Circuit  Courts  that  no  longer  exist.  
7RGD\WKH&RXUWVRI$SSHDOVDUHFRPPRQO\UHIHUUHGWRDVWKH³FLUFXLWFRXUWV´
because  each  one  of  them  presides  over  a  geographical  area  known  as  a  circuit  (see  
Figure  1.3).  The  nation  is  divided  into  twelve  circuits,  each  comprising  one  or  more  
IHGHUDOMXGLFLDOGLVWULFWVSOXVRQH³IHGHUDOFLUFXLW´WKDWLVDXWKRUL]HGWRJUDQWDSSHDOV
from  decisions  of  specialized  federal  courts.  Typically,  the  circuit  courts  hear  appeals  
from  the  federal  districts  within  their  circuits.  For  example,  the  U.S.  Court  of  Appeals  
for  the  Eleventh  Circuit,  based  in  Atlanta,  hears  appeals  from  the  District  Courts  
located  in  Alabama,  Georgia,  and  Florida.  The  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  District  of  
Columbia  Circuit,  based  in  Washington,  D.C.,  has  the  very  important  additional  
function  of  hearing  appeals  from  numerous  quasi-judicial  administrative  agencies  in  
the  federal  bureaucracy.  
Appeals  in  the  circuit  courts  are  normally  decided  by  rotating  panels  of  three  
judges,  although  under  exceptional  circumstances  these  courts  will  decide  cases  en  
banc,  meaning  that  all  of  the  judges  assigned  to  the  court  will  participate  in  the  
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decision.  On  average,  twelve  judges  are  assigned  to  each  circuit,  but  the  number  
varies  according  to  caseload.  According  to  data  compiled  by  the  Administrative  
Office  of  the  U.S.  Courts,  during  the  one-year  period  ending  on  September  30,  2008,  
approximately  61,000  were  commenced  in  the  U.S.  Courts  of  Appeals,  down  from  
approximately  65,000  during  the  twelve-month  period  ending  on  March  1,  2005.  
  
Specialized  Federal  Courts      Congress  has  also  established  a  set  of  specialized  
courts,  including  the  Tax  Court,  which  exists  to  resolve  disputes  between  taxpayers  
and  the  Internal  Revenue  Service;;  the  Court  of  International  Trade,  which  adjudicates  
controversies  between  the  federal  government  and  importers  of  foreign  goods;;  the  
&RXUWRI9HWHUDQV¶$SSHDOVZKLFKUHYLHZVGHFLVLRQVRIWKH%RDUGRI9HWHUDQV¶
$SSHDOVUHJDUGLQJYHWHUDQV¶FODLPVWREHQHILWVDQGWKH&RXUWRI)HGHUDO&ODLPV
which  is  responsible  for  adjudicating  civil  suits  for  damages  brought  against  the  
federal  government.  
  
Military  Tribunals  Under  the  Uniform  Code  of  Military  Justice,  crimes  committed  
by  persons  in  military  service  are  prosecuted  before  courts-martial.  Each  branch  of  
service  has  its  own  court  of  military  review,  the  decisions  of  which  are  subject  to  
review  by  a  civilian  court  known  as  the  U.S.  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Armed  Forces.  
In  the  wake  of  the  terrorist  attacks  of  September  11,  2001,  President  George  W.  Bush  
issued  a  controversial  executive  order  allowing  international  terrorists  to  be  tried  by  
³PLOLWDU\FRPPLVVLRQV´UDWKHUthan  by  federal  district  courts.  
  
The  U.S.  Supreme  Court    Although  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  is  explicitly  
recognized  in  Article  III  of  the  Constitution,  it  was  not  formally  established  until  
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passage  of  the  Judiciary  Act  of  1789.  This  act  provided  for  a  Court  composed  of  a  
chief  justice  and  five  associate  justices.  In  the  Judiciary  Act  of  1801,  hurriedly  passed  
in  the  waning  days  of  the  John  Adams  Administration,  Congress  decreased  the  
number  of  Supreme  Court  justices  to  five.  This  legislation  was  repealed  in  March  
1802,  however,  FRQVLVWHQWZLWK3UHVLGHQW7KRPDV-HIIHUVRQ¶VUHSXGLDWLRQRIWKH
)HGHUDOLVW3DUW\¶Vattempted  reorganization  of  the  federal  judiciary.  In  1807  the  Court  
was  expanded  to  include  seven  justices,  and  in  1837  Congress  increased  the  number  
to  nine.  During  the  Civil  War,  the  number  of  justices  was  briefly  increased  to  ten.  In  
1869  Congress  reestablished  the  number  at  nine,  where  it  has  remained  to  this  day.  
Although  Congress  theoretically  could  expand  or  contract  the  membership  of  the  
Court,  powerful  tradition  militates  against  doing  so.  
7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VILUVWVHVVLRQRSHQHGLQ1HZ<RUN&LW\RQ0RQGD\
February  1,  1790.  Because  no  cases  appeared  on  the  docket,  the  session  was  
adjourned  ten  days  later.  During  its  first  decade,  1790±1801,  the  Court  met  twice  a  
\HDUIRUEULHIWHUPVEHJLQQLQJLQ)HEUXDU\DQG$XJXVW2YHUWKH\HDUVWKH&RXUW¶V
annual  sessions  have  expanded  along  with  its  workload  and  its  role  in  the  political  and  
legal  system.  As  society  has  grown  larger,  more  complex,  and  more  litigious,  the  
6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VDJHQGDKDVVZHOOHG7he  Court  now  receives  some  10,000  petitions  
each  year  from  parties  seeking  review,  and  there  is  no  indication  that  its  caseload  will  
soon  decline.  
  6LQFHWKH&RXUW¶VDQQXDOWHUPKDVEHJXQRQWKH³ILUVW0RQGD\RI2FWREHU´
Until  1979,  the  Court  adjourned  its  sessions  for  the  summer,  necessitating  sessions  to  
handle  urgent  cases  arising  in  July,  August,  or  September.  Since  1979,  however,  the  
Court  has  stayed  in  continuous  session  throughout  the  year,  merely  declaring  a  recess  
at  the  end  of  each  Term  (typically  near  the  end  of  June)  for  a  summer  vacation.  For  
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e[DPSOHWKH&RXUW¶V2FWREHU  Term  ended  on  Friday,  June  29,  2009.  
  
Federal  Court  Jurisdiction  
The  jurisdiction  of  the  federal  courts  is  determined  both  by  the  language  of  Article  III  
of  the  Constitution  and  statutes  enacted  by  Congress.  The  jurisdiction  of  the  federal  
courts,  while  broad,  is  not  unlimited.  There  are  two  basic  categories  of  federal  
jurisdiction.  First,  and  most  important  for  students  of  constitutional  law,  is  federal  
question  jurisdiction.  The  essential  requirement  here  is  that  a  case  must  present  a  
federal  question²that  is,  a  question  arising  under  the  U.S.  Constitution,  a  federal  
statute,  regulation,  executive  order,  or  treaty.  Of  course,  given  its  expansive  modern  
role,  the  federal  government  has  produced  a  myriad  of  statutes,  regulations,  and  
executive  orders.  Consequently,  most  important  questions  of  public  policy  can  be  
framed  as  issues  of  federal  law,  thus  permitting  the  federal  courts  to  play  a  
tremendous  role  in  the  policy  making  process.  The  second  broad  category,  diversity  
of  citizenship  jurisdiction,  applies  only  to  civil  suits  and  is  unrelated  to  the  presence  
of  a  question  of  federal  law.  To  qualify  under  federal  diversity  jurisdiction,  a  case  
must  involve  parties  from  different  states  and  an  amount  in  controversy  that  exceeds  
$75,000.  
Although  the  issue  of  jurisdiction  can  be  viewed  as  an  external  constraint  on  the  
courts,  in  that  Congress  actually  writes  the  statutes  that  define  jurisdiction,  it  functions  
as  an  internal  constraint  as  well.  This  is  especially  true  at  the  Supreme  Court  level,  
where  the  exercise  of  jurisdiction  is  subject  to  the  discretion  of  the  justices.  In  1988  
Congress  made  the  appellate  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court  almost  entirely  
discretionary  by  greatly  limiting  the  so-called  appeals  by  right.  7RGD\WKH&RXUW¶V
appellate  jurisdiction  is  exercised  almost  exclusively  through  the  writ  of  certiorari,  
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ZKLFKLVLVVXHGDWWKH&RXUW¶VGLVFUHWLRQ)HGHUDl  law  authorizes  the  Court  to  grant  
certiorari  to  review  all  cases,  state  or  federal,  that  raise  questions  of  federal  law.  This  
extremely  wide  discretion  permits  the  Court  to  set  its  own  agenda,  facilitating  its  role  
as  a  policy  maker,  but  allowing  the  Court  to  avoid  certain  issues  that  may  carry  
undesirable  institutional  consequences.  The  Court  may  deflect,  or  at  least  postpone  
GHDOLQJZLWKLVVXHVWKDWLWFRQVLGHUV³WRRKRWWRKDQGOH´7KLVIOH[LEOHMXULVGLFWLRQ
then,  can  be  used  as  a  means  to  expand  or  OLPLWWKH&RXUW¶VSROLF\PDNLQJUROH
depending  on  the  issue  at  hand.  
Article  III  of  the  Constitution  declares  that  the  Supreme  Court  shall  have  original  
jurisdiction  ³>L@QDOO&DVHVDIIHFWLQJ$PEDVVDGRUVRWKHUSXEOLF0LQLVWHUVDQG
Consuls,  and  those  in  wKLFKD6WDWHVKDOOEH3DUW\´ PRGLILHGE\WKH(OHYHQWK
Amendment).  Congress  has  enacted  legislation  giving  the  District  Courts  concurrent  
jurisdiction  LQFDVHVGHDOLQJZLWK³$PEDVVDGRUVRWKHUSXEOLF0LQLVWHUVDQG
&RQVXOV´DVZHOODVLQFDVHVEHWZHHQWKHU.S.  government  and  one  or  more  state  
governments.  As  a  result,  the  Supreme  Court  has  exclusive  original  jurisdiction  only  
in  suits  between  state  governments,  often  involving  boundary  disputes.  These  cases,  
while  important  in  themselves,  represent  a  minute  SURSRUWLRQRIWKH&RXUW¶VFDVHORDG  
7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶Vappellate  jurisdiction  H[WHQGVWRDOOIHGHUDOFDVHV³ZLWK
VXFK([FHSWLRQVDQGXQGHUVXFK5HJXODWLRQVDVWKH&RQJUHVVVKDOOPDNH´ 86
Constitution,  Article  III,  Section  2).  Appellate  cases  coming  to  the  Supreme  Court  
from  the  lower  federal  courts  usually  come  from  the  thirteen  Courts  of  Appeals,  
although  they  may  come  from  the  U.S.  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Armed  Forces,  or,  
under  special  circumstances,  directly  from  the  District  Courts.  Appellate  cases  may  
also  come  from  the  state  courts  of  last  resort,  usually,  but  not  always,  designated  as  
state  supreme  courts.  
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Although  Congress  is  authorized  to  regulate  the  appellate  jurisdiction  of  the  
Supreme  Court,  it  has  rarely  used  this  power  to  curtail  the  CRXUW¶VDXWKRULW\5DWKHU
Congress  has  facilitated  the  institutional  development  of  the  Court  by  minimizing  its  
mandatory  appellate  jurisdiction  and  thus  giving  it  control  over  its  own  agenda.  
Likewise,  Congress  has  delegated  to  the  Court  the  authority  to  promulgate  rules  of  
procedure  for  itself  and  the  lower  federal  courts.  Consequently,  the  Supreme  Court  is  
nearly  autonomous  with  respect  to  the  determination  of  its  decision  making  process.  
  
TO  SUMMARIZE:  
Constitutional  law  evolves  through  a  process  of  judicial  interpretation  in  the  
context  of  particular  cases.  These  cases  may  arise  in  either  state  or  federal  courts.  
The  most  authoritative  judicial  interpretations  of  the  Constitution  are  those  
rendered  by  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court.  
Although  the  Supreme  Court  has  both  original  and  appellate  jurisdiction,  its  
DSSHOODWHMXULVGLFWLRQLVIDUPRUHLPSRUWDQWEHFDXVHWKH&RXUW¶VSULQFLSDOIXQFWLRQ
is  to  review  lower  federal  court  decisions  and  state  court  decisions  involving  
federal  questions.  Federal  law  authorizes  the  Court  to  grant  certiorari  to  review  all  
cases,  state  or  federal,  that  raise  substantial  federal  questions.  Because  certiorari  is  
JUDQWHGDWWKH&RXUW¶VGLVFUHWLRQWKH&RXUWKDVH[WHQVLYHFRQWURORYHULWVRZQ
DJHQGD7KLVIDFLOLWDWHVWKH&RXUW¶VUROHDVa  policy  making  body.  
  
CROSSING  THE  THRESHOLD:  ACCESS  TO  JUDICIAL  REVIEW  
Throughout  its  history  the  Supreme  Court  has  consistently  refused  to  render  advisory  
opinions.  This  policy  dates  from  an  early  circuit  court  opinion  in  which  two  members  
of  the  Supreme  Court  joined  a  federal  district  judge  in  refusing  to  advise  Congress  
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DQGWKH6HFUHWDU\RI:DURQVROGLHUV¶SHQVLRQDSSOLFDWLRQV VHH+D\EXUQ¶V&DVH[2  
U.S.  408  1792]).  In  1793  Chief  Justice  John  Jay,  expressing  the  view  of  the  Court,  
wrote  a  letter  to  President  George  Washington  declining  his  request  for  advice  
regarding  the  status  of  American  neutrality  in  the  war  between  France  and  England.  
  
The  Genesis  of  Constitutional  Law  Cases  
Consistent  with  its  refusal  to  render  advisory  opinions,  the  Supreme  CourW¶VGHFLVLRQV
are  limited  to  real  controversies  between  adverse  parties.  These  controversies  take  the  
form  of  cases.  The  court  case  is  the  basic  building  block  of  American  law.  Cases,  
including  those  presenting  constitutional  questions,  begin  in  one  of  two  ways:  as  civil  
suits  or  criminal  prosecutions.  
A  civil  suit  begins  when  one  party,  the  plaintiff,  files  suit  against  another  party,  
the  defendant.  Sometimes,  a  plaintiff  files  a  class  action  RQEHKDOIRIDOO³VLPLODUO\
VLWXDWHG´SHUVRQV,QVRPHFLYLOFDVes,  the  plaintiff  accuses  the  defendant  of  violating  
his  or  her  constitutional  rights.  Because  constitutional  rights  are  essentially  limitations  
on  the  actions  of  government,  the  respondent  in  such  a  civil  suit  is  generally  a  
governmental  official.  Suits  against  government  agencies  per  se  are  often,  but  not  
always,  barred  by  the  doctrine  of  sovereign  immunity.  Congress  and  every  state  
legislature  have  passed  laws  waiving  sovereign  immunity  with  regard  to  certain  types  
of  claims.  
Every  civil  suit  seeks  a  remedy  for  an  alleged  wrong.  The  remedy  may  be  
monetary  compensation  for  actual  damages  or  punitive  damages.  It  may  be  a  court  
order  requiring  specific  performance  from  or  barring  specified  action  by  the  
defendant.  It  may  be  a  simple  declaratory  judgment²a  statement  from  the  court  
declaring  the  rights  of  the  litigants.  Sometimes,  a  plaintiff  will  seek  an  injunction  
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against  a  defendant  to  cause  an  ongoing  injury  to  cease  or  to  prevent  an  injury  from  
occurring.  
In  a  civil  suit  alleging  the  violation  of  a  constitutional  right,  all  of  the  
aforementioned  remedies  are  available  to  the  plaintiff.  However,  because  many  
government  officials  (judges,  legislators,  governors,  and  so  forth)  are  immune  from  
suits  for  monetary  damages  stemming  from  their  official  decisions  or  actions,  suits  
against  government  officials  tend  to  seek  declaratory  judgments  and/or  injunctions.  A  
person  who  is  threatened  with  criminal  prosecution  under  an  unconstitutional  statute  
may  seek  an  injunction  against  enforcement  of  the  law  by  filing  a  civil  suit  against  the  
prosecutor.  Roe  v.  Wade,  the  landmark  abortion  decision,  began  when  Jane  Roe,  an  
unmarried  pregnant  woman,  brought  suit  against  Henry  Wade,  the  district  attorney  in  
Dallas,  Texas,  seeking  to  permanently  enjoin  Wade  from  enforcing  the  stDWH¶V
DERUWLRQODZDJDLQVWKHUDQGRWKHU³VLPLODUO\VLWXDWHG´ZRPHQ VHH&KDSWHU
Volume  II).  
In  certain  instances  individuals  whose  constitutional  rights  have  been  violated  
may  recover  monetary  damages.  The  Civil  Rights  Act  of  1866  (42  U.S.C.  §  1983)  
permits  courts  to  award  monetary  damages  to  plaintiffs  whose  constitutional  rights  are  
YLRODWHGE\SHUVRQVDFWLQJXQGHU³FRORURIODZ´$JRRGH[DPSOHRIWKLVW\SHRIDFWLRQ
is  seen  in  the  Rodney  King  case,  in  which  the  plaintiff  recovered  monetary  damages  
in  a  Section  1983  lawsuit  stemming  from  an  incident  of  police  brutality  in  Los  
Angeles  that  was  witnessed  on  TV  by  the  entire  nation.  
Criminal  prosecutions  often  raise  constitutional  issues.  As  noted  above,  one  who  
is  threatened  with  criminal  prosecution  under  an  unconstitutional  statute  can  seek  an  
injunction  to  bar  the  prosecutor  from  enforcing  the  law.  Once  a  prosecution  is  under  
way,  however,  the  usual  means  of  challenging  a  statute  is  by  filing  a  demurrer  to  an  
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indictment  or  through  the  appropriate  pretrial  motion.  If  one  is  convicted  under  an  
arguably  unconstitutional  statute,  the  appropriate  remedy  is,  of  course,  an  appeal  to  a  
higher  court.  Many  criminal  convictions  are  challenged  in  this  way.  As  an  illustration,  
consider  the  case  of  Texas  v.  Johnson    WKHODQGPDUN³IODJEXUQLQJ´FDVH
Gregory  Johnson  was  convicted  of  violating  the  Texas  law  making  it  a  crime  to  
desecrate  the  American  flag.  He  appealed  his  conviction  to  the  Texas  Court  of  
Criminal  Appeals,  the  state  court  of  last  resort  in  criminal  cases,  arguing  that  the  
conviction  violated  his  constitutional  rights.  The  Court  of  Criminal  Appeals  agreed,  
saying  the  state  flag  desecration  law  was  unconstitutional.  The  state  of  Texas  obtained  
review  in  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  on  a  writ  of  certiorari,  but  to  no  avail.  The  Supreme  
Court,  in  a  highly  publicized  and  controversial  decision,  agreed  with  the  Texas  Court  
of  Criminal  Appeals:  It  was  held  unconstitutional  to  punish  someone  for  the  act  of  
burning  the  American  flag  as  a  form  of  political  protest  (see  Chapter  3,  Volume  II).  
Very  often  constitutional  issues  arise  in  criminal  cases  owing  to  the  actions  of  the  
police  or  the  prosecutor,  or  decisions  made  by  the  trial  judge  on  the  admission  of  
evidence  or  various  trial  procedures.  The  federal  Constitution  provides  a  host  of  
protections  to  persons  accused  of  crimes,  including  freedom  from  unreasonable  
searches  and  seizures,  compulsory  self-incrimination,  double  jeopardy,  and  cruel  and  
unusual  punishments  (see  Chapter  5,  Volume  II).  Frequently,  these  protections  are  
invoked  by  persons  challenging  their  convictions  on  appeal.  While  the  overwhelming  
majority  of  these  appeals  are  resolved  by  intermediate  appellate  courts  or  state  courts  
of  last  resort,  a  small  number  of  such  cases  are  heard  each  term  by  the  U.S.  Supreme  
&RXUW6RPHRIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VPRVWIDPRXVGHFLVLRQVHJMapp  v.  Ohio  
(1961),  Miranda  v.  Arizona  (1966),  Roper  v.  Simmons  (2005),  and  Kennedy  v.  
Louisiana  (2008)  have  involved  the  rights  of  persons  accused  of  crimes.  (These  cases  
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are  discussed  and  excerpted  in  Chapter  5,  Volume  II.)  
  
Habeas  Corpus    The  Constitution  explicitly  recognizes  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  
an  ancient  common  law  device  that  persons  can  use  to  challenge  the  legality  of  arrest  
or  imprisonment.  One  who  believes  that  he  or  she  is  being  illegally  detained,  even  if  
that  person  is  in  prison  after  being  duly  convicted  and  exhausting  the  ordinary  appeals  
process,  may  seek  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  in  the  appropriate  court.  In  2002,  relatives  
of  foreign  nationals  apprehended  purVXDQWWRWKH³ZDURQWHUURULVP´DQGLQFDUFHUDWHG
at  the  American  naval  base  at  Guantanamo  Bay,  Cuba  sought  habeas  corpus  relief  in  
the  federal  courts.  Despite  lower  court  decisions  holding  that  federal  courts  did  not  
have  jurisdiction,  the  Supreme  Court  heOGWKDW³>D@OLHQVKHOGDWWKHEDVHQROHVVWKDQ
$PHULFDQFLWL]HQVDUHHQWLWOHGWRLQYRNHWKHIHGHUDOFRXUWV¶DXWKRULW\´7KLV
controversial  decision  opened  the  door  to  judicial  review  of  the  confinement  of  
hundreds  of  alleged  enemy  combatants  being  held  in  indefinite  detention  by  the  
military  pursuant  to  an  order  of  the  President  (see  Rasul  v.  Bush  [2004]).  This  case  
will  not  be  excerpted  in  the  5th  edition.    
The  federal  habeas  corpus  statute  affords  opportunities  to  persons  convicted  of  
crimes  to  obtain  review  of  their  convictions  in  federal  courts,  even  if  they  received  
DSSHOODWHUHYLHZLQWKHVWDWHFRXUWV6RPHRIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VPRVWLPSRUWDQW
decisions  in  the  area  of  criminal  procedure,  for  example,  Gideon  v.  Wainwright  
(1963),  have  come  in  federal  habeas  corpus  cases  filed  by  state  prisoners.  A  
proliferation  of  such  cases  beginning  in  the  1960s  led  critics  to  call  for  the  curtailment  
or  outright  abolition  of  federal  habeas  corpus  review  of  state  criminal  cases.  Although  
it  has  not  been  abolished,  federal  habeas  corpus  review  has  been  restricted  in  recent  
years,  both  through  congressional  and  judicial  action  (see  Chapter  5,  Volume  II).  
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Standing  
After  determining  that  a  real  case  or  controversy  exists,  a  federal  court  must  ascertain  
whether  the  plaintiff  or  petitioner  has  standing.  This  is  simply  a  determination  of  
whether  these  parties  are  the  appropriate  ones  to  litigate  the  legal  questions  presented  
by  the  lawsuit.  The  Supreme  Court  has  developed  an  elaborate  body  of  principles  
defining  the  nature  and  contours  of  standing.  Essentially,  to  have  standing  a  party  
must  have  a  personal  stake  in  the  case.  Thus,  a  plaintiff  must  have  suffered  some  
direct  and  substantial  injury,  or  be  likely  to  suffer  such  an  injury  if  a  particular  legal  
wrong  is  not  redressed.  A  defendant  must  be  the  party  responsible  for  perpetrating  the  
alleged  legal  wrong.  
In  most  situations  a  taxpayer  does  not  have  standing  to  challenge  policies  or  
programs  that  he  or  she  is  forced  to  support.  In  Frothingham  v.  Mellon  (1923),  the  
SuprePH&RXUWKHOGWKDWRQHZKRLQYRNHVIHGHUDOMXGLFLDOSRZHU³PXVWEHDEOHWR
show  that  he  has  sustained  or  is  immediately  in  danger  of  sustaining  some  direct  
LQMXU\DVWKHUHVXOWRIWKHVWDWXWH¶VHQIRUFHPHQWDQGQRWPHUHO\WKDWKHVXIIHUVLQVRPH
indefinite  ZD\FRPPRQZLWKSHRSOHJHQHUDOO\´  (Refer  here  to  Flast  v.  Cohen  and  
recent  Roberts  Court  decisions  on  standing.)    
  
In  Raines  v.  Byrd  (1997),  the  Supreme  Court  denied  standing  to  six  members  of  
Congress  who  sought  to  challenge  the  constitutionality  of  an  act  of  Congress  
providing  the  president  with  line-item  veto  authority.  Each  of  the  plaintiffs  had  voted  
against  the  act,  but  the  Court  concluded  that  because  the  president  had  not  yet  
exercised  his  line-item  veto  power,  they  could  not  show  that  they  had  been  injured  by  
the  measure.  By  the  end  of  1997,  President  Bill  Clinton  had  exercised  the  line-item  
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veto  a  number  of  times,  and  several  of  these  instances  provoked  affected  parties  to  file  
suit.  In  Clinton  v.  City  of  New  York  (1998),  the  Court  reached  the  merits  of  the  dispute  
and  declared  the  line-item  veto  law  unconstitutional  (see  Chapter  3).  
Another  H[DPSOHRIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VFRPSOH[VWDQGLQJMXULVSUXGHQFHDURVH
RXWRI0LFKDHO1HZGRZ¶VKLJKO\SXEOLFL]HG)LUVW$PHQGPHQWFKDOOHQJHRIDORFDO
school  boaUG¶VUHTXLUHPHQWWKDWWKH3OHGJHRI$OOHJLDQFHZLWKLWVUHIHUHQFHWR³RQH
QDWLRQXQGHU*RG´EHFRQGXFWHGDWWKHEHJLQQLQJRIHDFKVFKRROGD\1HZGRZZDV
the  noncustodial  parent  of  a  child  who  attended  one  of  the  schools  covered  by  this  
policy.  Sandra  BanQLQJWKHFKLOG¶VPRWKHULQWHUYHQHGLQWKHODZVXLWFRQWHQGLQJWKDW
DVKHUGDXJKWHU¶VVROHOHJDOFXVWRGLDQVKHIHOW³WKDWLWZDVQRWLQWKHFKLOG¶VLQWHUHVWWR
EHDSDUW\WR1HZGRZ¶VODZVXLW´,QDGHFLVLRQWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWLQDQRSLQLRQ
by  Justice  John  Paul  Stevens,  denied  standing  to  Mr.  Newdow,  concluding  that  it  
ZRXOGEH³LPSURSHUIRUWKHIHGHUDOFRXUWVWRHQWHUWDLQDFODLPE\DSODLQWLIIZKRVH
standing  to  sue  is  founded  on  family  law  rights  that  are  in  dispute  when  the  
prosecution  of  the  lawsuit  may  have  an  adverse  effect  on  the  person  who  is  the  source  
RIWKHSODLQWLII¶VFODLPHGVWDQGLQJ´  
The  issue  of  standing  is  far  more  than  a  mere  technical  aspect  of  the  judicial  
process.  The  doctrine  of  standing  determines  who  may  challenge  government  policies  
and,  to  some  extent,  what  types  of  policies  may  be  challenged.  Arguments  over  
standing  reflect  different  conceptions  of  the  role  of  the  federal  courts  in  the  political  
system.  
Dissenting  in  Warth  v.  Seldin  (1975),  Justice  William  O.  Douglas  observed  that  
³VWDQGLQJKDVEHFRPHDEDUULHUWRDFFHVVWRWKHIHGHUDOFRXUWV´'RXJODVLQVLVWHGWKDW
³WKH$PHULFDQGUHDPWHDFKHVWKDWLIRQHUHDFKHVKLJKHQRXJKDQGSHUVLVWVWKHUHLVD
IRUXPZKHUHMXVWLFHLVGLVSHQVHG´+HFRQFOXGHGWKDWWKH³WHFKQLFDOEDUULHUV´Vhould  
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EHORZHUHGVRWKDWWKHFRXUWVFRXOG³VHUYHWKDWDQFLHQWQHHG´$VKDUSO\FRQWUDVWLQJ
position  is  offered  by  Justice  Lewis  Powell,  concurring  in  United  States  v.  Richardson  
(1975):  
Relaxation  of  standing  requirements  is  directly  related  to  the  expansion  of  judicial  
power.  It  seems  to  me  that  allowing  unrestricted«  standing  would  significantly  
alter  the  allocation  of  power  at  the  national  level,  with  a  shift  away  from  a  
democratic  form  of  government.  
  
Mootness  
A  case  is  moot  if  the  issues  that  gave  rise  to  it  have  been  resolved  or  have  otherwise  
disappeared.  Such  a  case  is  apt  to  be  dismissed  because  a  court  decision  would  have  
no  practical  effect.  An  excellent  example  of  a  constitutional  case  being  dismissed  for  
mootness  is  School  District  241  v.  Harris  (1995).  In  1991,  a  group  of  students  and  
parents,  backed  by  the  American  Civil  Liberties  Union,  filed  suit  to  challenge  two  
prayers  and  a  hymn  that  were  part  of  a  graduation  ceremony  at  an  Idaho  public  high  
school.  
The  federal  district  court  in  Idaho  rejected  the  challenge,  but  the  Ninth  Circuit  
Court  of  Appeals  declared  the  practice  unconstitutional  under  the  Establishment  
Clause  of  the  First  Amendment.  The  Supreme  Court  remanded  the  case,  instructing  
the  Court  of  Appeals  to  dismiss  it  as  moot  because  the  students  who  filed  the  suit  had  
graduated.  This  illustrates  how  the  Court  can  use  the  mootness  doctrine  to  avoid  
consideration  of  a  controversial  constitutional  question.  
If  the  federal  courts  strictly  adhered  to  the  mootness  rule,  certain  inherently  time  
ERXQGTXHVWLRQVZRXOGQHYHUEHDGGUHVVHG6XFKLVVXHVDUHLQWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V
ZRUGV³FDSDEOHRIUHSHWLWLRQ\HWHYDGLQJUHYLHZ´Roe  v.  Wade  (1973),  the  landmark  
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abortion  case,  provides  a  good  illustration.  The  gestation  period  of  the  human  fetus  is  
nine  months;;  the  gestation  period  for  constitutional  litigation  tends  to  be  much  longer!  
Thus,  by  the  time  the  Roe  case  reached  the  Supreme  Court,  Jane  Roe  had  given  birth  
WRKHUFKLOG([SODLQLQJWKH&RXUW¶VUHIXVDOWRGLVPLVVWKHFDVHDVPRRW-XVWLFH+Drry  
5%ODFNPXQ¶VPDMRULW\RSLQLRQVWDWHG  
The  usual  rule«  is  that  an  actual  controversy  must  exist  at  stages  of  appellate  or  
certiorari  review,  and  not  simply  at  the  date  the  action  is  initiated.  But  when,  as  
here,  pregnancy  is  a  significant  fact  in  the  litigation,  the  normal  266-day  human  
gestation  period  is  so  short  that  the  pregnancy  will  come  to  term  before  the  usual  
appellate  process  is  complete.  If  that  termination  makes  a  case  moot,  pregnancy  
litigation  will  seldom  survive  much  beyond  the  trial  stage,  and  appellate  review  
will  be  effectively  denied.  Our  law  should  not  be  that  rigid.  Pregnancy  often  
comes  more  than  once  to  the  same  woman,  and  in  the  general  population,  if  man  
is  to  survive,  it  will  always  be  with  us.  Pregnancy  provides  a  classic  justification  
for  a  conclusion  of  nonmootness.  
  
In  Roe,  the  Court  chose  to  relax  the  mootness  rule  to  address  an  important  issue.  
Had  the  Court  been  disinclined  to  deal  with  the  divisive  abortion  question,  however,  
the  mootness  doctrine  would  have  provided  a  coQYHQLHQW³RXW´  
  
Ripeness  
A  case  that  comes  to  court  too  late,  like  School  District  241  v.  Harris,  may  be  
GLVPLVVHGDVPRRWRQHWKDWFRPHVWRFRXUWWRRVRRQPD\EHGLVPLVVHGDV³QRWULSHIRU
UHYLHZ´7KHSXUSRVHRIWKHripeness  doctrine  is  to  prevent  the  courts  from  getting  
prematurely  involved  in  issues  that  may  ultimately  be  resolved  through  other  means.  
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Like  the  doctrines  of  standing  and  mootness,  the  ripeness  doctrine  is  not  merely  a  
means  of  conserving  judicial  power,  but  can  be  used  flexibly  as  part  of  the  judicial  
agenda-setting  process.  
A  classic  example  of  the  use  of  the  ripeness  doctrine  to  avoid  an  important  
constitutional  issue  occurred  in  Poe  v.  Ullman  (1961).  In  this  case,  the  Supreme  Court  
dismissed  a  challenge  to  a  nineteenth  century  Connecticut  law  that  prohibited  
practicing  birth  control  through  artificial  means.  The  Court  said  that  since  the  law  had  
not  yet  been  enforced  against  the  plaintiffs,  the  case  was  not  ripe  for  judicial  review.  
Eventually,  the  Court  reviewed  and  struck  down  the  Connecticut  statute,  but  only  
after  an  individual  was  convicted  and  fined  for  violating  the  law  (see  Griswold  v.  
Connecticut  [1965],  discussed  and  reprinted  in  Chapter  6,  Volume  II).  
  
Exhaustion  of  Remedies  
A  close  cousin  of  the  ripeness  doctrine  is  the  exhaustion  of  remedies  requirement.  
For  a  case  to  be  ripe  for  judicial  consideration,  the  parties  must  first  have  exhausted  
all  nonjudicial  remedies.  This  doctrine  applies  primarily  to  cases  that  involve  
decisions  by  administrative  or  regulatory  agencies.  Thus,  for  example,  a  corporation  
that  has  been  denied  a  broadcasting  license  by  the  Federal  Communications  
Commission  must  first  exhaust  all  means  of  appeal  within  the  FCC  before  taking  the  
case  to  federal  court.  The  exhaustion  of  remedies  doctrine  is  designed  to  avoid  
XQQHFHVVDU\OLWLJDWLRQDQGDOORZVWKHFRXUWVWRGHIHUWRDJHQF\³H[SHUWV´LQWKH
resolution  of  what  can  be  complex  and  technical  issues.  
In  Natural  Gas  Pipeline  Company  v.  Slattery  (1937),  the  Supreme  Court  said  that  
the  exhaustion  requirement  haG³HVSHFLDOIRUFH´ZKHQWKHFDVHLQYROYHGDVWDWHDV
GLVWLQFWIURPDIHGHUDODJHQF\,QVXFKFDVHVWKH&RXUW¶VFXVWRPDU\GHIHUHQFHWRWKH
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executive  branch  is  compounded  with  its  traditional  deference  to  state  governments.  
Judicial  intervention  into  state  or  federal  agency  decision  making  may  be  justified,  
KRZHYHULQRUGHUWRSUHYHQW³LUUHSDUDEOHLQMXU\´IURPEHLQJLQIOLFWHGRQDFLWL]HQRU
company  (see  Oklahoma  Natural  Gas  Company  v.  Russell  [1923]).  
  
The  Doctrine  of  Abstention  
Closely  akin  to  exhaustion  of  remedies  is  the  doctrine  of  abstention.  Whereas  the  
principal  application  of  the  exhaustion  of  remedies  doctrine  is  to  bureaucratic  decision  
making,  the  primary  application  of  abstention  is  to  the  state  court  systems.  
Essentially,  the  abstention  doctrine  prohibits  the  federal  courts  from  intervening  in  
state  court  proceedings  until  they  have  been  finalized.  Thus  a  person  convicted  of  a  
crime  in  a  state  court  normally  must  exhaust  all  means  of  appeal  in  the  state  judiciary  
before  petitioning  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  for  a  writ  of  certiorari  or  a  federal  district  
court  for  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus.  
Under  the  doctrine  of  abstention,  federal  judges  normally  abstain  from  issuing  
injunctions  to  prevent  persons  from  being  prosecuted  under  unconstitutional  state  
statutes.  For  example,  in  Younger  v.  Harris  (1971),  the  Supreme  Court  said  it  was  
improper  for  a  federal  court  to  enjoin  a  state  prosecutor  from  trying  a  man  under  a  
state  law  virtually  identical  to  one  that  had  recently  been  declared  unconstitutional.  
WritiQJIRUWKH&RXUW-XVWLFH+XJR%ODFNVWUHVVHGWKHQRWLRQRI³FRPLW\´ZKLFK
entails  mutual  respect  between  the  state  and  federal  governments.  
  
The  Political  Questions  Doctrine  
Even  though  a  case  may  meet  the  formal  prerequisites  of  jurisdiction,  standing,  
ripeness,  and  exhaustion  of  remedies,  the  federal  courts  may  still  refuse  to  consider  
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the  merits  of  the  dispute.  Under  the  political  questions  doctrine,  cases  may  be  
dismissed  as  nonjusticiable  if  the  issues  they  present  are  regarded  as  extremely  
³SROLWLFDO´DQGWKXVLQDSSURSULDWHIRUMXGLFLDOUHVROXWLRQ2IFRXUVHLQDEURDGVHQVH
all  constitutional  cases  that  make  their  way  into  the  federal  courts  are  political  in  
nature.  The  political  questions  doctrine  really  refers  to  those  issues  that  are  likely  to  
draw  the  courts  into  a  political  battle  with  the  executive  or  legislative  branch,  or  that  
are  simply  more  amenable  to  executive  or  legislative  decision  making.  
A  classic  discussion  and  application  of  the  political  questions  doctrine  appears  in  
Luther  v.  Borden  (1849).  In  this  case,  the  Supreme  Court  refused  to  take  sides  in  a  
dispute  between  two  rival  governments  in  Rhode  Island,  one  based  on  a  popular  
referendum,  the  other  based  on  an  old  royal  charter.  Writing  for  the  Court,  Chief  
Justice  Roger  B.  Taney  oEVHUYHGWKDWWKHDUJXPHQWLQWKHFDVH³WXUQHGRQSROLWLFDO
ULJKWVDQGSROLWLFDOTXHVWLRQV´1RWLQVLJQLILFDQWO\3UHVLGHQW-RKQ7\OHUKDGDJUHHGWR
send  in  troops  to  support  the  charter  government  before  the  case  ever  went  to  the  
Supreme  Court.  
The  best-established  application  of  the  political  questions  doctrine  is  the  federal  
FRXUWV¶XQZLOOLQJQHVVWRHQWHUWKHILHOGVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQVPLOLWDU\DIIDLUVDQG
foreign  policy  making.  This  was  demonstrated  in  Massachusetts  v.  Laird  (1970),  in  
which  the  Supreme  Court  dismissed  a  suit  challenging  the  constitutionality  of  the  
Vietnam  War.  This  position  was  reaffirmed  in  Goldwater  v.  Carter  (1979),  in  which  
the  Court  refused  to  entertain  a  lawsuit  brought  by  a  U.S.  senator  challenging  
3UHVLGHQW&DUWHU¶VXQLlateral  termination  of  a  defense  treaty  with  Taiwan.    The  Court,  
however,  did  not  regard  the  political  questions  doctrine  as  a  basis  for  limiting  its  
UHYLHZRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOTXHVWLRQVDULVLQJIURP3UHVLGHQW*HRUJH:%XVK¶V
FRQILQHPHQWRI³HQHP\FRPEDWDQWV´DW*XDQWDQDPR%D\&XED    
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For  many  years,  the  federal  courts  used  the  political  questions  doctrine  to  stay  out  
of  controversies  involving  the  apportionment  of  legislative  districts.  In  Colegrove  v.  
Green  (1946),  Justice  Felix  Frankfurter  warned  of  the  dangers  of  entering  the  
³SROLWLFDOWKLFNHW´RIUHDSSRUWLRQPHQW%XWLQBaker  v.  Carr  (1962),  the  Supreme  
Court,  in  a  lengthy  opinion  by  Justice  William  Brennan,  held  that  legislative  
malapportionment  (that  is,  gross  disparities  in  population  among  districts)  was  a  
justiciable  question  in  federal  court.  This  decision  signaled  a  veritable  revolution,  in  
which  federal  courts  directed  the  reapportionment  of  legislative  districts  at  all  levels  
of  government,  from  the  U.S.  House  of  Representatives  to  local  school  boards,  on  the  
EDVLVRI³RQHSHUVRQRQHYRWH´,QNixon  v.  United  States  (1993)  the  Justices  voted  9  
WRWRGLVPLVVDVXLWFKDOOHQJLQJWKH6HQDWH¶V  current  method  for  holding  
impeachment  trials.  Under  this  shortcut  procedure,  a  committee  of  twelve  senators  
hears  testimony,  reviews  the  evidence,  and  prepares  a  summary  report  to  the  full  
6HQDWH$IWHUKHDULQJRUDODUJXPHQWVIURPWKHDFFXVHGDQGWKH³LPSHDFKPHQW
PDQDJHUV´IURPWKH+RXVHRI5HSUHVHQWDWLYHVWKHIXOO6HQDWHYRWHVRQZKHWKHUWKH
accused  should  be  removed  from  office.  Former  federal  district  judge  Walter  L.  
Nixon,  who  had  been  removed  from  office  after  being  impeached,  argued  that  the  
shortcut  procedure  violated  Article  I,  Section  3,  clause  6,  which  provides  that  the  
³6HQDWHVKDOOKDYHWKHVROH3RZHUWRWU\DOO,PSHDFKPHQWV´7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW
IRXQGWKH6HQDWH¶VFKRLFHRIWKHPHDQVIRUIXOILOOLQJLWVREOLJDWLRQXQGHUWKH
Impeachment  Trial  Clause  to  be  a  nonjusticiable  political  question.  
  
TO  SUMMARIZE:  
Federal  courts  are  not  in  the  business  of  rendering  advisory  opinions  on  the  
meaning  of  the  Constitution.  Rather,  their  decisions  are  limited  to  real  
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controversies  between  adverse  parties.  
The  Supreme  Court  has  articulated  several  doctrines  that  limit  access  to  judicial  
review.  Chief  among  them  are  standing,  ripeness,  mootness,  exhaustion  of  
remedies,  abstention,  and  the  political  questions  doctrine.  
  
7+(6835(0(&2857¶6DECISION  MAKING  PROCESS  
7KHH[FODPDWLRQ³,¶OOILJKWLWDOOWKHZD\WRWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWLI,KDYHWR´LVDVWRFN
phrase  in  American  SROLWLFDOUKHWRULF<HWLWLVH[WUHPHO\GLIILFXOWWRJHWRQH¶VFDVH
before  the  High  Court.  The  Supreme  Court  uses  its  limited  resources  to  address  the  
most  important  questions  in  American  law.  The  rectification  of  injustices  in  individual  
cases  is  usually  accorded  much  lower  priority.  
  
Case  Selection  
There  are  three  mechanisms  by  which  the  Supreme  Court  reviews  lower  court  
decisions.  By  far  the  rarest  is  certification,  in  which  a  federal  appeals  court  formally  
DVNVWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWWRFHUWLI\RU³PDNHFHUWDLQ´DSRLQWRIODZ7KHVHFRQGLVRQ
appeal  by  right  in  which,  at  least  theoretically,  the  Court  must  rule  on  the  merits  of  the  
appeal.  As  noted  earlier,  however,  Congress  has  restricted  such  appeals  to  a  few  
narrow  categories  of  cases.  By  far  the  most  common  means  by  which  the  Court  grants  
review  is  through  the  writ  of  certiorari.  
One  who  loses  an  appeal  in  a  state  court  of  last  resort  or  a  federal  court  of  appeals  
may  file  a  petition  for  certiorari  in  the  Supreme  Court.  The  filing  fee  is  currently  
$300,  which  may  be  waived  for  indigent  litigants  on  the  filing  of  a  motion  to  proceed  
in  forma  pauperis.  About  two-thirds  of  the  cert  petitions  the  Supreme  Court  receives  
are  filed  in  forma  pauperis;;  most  of  these  come  from  prisoners  seeking  further  review  
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of  their  convictions  or  sentences.  
The  chances  of  the  Supreme  Court  granting  review  in  a  given  case  are  very  slim.  
The  odds  are  somewhat  improved  if  the  case  originated  in  a  federal  court.  The  odds  
are  much  better  still  if  the  petitioner  is  the  federal  government,  the  most  frequent  
litigator  in  the  federal  courts.  Of  the  approximately  10,000  petitions  for  certiorari  
coming  to  it  each  year,  the  Court  will  normally  grant  review  in  only  about  a  hundred,  
and  even  some  of  these  cases  will  be  dismissed  later  without  a  decision  on  the  merits.  
Others  will  be  disposed  of  through  brief  memorandum  decisions,  in  which  the  Court  
does  not  provide  its  reasoning  through  the  issuance  of  opinions.  Over  the  last  decade  
the  Supreme  Court  has  averaged  about  85  full  opinion  decisions  annually,  in  contrast  
to  a  yearly  average  of  about  150  in  the  early  1980s.  In  the  October  2008  term,  ending  
on  June  29,  2009,  the  Court  handed  down  83  such  decisions.  
7KHSURFHVVRIFDVHVHOHFWLRQDFWXDOO\EHJLQVZLWKWKHMXVWLFHV¶law  clerks  (staff  
attorneys)  reading  the  numerous  petitions  for  certiorari  and  preparing  summary  
memoranda.  With  the  assistance  of  clerks,  the  chief  justice,  who  bears  primary  
responsibility  for  Court  administration,  prepares  a  discuss  list  of  cases  to  be  
considered  for  certiorari.  The  associate  justices  may  add  cases  to  the  list.  Unless  at  
least  one  justice  indicates  that  a  petition  should  be  discussed,  review  is  automatically  
denied,  which  disposes  of  more  than  70  percent  of  the  petitions  for  certiorari.  
The  Court  considers  petitions  on  the  discuss  list  in  private  conferences.  A  
conference,  usually  lasting  the  better  part  of  a  week,  is  held  immediately  before  the  
FRPPHQFHPHQWRIWKH&RXUW¶VWHUPLQ2FWREHU7KLVpreterm  conference  is  devoted  
entirely  to  consideration  of  cert  petitions.  Regular  conferences  are  held  throughout  the  
term,  both  for  the  purpose  of  reviewing  cert  petitions  and  for  discussing  and  deciding  
the  cases  in  which  the  Court  has  granted  review.  
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At  least  four  justices  must  vote  to  grant  certiorari  in  order  for  the  Court  to  accept  a  
case  from  the  discuss  list.  The  rule  of  four  permits  a  minority  of  justices  to  set  the  
&RXUW¶VDJHQGD7KHUHLVHYLGHQFHWKDWWKLVKDSSHQVIDLUO\URXWLQHO\,QVXFK
situations,  it  would  be  possible  for  the  five  justices  who  voted  against  cert  to  vote  
subsequently  to  dismiss  the  case  without  reaching  the  merits.  Yet  institutional  norms  
militate  against  this  strategy,  suggesting  the  collegiality  of  the  Court  as  a  decision  
making  body.  
Nearly  99  percent  of  the  petitions  for  certiorari  coming  to  the  Supreme  Court  are  
denied.  A  denial  of  certiorari,  just  like  the  dismissal  of  an  appeal,  has  the  effect  of  
sustaining  the  lower  court  decision  under  challenge.  An  important  distinction  is  made,  
however,  between  denials  of  certiorari  and  dismissals  of  appeal.  According  to  the  
6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQHopfman  v.  Connolly  (1985),  a  denial  of  cert  carries  no  
weight  as  precedentZKHUHDVGLVPLVVDORIDQDSSHDO³IRUZDQWRIDVXEVWDQWLDOIHGHUDO
TXHVWLRQ´KDVELQGLQJSUHFHGHQWLDOHIIHFWRQORZHUFRXUWV.  The  fact  that  the  Court  has  
decided  not  to  review  a  lower  court  decision  does  not  mean  that  the  Court  necessarily  
approves  of  the  way  it  was  decided.  There  is  nothing  to  prevent  the  Court  from  
reaching  the  same  issue  in  a  future  case  and  deciding  it  differently.  Denial  of  
certiorari  thus  may  be  as  much  a  function  of  scarce  judicial  resources  as  it  is  an  
expression  of  approval  of  the  lower  court  decision.  Because  it  entails  the  authoritative  
DOORFDWLRQRIYDOXHVE\JRYHUQPHQWWKH&RXUW¶VFDVHVHOHFWLRQSUocess  must  be  
viewed  as  inescapably  political.  
  
Summary  Decisions  
As  noted  previously,  not  all  cases  accepted  by  the  Supreme  Court  are  afforded  
plenary  review,  RU³IXOO-GUHVVWUHDWPHQW´6RPHFDVHVDUHGHFLGHGVXPPDULO\²that  
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is,  quickly,  without  the  benefit  of  full  argumentation  before  the  Court.  These  
decisions  are  rendered  in  the  form  of  a  memorandum  or  per  curiam  (unsigned)  
opinion,  usually  with  little  discussion  or  justification.  Although  memorandum  
decisions  are  fully  binding  on  the  parties  to  the  case,  they  are  accorded  little  
individual  significance  as  precedents.  The  major  function  of  summary  decisions  is  
error  correction;;  they  have  little  impact  on  constitutional  lawmaking.  
  
Submission  of  Briefs  
In  cases  slated  for  plenary  review,  lawyers  for  both  parties  (the  petitioner  and  the  
respondent  or  the  appellant  and  the  appellee)  are  requested  to  submit  briefs.  Briefs  are  
ZULWWHQGRFXPHQWVFRQWDLQLQJOHJDODUJXPHQWVLQVXSSRUWRIDSDUW\¶VSRVLWLRQ%\
&RXUWUXOHWKHSDUWLHV¶EULHIVDUHOLPLWHGWRILIW\Sages.  In  addition  to  the  briefs  
submitted  by  the  parties  to  the  litigation,  the  Court  may  permit  outside  parties  to  file  
amicus  curiae   ³IULHQGRIWKHFRXUW´ EULHIVAmicus  briefs  are  often  filed  on  behalf  of  
organized  groups  that  have  an  interest  in  the  outcome  of  a  case.  Examples  of  interest  
groups  that  routinely  file  amicus  briefs  in  the  Supreme  Court  include  the  American  
Civil  Liberties  Union  (ACLU),  the  National  Association  for  the  Advancement  of  
Colored  People  (NAACP),  and  Americans  United  for  Separation  of  Church  and  State.  
  
Oral  Argument  and  Conference  
After  the  briefs  of  parties  and  amici  have  been  submitted,  the  case  is  scheduled  for  
oral  argument  a  public  hearing  where  lawyers  for  both  sides  appear  before  the  Court  
to  make  verbal  presentations  and,  more  importantly,  answer  questions  from  the  bench.  
The  oral  argument  is  the  only  occasion  on  which  lawyers  in  a  case  have  any  direct  
contact  with  the  justices.  
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Oral  arguments  are  normally  held  on  Mondays,  Tuesdays,  and  Wednesdays  
beginning  on  the  first  Monday  in  October  and  ending  in  late  April.  Oral  argument  on  
a  given  case  is  usually  limited  to  one  hour.  Four  cases  will  be  argued  before  the  Court  
RQDQ\JLYHQRUDODUJXPHQWGD\³&RXUWZDWFKHUV´ LQFOXGLQJUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRI
interest  groups,  the  media,  and  academia)  often  attend  oral  arguments  hoping  to  learn  
VRPHWKLQJDERXWWKH&RXUW¶VSUHGLVSRVLWLRQZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHFDVHXQGHU
consideration  or  something  about  the  general  proclivities  of  the  justices,  especially  the  
most  recent  appointees.  
Within  days  after  a  case  is  orally  argued,  it  is  discussed  in  private  conference  
among  the  justices.  Conferences  are  usually  held  on  Wednesdays,  Thursdays,  and  
Fridays.  At  conference,  the  chief  justice  opens  the  discussion  by  reviewing  the  
essential  facts  of  the  case  at  hand,  summarizing  the  history  of  the  case  in  the  lower  
courts,  and  stating  his  view  as  to  the  correct  decision.  This  provides  the  chief  with  a  
chance  to  influence  his  colleagues,  an  opportunity  that  only  a  few  occupants  of  the  
office  have  been  able  to  exploit.  It  is  well  known,  however,  that  Chief  Justice  Charles  
Evans  Hughes  was  on  occasion  able  to  overwhelm  other  members  of  the  Court  by  a  
photographic  memory  that  gave  him  command  of  legal  and  factual  details.  
After  the  chief  justice  has  presented  the  case,  associate  justices,  speaking  in  order  
RIVHQLRULW\SUHVHQWWKHLUYLHZVRIWKHFDVHDQGLQGLFDWHWKHLU³YRWHV´DVWRWKHSURSHU
judgment.  This  original  vote  on  the  merits  is  not  binding,  however,  and  justices  have  
been  known  to  change  their  votes  prior  to  the  announcement  of  the  decision.  The  final  
vote  is  not  recorded  until  the  decision  is  formally  announced.  
  
Judgment  and  Opinion  Assignment  
In  deciding  a  case  that  has  been  fully  argued,  the  Court  has  several  options.  First,  the  
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Court  may  decide  that  it  should  not  have  granted  review  in  the  first  place,  whereupon  
WKHSHWLWLRQLVGLVPLVVHGDVKDYLQJEHHQ³LPSURYLGHQWO\JUDQWHG´7KLVRFFXUV
infrequently.  Alternatively,  the  Court  may  instruct  the  parties  to  reargue  the  case,  
focusing  on  somewhat  different  issues.  The  case  is  then  likely  to  be  carried  over  to  the  
&RXUW¶VQH[WWHUPDQGQRWGHFLGHGZLWKILQDOLW\XQWLOPRUHWKDQD\HDUDIWHUWKH
original  argument.  This  is  precisely  what  happened  in  two  of  the  most  significant  
cases  of  the  twentieth  century:  Brown  v.  Board  of  Education  (1954),  the  school  
desegregation  case,  and  Roe  v.  Wade  (1973),  the  abortion  case.  It  is  interesting  to  note  
that  in  the  Brown  case,  the  Court  not  only  called  for  reargument  of  the  issues,  but,  
under  the  leadership  of  the  newly  appointed  Chief  Justice  Earl  Warren,  delayed  its  
decision  until  unanimity  could  be  achieved.  
If  the  Court  decides  to  render  judgment,  it  will  affirm  (uphold),  reverse  
(overturn),  or  vacate  (cancel  or  nullify)  the  decision  of  the  lower  court.  Alternatively,  
LWPD\PRGLI\WKHORZHUFRXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQVRPHUHVSHFW5HYHUVDORUPRGLILFDWLRQRI
a  lower  court  decision  requires  a  majority  vote,  a  quorum  being  six  justices.  A  tie  vote  
(in  cases  where  one  or  more  justices  do  not  participate)  always  results  in  the  
affirmance  of  the  decision  under  review.  
Once  a  judgment  has  been  reached,  it  remains  for  the  decision  to  be  explained  and  
justified  in  one  or  more  written  opinions.  In  the  early  days  of  the  Court,  opinions  were  
issued  seriatim²that  is,  each  justice  would  produce  an  opinion  reflecting  his  views  of  
the  case.  John  Marshall,  who  became  chief  justice  in  1801,  is  generally  credited  with  
instituting  the  practice  of  issuing  an  Opinion  of  the  Court,  which  reflects  the  views  of  
at  least  a  majority  of  the  justices.  It  appears  that  this  practice  was  actually  begun  a  few  
\HDUVHDUOLHUE\0DUVKDOO¶VLPPHGLDWHSUHGHFHVVRU&KLHI-XVWLFH2OLYHU(OOVZRUWK
The  Opinion  of  the  Court,  referred  to  as  the  majority  opinion  when  the  Court  is  not  
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unanimous,  has  the  great  advantage  oISURYLGLQJDFRKHUHQWVWDWHPHQWRIWKH&RXUW¶V
position  to  the  parties,  the  lower  courts,  and  the  larger  legal  and  political  
communities.  
It  must  be  understood,  however,  that  even  a  unanimous  vote  in  support  of  a  
particular  judgment  does  not  guarantee  that  there  will  be  an  Opinion  of  the  Court.  
Justices  can  and  do  differ  on  the  rationales  they  adopt  for  voting  a  particular  way.  
Every  justice  retains  the  right  to  produce  an  opinion  in  every  case,  either  for  or  against  
the  judgment  of  the  Court.  A  concurring  opinion  is  one  written  in  support  of  the  
&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQDdissenting  opinion  is  one  that  disagrees  with  the  decision.  An  
opinion  concurring  in  the  judgment  LVRQHWKDWVXSSRUWVWKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQEXW
disagrees  with  the  rationale  expressed  in  the  majority  opinion.  
Dissenting  opinions,  indicative  of  intellectual  conflict  on  the  Court,  are  very  
important  in  the  development  of  American  constitutional  law.  It  is  often  said  that  
³\HVWHUGD\¶VGLVVHQWLVWRPRUURZ¶VPDMRULW\RSLQLRQ´8VXDOO\WKHWLPHODJLV  much  
longer,  but  there  are  a  number  of  examples  of  dissents  being  vindicated  by  later  Court  
decisions.  Nevertheless,  it  is  more  frequently  the  case  that  a  dissenting  vote  is  merely  
a  defense  of  a  dying  position.  
Since  the  1930s  the  number  of  concurring  and  dissenting  opinions  has  
dramatically  increased,  reflecting  both  the  growing  complexity  of  the  law  and  the  
demise  of  consensual  norms  in  the  Court  itself.  The  modern  Court  appears  to  be  less  
FROOHJLDOLQLWVGHFLVLRQPDNLQJDQGWRRSHUDWHPRUHOLNH³QLQHVHSDUDWHODZILUPV´
When  the  Court  fails  to  produce  a  majority  opinion,  typically  one  opinion  announces  
the  judgment  of  the  Court  and  states  the  views  of  those  justices  who  endorse  that  
opinion.  This  is  referred  to  as  the  plurality  opinion  if  it  garners  the  most  signatures  
DPRQJWKRVHMXVWLFHVZKRVXSSRUWWKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQ1RWHWKDWEHFDXVHLWGRHVQRW
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express  the  views  of  a  majority  of  justices,  the  plurality  opinion  has  no  official  weight  
as  precedent.  
Alternatively,  the  judgment  of  the  Court  may  be  expressed  in  a  per  curiam  
opinion,  which  is  not  attributed  to  any  particular  justice.  Thus,  the  maximum  number  
of  opinions  that  may  be  produced  in  one  decision  is  ten:  one  per  curiam  opinion  
announcing  the  decision  of  the  Court  followed  by  nine  individual  concurring  or  
dissenting  opinions.  This  occurred  in  the  famous  Pentagon  papers  case  of  1971.  The  
Court  voted  6  to  3  to  permit  the  New  York  Times  and  the  Washington  Post  to  publish  
the  Pentagon  papers  despite  an  attempt  by  the  Nixon  administration  to  prevent  the  
newspapers  from  doing  so.  The  decision  was  announced  in  a  three-paragraph  per  
curiam  opinion.  Six  justices  (namely,  Black,  Douglas,  Brennan,  Stewart,  Marshall,  
and  White)  authored  concurring  opinions.  Three  of  their  colleagues  (Chief  Justice  
Burger  and  Justices  Blackmun  and  Harlan)  wrote  dissenting  opinions  (see  New  York  
Times  Company  v.  United  States  [1971],  discussed  and  reprinted  in  Chapter  3,  
Volume  II).  
3HUVLVWHQWFULWLFLVPRIWKH&RXUW¶VIDLOXUHWRSURGXFHPDMRULW\RSLQLRQVLQD
number  of  important  constitutional  cases,  especially  in  the  1970s  and  1980s,  may  
have  contributed  to  a  moderate  reversal  of  this  trend  in  the  1990s.  It  is  understandable  
that  judicial  scholars  as  well  as  lower  court  judges  and  others  responsible  for  
implementing  Supreme  Court  decisions  would  attach  great  value  to  the  Opinion  of  the  
Court.  Of  course,  the  agreement  of  at  least  five  justices  on  a  coherent  rationale  in  
support  of  virtually  any  constitutional  decision  is  not  easily  achieved.  It  requires  both  
a  high  degree  of  collegiality  among  the  justices  and  leadership  from  the  chief  justice.  
The  many  complex  issues  coming  before  the  Court  allow  for  a  wide  range  of  
responses  from  individual  justices,  compounding  the  difficulty  of  forging  a  majority  
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opinion.  
In  an  effort  to  obtain  this  level  of  agreement,  the  chief  justice,  assuming  he  is  in  
the  majority,  will  either  prepare  a  draft  opinion  himself  or  assign  the  task  to  one  of  his  
colleagues  in  the  majority.  If  the  chief  is  in  dissent,  the  responsibility  of  opinion  
assignment  falls  on  the  senior  associate  justice  in  the  majority.  Sometimes,  in  a  5-to-4  
GHFLVLRQDPDMRULW\RSLQLRQPD\EH³UHVFXHG´E\DVVLJQLQJLWWRWKHVZLQJYRWHU²that  
is,  the  justice  who  was  most  likely  to  dissent.  On  the  modern  Court,  the  task  of  
writing  majority  opinions  is  more  or  less  evenly  distributed  among  the  nine  justices.  
However,  majority  opinions  in  important  decisions  are  more  apt  to  be  authored  by  the  
chief  justice  or  a  senior  member  of  the  Court.  
After  the  opinion  has  been  assigned  to  one  of  the  justices,  work  begins  on  a  rough  
draft.  At  this  stage  the  law  clerks  play  an  important  role  by  performing  legal  research  
and  assisting  the  justice  in  the  writing  of  the  opinion.  When  a  draft  is  ready,  it  is  
circulated  among  those  justices  in  the  majority  for  their  suggestions  and,  ultimately,  
their  signatures.  A  draft  opinion  that  fails  to  receive  the  approval  of  a  majority  of  
justices  participating  in  a  given  decision  cannot  be  characterized  as  the  Opinion  of  the  
Court.  Accordingly,  a  draft  may  be  subject  to  considerable  revision  before  it  attains  
the  status  of  majority  opinion.  
The  Supreme  Court  announces  most  of  its  plenary  decisions  in  open  court,  often  
late  in  the  term.  A  decision  is  announced  by  the  author  of  the  majority  or  plurality  
opinion,  who  may  even  read  excerpts  from  that  opinion.  In  important  and  
controversial  cases,  concurring  and  dissenting  justices  will  read  excerpts  from  their  
opinions  as  well.  When  several  decisions  are  to  be  announced,  the  justices  making  the  
announcements  will  speak  in  reverse  order  of  their  seniority  on  the  Court.  After  
GHFLVLRQVDUHDQQRXQFHGVXPPDULHVDUHUHOHDVHGWRWKHPHGLDE\WKH&RXUW¶VSXEOLF
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information  office.  Today,  the  nation  is  informed  of  an  important  Supreme  Court  
decision  within  minutes  of  its  being  handed  down.  
  
Publication  of  Supreme  Court  Decisions  
The  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court,  indeed  of  all  appellate  courts  in  this  country,  are  
published  in  books  known  as  case  reporters.  The  official  reporter,  published  by  the  
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  is  titled  the  United  States  Reports  (abbreviated  U.S.  
in  legal  citations).  West  Publishing  Company  publishes  a  commercial  edition  entitled  
Supreme  Court  Reporter  (abbreviated  S.Ct.).  Finally,  the  LexisNexis  publishes  the  
United  States  Supreme  Court  Reports,  /DZ\HUV¶(GLWLRQ(abbreviated  L.Ed.  or,  for  
volumes  since  the  mid-1950s,  L.Ed.  2d).  Lawyers,  judges,  academics,  and  students  
wishing  to  read  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  may  utilize  any  of  these  reporters,  
DQGUHIHUHQFHVWRWKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQVXVXDlly  cite  all  three.  
For  example,  the  Pentagon  papers  case,  New  York  Times  v.  United  States,  is  cited  
as  403  U.S.  713,  91  S.Ct.  2140,  29  L.Ed.  2d  822  (1971).  This  indicates  that  the  case  
can  be  located  in  Volume  403  of  the  United  States  Reports,  beginning  on  page  713,  or  
Volume  91,  page  2140,  and  Volume  29,  page  822,  of  the  Supreme  Court  Reporter  and  
/DZ\HUV¶(GLWLRQ  respectively.  
In  the  last  several  years,  the  Court  has  made  its  decisions  available  to  the  public  
on  the  Internet,  a  boon  to  students  and  scholars.  One  of  the  easiest  ways  to  access  
these  decisions  is  to  go  to  www.findlaw.com,  which  is  a  very  comprehensive  legal  
UHVRXUFHV:HEVLWH7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VRIILFLDO:HEVLWHORFDWHGDW
ZZZVXSUHPHFRXUWXVJRYQRWRQO\SURYLGHVWKH&RXUW¶VRSLQLRQVEut  also  its  docket,  
FDOHQGDUIRURUDODUJXPHQWVEULHIVRIFRXQVHODQGWKH&RXUW¶VUXOHVRISURFHGXUH  
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TO  SUMMARIZE:  
The  Supreme  Court  hands  down  both  plenary  and  summary  decisions.  Summary  
dispositions  are  made  without  the  benefit  of  full  argumentation  before  the  Court.  
The  major  function  of  summary  decisions  is  error  correction,  as  opposed  to  legal  
policy  making.  
Plenary  decisions  are  characterized  by  the  submission  of  briefs  by  the  parties,  oral  
argument,  and  the  issuance  of  full  opinions  from  the  Court.  
The  justices  reach  their  decisions  in  private  conferences  in  which  votes  are  taken  
and  opinion  assignments  are  made.  
Decisions  and  their  accompanying  opinions  are  published  in  the  United  States  
Reports,  the  Supreme  Court  Reporter,  and  the  /DZ\HUV¶(GLWLon.  The  Court  also  
makes  electronic  versions  of  its  decisions  available  to  the  public  via  the  Internet.  
  
THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  JUDICIAL  REVIEW  
As  we  have  noted,  judicial  review  is  the  cornerstone  of  American  constitutional  law.  
In  American  constitutional  law,  judicial  review  denotes  the  power  of  a  court  of  law  to  
review  a  policy  of  government  (usually  a  legislative  act)  and  to  invalidate  that  policy  
if  it  is  found  to  be  contrary  to  constitutional  principles.  In  effect,  a  court  of  law  has  the  
power  to  nullify  aQDFWLRQRIWKHSHRSOH¶VHOHFWHGUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVLIZKDWWKH\KDYH
done  is  determined  to  be  unconstitutional.  
Judicial  review  is  a  uniquely  American  invention.  Although  English  common  law  
courts  exercised  the  power  to  make  law  in  some  instances,  no  English  court  claimed  
the  authority  to  nullify  an  act  of  Parliament.  However,  in  'U%RQKDP¶V&DVH(1610),  
the  great  English  jurist  Sir  Edward  Coke  recognized  that  parliamentary  enactments  
were  subordinate  to  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  common  law.  Although  this  was  
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QRWDQRXWULJKWHQGRUVHPHQWRIMXGLFLDOUHYLHZDVZHNQRZLWWRGD\&RNH¶VKROGLQJ
was  important  in  recognizing  that  legislative  acts  must  conform  to  some  higher  law.  
While  judicial  review  is  normally  associated  with  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court,  it  is  a  
power  possessed  by  most  courts  of  law  in  this  country.  In  fact,  a  nascent  form  of  
judicial  review  had  already  been  exercised  by  a  few  state  courts  prior  to  the  adoption  
of  the  U.S.  Constitution  (see,  for  example,  Trevett  v.  Wheeden,  Rhode  Island  [1786]).  
The  Framers  of  the  Constitution,  however,  did  not  explicitly  resolve  the  question  of  
whether  the  newly  created  federal  courts  should  have  this  power.  Article  III  is  silent  
on  the  subject.  It  remained  for  the  Supreme  Court,  in  a  bold  stroke  of  legal  and  
political  genius,  to  assert  this  power.  
  
Marbury  v.  Madison  
The  Supreme  Court  assumed  the  power  to  review  legislation  as  early  as  1796,  when  it  
upheld  a  federal  tax  on  carriages  as  a  valid  exercise  of  the  congressional  taxing  power  
(see  Hylton  v.  United  States).  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Alexander  Hamilton,  who,  
as  a  co-author  of  the  Federalist  Papers,  had  strongly  endorsed  judicial  review,  argued  
this  case  before  the  Supreme  Court  on  behalf  of  the  government.  Although  the  Hylton  
decision  approving  congressional  action  implied  the  power  of  judicial  review,  it  did  
not  establish  it;;  to  do  that  the  Court  would  have  to  strike  down  an  act  of  Congress.  
The  opportunity  to  do  so  came  in  1803.  The  decision  in  Marbury  v.  Madison  became  
the  single  most  important  ruling  in  Supreme  Court  history.  
The  Marbury  case  arose  out  of  what  may  be  fairly  described  as  a  bizarre  set  of  
circumstances.  After  the  national  election  of  1800,  in  which  the  Federalists  lost  the  
presidency  and  both  houses  of  Congress  to  the  Jeffersonian  Republicans,  the  
Federalists  sought  to  preserve  their  influence  within  the  national  government  by  
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enlarging  their  control  over  the  federal  courts.  The  lame  duck  Congress,  in  which  the  
Federalists  held  a  majority,  quickly  passed  the  Judiciary  Act  of  1801,  which  was  
signed  into  law  by  the  lame  duck  president,  John  Adams.  This  Act  reorganized  the  
federal  judiciary  by  creating  six  new  federal  circuits  to  be  presided  over  by  sixteen  
newly  appointed  judges,  which  under  the  Constitution  President  Adams  would  be  able  
to  fill  with  good  Federalists,  of  course.  This  innovative  Act  formally  abolished  the  
burdensome  duties  of  circuit-riding,  a  major  source  of  complaint  among  Supreme  
Court  justices.  The  incoming  Jefferson  Administration  regarded  this  reform  as  a  
blatant  political  power  play  and  engineered  the  repeal  of  the  Act  in  1802.  Circuit-
riding  duties  were  reinstituted  and,  as  previously  noted,  were  not  fully  terminated  
until  1891.  
The  lame  duck  Federalist  Congress  also  adopted  legislation  creating  a  number  of  
minor  judicial  positions  for  the  newly  established  District  of  Columbia.  Here  again,  
the  power  to  fill  these  posts  lay  primarily  with  the  president.  William  Marbury  was  
one  of  the  many  Federalist  politicians  appointed  to  judicial  office  in  the  waning  days  
of  the  $GDPVDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ0DUEXU\¶VFRPPLVVLRQDVMXVWLFHRIWKHSHDFHIRUWKH
District  of  Columbia  had  been  signed  by  the  president  following  Senate  confirmation  
RQ0DUFK3UHVLGHQW$GDPV¶VODVWIXOOGD\LQRIILFH(YHU\WKLQJZDVLQRUGHU
and  after  Secretary  of  State  John  Marshall  placed  the  seal  of  the  United  States  on  the  
letter  of  commission,  it  was  ready  to  be  delivered  to  Mr.  Marbury.  But  for  some  
UHDVRQ\HWWREHIXOO\H[SODLQHGWKHGHOLYHU\ZKLFKZDVHQWUXVWHGWR-RKQ0DUVKDOO¶V
brother  JamHVQHYHUWRRNSODFH0DUEXU\¶VFRPPLVVLRQZDVUHWXUQHGWR-RKQ
0DUVKDOO¶VRIILFHRQWKHHYHQLQJRI0DUFKRUWKHPRUQLQJRI0DUFKDORQJZLWK
several  other  justice  of  the  peace  commissions  that  James  Marshall  also  failed  to  
deliver.  These  commissions  simply  disappeared  in  the  last-minute  confusion  of  
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moving  records  and  other  papers  from  the  office  of  the  outgoing  secretary  of  state,  
who  was  moving  from  the  cabinet  to  his  new  post²chief  justice  of  the  United  States.  
Thomas  Jefferson  was  sworn  in  as  the  nDWLRQ¶VWKLUGSUHVLGHQWRQ0DUFK
The  new  secretary  of  state,  James  Madison,  fully  supported  by  the  president,  declined  
to  deliver  copies  of  the  commissions  to  Marbury  and  the  other  Federalists  who  had  
failed  to  get  their  judgeships.  After  Marbury  and  others  began  to  press  the  issue,  
Jefferson  mounted  an  effort  to  repeal  the  Judiciary  Act  of  1801.  A  willing  Congress,  
now  dominated  by  Jeffersonian  Republicans,  was  happy  to  oblige.  Not  only  did  
Congress  repeal  the  Judiciary  Act,  but  it  abolished  the  Supreme  Court  term  of  1802!  
(Whether  Congress  could  take  such  a  bold  step  today  is  highly  unlikely,  since  the  
annual  Supreme  Court  term  has  become  an  institution  in  itself.)  
Although  having  to  wait  until  1803  for  a  decision,  Marbury  and  three  other  
frustrated  appointees  filed  suit  against  James  Madison  in  the  Supreme  Court,  invoking  
WKH&RXUW¶VRULJLQDOMXULVGLFWLRQ0DUEXU\DVNHGWKH&RXUWWRLVVXHDZULWRI
mandamus,  an  order  directing  Madison  to  deliver  the  disputed  judicial  commission  to  
him.  The  stage  was  now  set  for  a  head-on  collision  between  the  Court,  staffed  entirely  
by  Federalists,  and  the  Jefferson  administration.  
It  seems  not  to  have  occurred  to  the  new  chief  justice  that  he  should  have  recused  
himself  (abstained)  in  the  Marbury  FDVH%\WRGD\¶Vstandards  of  professional  
UHVSRQVLELOLW\0DUVKDOO¶VLPSDUWLDOLW\ZRXOGKDYHEHHQGRXEWHGWRVD\WKHOHDVW$W
WKHWLPHRI0DUEXU\¶VDSSRLQWPHQW-RKQ0DUVKDOOZDVDOHDGHULQWKH)HGHUDOLVW
Party.  He  was  central  to  the  planning  of  the  Judiciary  Act  of  1801  that  had  so  enraged  
WKH-HIIHUVRQLDQV0RUHRYHULWZDV0DUVKDOO¶VIDLOXUHDVVHFUHWDU\RIVWDWHWRGHOLYHU
0DUEXU\¶VFRPPLVVLRQWKDWQHFHVVLWDWHGWKHODZVXLW  
John  Marshall  and  his  Federalist  brethren  on  the  Supreme  Court  found  themselves  
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in  a  dilemma.  On  the  one  hand  they  could  issue  the  writ  of  mandamus  and  risk  the  
very  real  possibility  that  the  Jefferson  administration  would  refuse  to  obey  the  Court,  
in  which  case  the  Court  would  suffer  a  serious  blow  to  its  prestige.  To  make  matters  
worse,  President  Jefferson  had  strongly  intimated  that  if  the  Court  were  to  issue  the  
mandamus,  he  would  seek  to  have  several  members  of  the  Court,  including  his  distant  
cousin  John  Marshall,  brought  before  Congress  on  articles  of  impeachment!  On  the  
other  hand,  if  the  Court  were  to  deny  Marbury  his  commission,  it  would  have  been  
widely  perceived  as  an  admission  of  weakness  and  would  have  damaged  the  prestige  
of  the  Court,  not  to  mention  that  of  the  Federalist  Party.  While  Chief  Justice  Marshall,  
a  longtime  opponent  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  did  not  back  away  from  an  opportunity  to  
confront  the  new  administration,  neither  of  the  aforementioned  alternatives  seemed  
palatable.  
Marshall  was  an  imposing  figure²a  man  of  great  intellect  and  forceful  
personality  who  dominated  the  Court  during  his  thirty-four-year  tenure  as  chief  
justice.  He  spoke  for  an  undivided  Court  in  solving  the  Marbury  puzzle.  His  solution,  
announced  in  an  11,000-word  opinion  that  required  four  hours  for  him  to  read  from  
the  bench  on  February  24,  1803,  emphasized  the  following  conclusions:  William  
Marbury  had  a  legal  right  to  his  commission;;  by  implication,  the  Jefferson  
administration  was  legally  and  morally  wrong  to  deny  it  to  him.  The  writ  of  
mandamus  afforded  an  appropriate  remedy.  However,  the  Court  would  not  issue  the  
writ  of  mandamus.  The  reason  it  would  not  do  so,  said  John  Marshall,  was  that  the  
Court  had  no  authority  to  issue  the  writ.  
7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VSUHVXPHGDXWKRULW\WRLVVXHWKHZULWRIPDQGDPXVKDGEHHQ
based  on  Section  13  of  the  Judiciary  Act  of  1789.  Section  13  granted  the  Court  the  
DXWKRULW\WR³LVVXH«  writs  of  mandamus,  in  cases  warranted  by  the  principles  and  
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XVDJHVRIODZ´$FFRUGLQJWR-RKQ0DUVKDOO¶VRSLQLRQLQMarbury,  however,  the  
Court  could  not  issue  the  writ  because  the  relevant  provision  of  Section  13  was  
unconstitutional.  It  was  invalid,  according  to  Marshall,  because  it  expanded  the  
&RXUW¶VRULJLQDOMXULVGLFWLRQ  
Article  III,  Section  2,  of  the  Constitution  expressly  provides  that  Congress  has  
authority  to  regulate  the  appellate  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court.  The  implication  
LVWKDW&RQJUHVVKDVQRVXFKDXWKRULW\ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKH&RXUW¶VRULJLQDOMXULVGLFWLRQ
,Q0DUVKDOO¶VYLHZ6HFWLRQZDVLQYDOLGLQVRIDUDVLWSHUPLWWHGWKH&RXUWWRLVVXHD
writ  of  mandamus  in  a  case  under  WKH&RXUW¶VRULJLQDOMXULVGLFWLRQ7KH&RXUWKDG
held  for  the  first  time  that  an  act  of  Congress  was  null  and  void.  
0DQ\OHJDOVFKRODUVKDYHTXHVWLRQHG-RKQ0DUVKDOO¶VUHDVRQLQJ2QHFDQDUJXH
that  all  that  Congress  had  done  in  crafting  Section  13  of  the  Judiciary  Act  was  to  
UHFRJQL]HWKH&RXUW¶VSRZHUWRLVVXHFHUWDLQNLQGVRIZULWVLQFDVHVDSSURSULDWHO\
EHIRUHLW,QRWKHUZRUGV&RQJUHVVKDGQRWH[SDQGHGWKH&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQDWDOO
but  merely  recognized  a  legal  remedy  that  the  Court  might  have  possessed  even  in  the  
absence  of  the  statute!  More  recent  research  conducted  by  legal  historian  Thomas  Y.  
Davies  seriously  questions  whether  the  distinction  between  original  and  appellate  
MXULVGLFWLRQZDVHYHQDSSOLFDEOHWRWKH³SUHURJDWLYHZULW´RIPDQGDPXV  Rather,  in  
1803,  mandamus  power  was  still  regarded  as  an  inherent  feature  of  the  superintending  
authority  of  a  supreme  court.  Thus,  mandamus  was  implicit  in  WKHPDQGDWHIRU³RQH
VXSUHPH&RXUW´DWWKHEHJLQQLQJRI$UWLFOH,,,RIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ$WWKDWWime,  
KRZHYHU0DUVKDOO¶VUHDVRQLQJRQWKLVLVVXHZDVQRWVHULRXVO\FKDOOHQJHG  
A  much  larger  question  is  posed  in  Marbury  v.  Madison  than  the  validity  of  
Section  13  of  the  Judiciary  Act  of  1789.  Even  assuming  the  invalidity  of  the  act,  
where  does  the  Supreme  Court  get  the  power  to  strike  down  the  law?  After  all,  the  

Stephens  and  Scheb  1-41  

Constitution  does  not  explicitly  recognize  judicial  review.  In  support  of  this  
assumption  of  power,  John  Marshall  reasoned  that,  because  the  Constitution  is  the  
³VXSUHPHODZRIWKHODQG´DQGLW  is  the  duty  of  the  judiciary  to  interpret  the  law,  
judicial  review  is  both  necessary  and  inevitable.  Perhaps  because  the  Supremacy  
Clause  of  Article  VI  focuses  on  the  subordinate  relationship  of  state  to  federal  law,  
Marshall  relied  more  heavily  on  Article  III,  which  established  and  broadly  defined  
federal  judicial  power.  It  was  in  this  context  that  Marshall  made  his  frequently  quoted  
DVVHUWLRQWKDW³>L@WLVHPSKDWLFDOO\WKHSURYLQFHDQGGXW\RIWKHMXGLFLDOGHSDUWPHQWWR
VD\ZKDWWKHODZLV´,QUHDFKLQJ  this  conclusion,  Marshall  stressed  the  fact  that  
judges  take  an  oath  to  support  and  defend  the  Constitution.  Marshall  ended  his  
ODQGPDUNRSLQLRQZLWKWKHTXHVWLRQ³:K\GRHVDMXGJHVZHDUWRGLVFKDUJHWKHGXWLHV
agreeable  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  if  that  Constitution  forms  no  rule  
IRUKLVJRYHUQPHQW"´  
  
Rejoinder  to  John  Marshall  
2QHRIWKHPRVWHIIHFWLYHUHIXWDWLRQVRI0DUVKDOO¶VSRVLWLRQZDVRIIHUHGE\-XVWLFH
John  B.  Gibson  of  the  Pennsylvania  Supreme  Court.  In  a  dissenting  opinion  in  an  
otherwise  unremarkable  decision,  Eakin  v.  Raub  (1825),  Gibson  contended  that  the  
courts  had  no  more  authority  to  strike  down  legislative  acts  than  the  legislatures  had  
WRVWULNHGRZQMXGLFLDOGHFLVLRQV,Q*LEVRQ¶VYLHZHDFKEUDQFKRIWKHJRYHUQPHQWLV
ultimately  responsible  to  the  people  for  the  constitutionality  of  its  own  acts.  In  support  
RIWKLVDUJXPHQW*LEVRQQRWHGWKDW³>W@KHRDWKWRVXSSRUWWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQLVQRW
peculiar  to  the  judges,  but  is  taken  indiscriminately  by  every  officer  of  the  
goverQPHQW´$OWKRXJK-XVWLFH*LEVRQ¶VSRVLWLRQPLJKWVWLOOKDYHVRPHDSSHDOLQ
theory,  judicial  review  has  long  been  accepted  as  an  essential  power  of  American  
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courts  and  an  important  feature  of  the  system  of  checks  and  balances.  Indeed,  one  can  
argue  that  without  judicial  review  the  system  of  checks  and  balances  is  incomplete,  
since  judicial  review  is  the  only  significant  check  that  the  courts  have  on  the  actions  
of  the  legislative  and  executive  branches.  
  
Early  Development  of  Judicial  Review  
The  Supreme  Court¶VDVVHUWLRQRIMXGLFLDOUHYLHZLQMarbury  v.  Madison  went  largely  
unchallenged  for  two  reasons.  First,  although  claiming  the  right  to  review  legislation,  
the  Court  avoided  a  confrontation  with  the  president  and  Congress.  Second,  the  
provision  invalidated  by  the  Court  was  not  a  major  element  of  public  policy.  Rather  it  
was  a  minor  provision  of  a  law  dealing  with  the  judicial  process  itself,  an  area  in  
which  the  Supreme  Court  might  be  presumed  to  have  greater  expertise  and  hence  a  
greater  claim  to  exercise  judicial  review.  Some  scholars  have  contended  that  the  
significance  of  Marbury  as  a  precedent  for  the  broad  exercise  of  judicial  review  was  
not  fully  recognized  until  roughly  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century.  However,  
according  to  research  by  the  authors,  American  courts  cited  Marbury  v.  Madison  more  
than  one  hundred  times  prior  to  1850.  
Marbury  v.  Madison  was  the  only  instance  in  which  the  Supreme  Court  under  
John  Marshall  struck  down  an  act  of  Congress.  The  Marshall  Court  did,  however,  use  
its  power  of  judicial  review  to  strike  down  a  number  of  state  laws  in  some  very  
LPSRUWDQWFDVHV7KH&RXUW¶VILUVWFOHDUH[HUFLVHRIWKLVSRZHUFDPHLQLQWKH
highly  politicized  case  of  Fletcher  v.  Peck,  in  which  the  Court  invalidated  a  Georgia  
law  interfering  with  private  property  rights  (see  Chapter  2,  Volume  II).  
Perhaps  the  most  important  of  these  state  cases  was  0¶&XOORFKY0DU\ODQG
(1819),  in  which  the  Court  declared  unconstitutional  an  attempt  by  a  state  to  tax  a  
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branch  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  (see  Chapter  2).  Nearly  as  important  was  
Gibbons  v.  Ogden  (1824),  in  which  the  Court  invalidated  a  New  York  law  granting  a  
monopoly  to  a  steamboat  company  in  contravention  of  a  federal  law  granting  a  license  
to  another  company  (see  Chapter  2).  Not  only  were  the  decisions  in  0¶&XOORFKY
Maryland  and  Gibbons  v.  Ogden  important  as  assertions  of  power  by  the  Supreme  
Court,  they  were  instrumental  in  enlarging  the  powers  of  Congress  vis-à-vis  the  states.  
In  addition  to  asserting  the  power  to  invalidate  state  laws,  the  Marshall  Court  
established  its  authority  to  overrule  decisions  of  the  highest  state  appellate  courts  on  
questions  of  federal  law,  both  constitutional  and  statutory.  Article  VI  provides  that  the  
&RQVWLWXWLRQODZVDQGWUHDWLHVRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV³VKDOO  be  the  supreme  Law  of  the  
Land;;  and  the  Judges  in  every  State  shall  be  bound  thereby,  any  Thing  in  the  
&RQVWLWXWLRQRU/DZVRIDQ\6WDWHWRWKH&RQWUDU\QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJ´6HFWLRQRIWKH
Judiciary  Act  of  1789  provided  that  appeals  could  be  brought  to  the  Supreme  Court  
from  certain  decisions  of  the  highest  state  courts.  Against  the  strenuous  objections  of  
VWDWHV¶ULJKWVDGYRFDWHVOHGE\-XGJH6SHQFHU5RDQHRI9LUJLQLDWKH0DUVKDOO&RXUW
successfully  asserted  federal  judicial  authority  over  the  states  with  respect  to  the  
interpretation  of  federal  law.  Judge  Roane  conceded  that  state  judges  were  bound  by  
federal  law,  but  asserted  that  state  court  decisions  ought  to  be  final  in  regard  to  the  
interpretation  of  federal  law,  including  the  U.S.  Constitution.  
WhHQWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWLQYDOLGDWHG9LUJLQLD¶VDOLHQ-inheritance  and  confiscation  
laws  in  1813,  the  Virginia  Supreme  Court  responded  with  an  opinion  by  Chief  Judge  
Roane  declaring  Section  25  of  the  Judiciary  Act  of  1789  unconstitutional.  This  action  
brought  the  case  back  to  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court.  In  a  detailed  opinion  by  Justice  
Joseph  Story  (John  Marshall  having  recused  himself  due  to  earlier  participation  in  this  
litigation,  which  had  begun  in  the  1780s),  the  Supreme  Court  affirmed  its  power  to  
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review  state  court  decisions  on  matters  of  federal  law  (0DUWLQY+XQWHU¶V/HVVHH
[1816]).  
6WDWHV¶ULJKWVDGYRFDWHVFRQWLQXHGWRDVVDLO6XSUHPH&RXUWDXWKRULW\WRUHYLHZWKH
decisions  of  state  courts  on  matters  of  federal  law.  The  issue  reached  the  Supreme  
Court  once  again  in  Cohens  v.  Virginia  (1821).  P.  J.  and  M.  J.  Cohen  had  been  
FRQYLFWHGLQD9LUJLQLDFRXUWRIYLRODWLQJWKDWVWDWH¶VODZSURKLELWLQJWKHVDOHRIORWWHU\
tickets.  The  Cohens  had  been  selling  tickets  in  Norfolk  for  the  Washington,  D.C.  
lottery,  which  had  been  authorized  by  Congress  to  finance  civic  improvements  in  the  
capital.  
The  Cohens  challenged  their  convictions  in  the  Supreme  Court,  arguing  that  the  
federal  law  authorizing  the  lottery  took  precedence  over  the  Virginia  law  
criminalizing  the  sale  of  lottery  tickets.  On  this  point  the  Cohens  ultimately  lost,  the  
Supreme  Court  concluding  that  Congress  had  not  authorized  the  sale  of  lottery  tickets  
outside  the  District  of  Columbia.  From  a  technical  standpoint  this  was  a  minor  
criminal  case  involving  a  fiQHRIRQO\+RZHYHUWKHFRPSHWLQJIRUFHVRIVWDWHV¶
rights  and  national  supremacy  converted  it  into  a  major  constitutional  battle.  
5HVSRQGLQJWR9LUJLQLD¶VGHQLDORIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VDXWKRULW\WRKHDUWKH&RKHQV¶
appeal,  Chief  Justice  Marshall  forFHIXOO\DVVHUWHGWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQ
RYHUVWDWHFRXUWGHFLVLRQV³ZKLFKPD\FRQWUDYHQHWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQRUWKHODZVRIWKH
8QLWHG6WDWHV´  
  
The  Dred  Scott  Case  
Although  the  Supreme  Court  under  John  Marshall  succeeded  in  establishing  and  
expandiQJWKHVFRSHRIMXGLFLDOUHYLHZXQGHU0DUVKDOO¶VVXFFHVVRUWKH&RXUW
damaged  its  credibility  and  prestige  by  an  impolitic  use  of  this  power.  The  case  was  
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Scott  v.  Sandford  (1857),  the  first  Supreme  Court  decision  after  Marbury  v.  Madison  
to  declare  an  act  of  Congress  unconstitutional.  
Slavery  had  been  a  divisive  political  issue  as  early  as  the  Constitutional  
Convention  of  1787.  By  the  early  nineteenth  century  it  was  clear  that  slavery  
threatened  to  disunite  the  United  States.  Congress  responded  by  adopting  a  series  of  
compromises  on  the  issue.  Perhaps  the  most  important  of  these  was  the  Missouri  
Compromise  of  1820.  Under  this  act  of  Congress,  Missouri  was  admitted  to  the  Union  
as  a  slave  state²that  is,  one  in  which  slavery  would  be  legal.  However,  slavery  would  
be  prohibited  in  the  remaining  western  territories  north  of  36  degrees  30  minutes  
latitude,  a  line  corresponding  to  the  southern  boundary  of  Missouri.  
The  Scott  case  began  when  Dred  Scott,  a  slave  backed  by  Abolitionist  forces,  
brought  suit  seeking  emancipation  from  his  owner,  John  Sandford.  Scott  was  formerly  
owned  by  a  Dr.  Emerson,  a  surgeon  in  the  U.S.  Army.  In  1834  Emerson  had  taken  
Scott  from  Missouri,  where  he  had  long  resided,  into  the  free  state  of  Illinois  and  from  
there  to  Fort  Snelling  in  the  Wisconsin  territory,  which  was  also  free  under  the  
Missouri  Compromise.  After  several  years  Emerson  and  Dred  Scott  returned  to  
Missouri.  Within  a  short  time,  Emerson  died,  and  title  to  Scott  ultimately  passed  to  
John  Sandford,  a  New  Yorker.  In  1846  Scott  brought  suit  against  Sandford  in  the  
Missouri  courts  to  obtain  his  freedom,  arguing  that  his  several-year  residency  on  free  
soil  had  nullified  his  status  as  a  slave.  
After  a  favorable  decision  for  Scott  at  the  lower  court  level,  the  Missouri  Supreme  
Court  rejected  his  claim.  Dred  Scott  then  initiated  a  federal  lawsuit  on  the  
jurisdictional  ground  that  he  and  Sandford  were  citizens  of  different  states.  In  
UHVSRQVHWR6FRWW¶VFODLP6DQGIRUGFRQWHQGHGWKDWVLQFH6FRWWZDVD1HJURKHZDV
not  a  citizen  of  Missouri  and  that,  accordingly,  the  federal  courts  had  no  jurisdiction  
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LQKLVFDVH6FRWWILOHGDGHPXUUHULQDQVZHUWRWKLVSOHDDUJXLQJWKDW6DQGIRUG¶V
FRQWHQWLRQKDGQROHJDOHIIHFW$OWKRXJKWKHIHGHUDOWULDOFRXUWVXVWDLQHG6FRWW¶V
demurrer,  thus  possibO\FRQFHGLQJKLVFLWL]HQVKLSLWUXOHGDJDLQVW6FRWW¶VFODLPWKDW
his  residency  in  a  free  territory  entitled  him  to  freedom.  Scott  appealed  to  the  
Supreme  Court,  and  the  case  soon  became  the  focal  point  of  the  intensifying  conflict  
over  slavery.  
Both  sides  in  the  slavery  controversy  looked  to  the  Court  for  a  constitutional  
ruling  vindicating  their  divergent  views  on  the  legal  status  of  blacks  and  the  power  of  
Congress  to  regulate  slavery  in  the  territories.  In  1857  five  members  of  the  Court,  
Chief  Justice  Roger  B.  Taney  and  four  southern  colleagues  (Justices  Campbell,  
Catron,  Daniel,  and  Wayne)  supported  the  institution  of  slavery  without  reservation.  
Two  of  the  four  northerners  on  the  Court,  Justices  Nelson  and  Grier,  if  not  supporters  
of  slavery,  were  at  least  anti-Abolitionist  in  their  sentiments.  These  seven  justices  
comprised  the  majority  in  the  Dred  Scott  decision.  Justices  Curtis  and  McLean  wrote  
strong  dissenting  opinions.  
The  Dred  Scott  decision  was  rendered  in  an  atmosphere  of  intense  emotion  and  
poOLWLFDOSDUWLVDQVKLS&KLHI-XVWLFH7DQH\¶VLPSDVVLRQHGPDMRULW\RSLQLRQZHQWIDU
beyond  the  jurisdictional  question  presented  in  the  case.  The  opinion  held  that  blacks,  
not  just  slaves  but  free  blacks  as  well,  were  not  citizens  of  the  United  States  and  could  
³WKHUHIRUHFODLPQRQHRIWKHULJKWVDQGSULYLOHJHVZKLFK>WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ@SURYLGHV´
,QGHHGLQ7DQH\¶VYLHZEODFNV³KDGQRULJKWVRUSULYLOHJHVH[FHSWVXFKDVWKRVHZKR
KHOGWKHSRZHUDQGWKH*RYHUQPHQWPLJKWFKRRVHWRJUDQWWKHP´7KH&RXUWIXUWKHr  
ruled  that  the  Missouri  Compromise  was  an  arbitrary  deprivation  of  the  property  
rights  of  slaveholders  and,  as  such,  offended  the  provision  of  the  Fifth  Amendment  
WKDWSURKLELWVJRYHUQPHQWIURPGHSULYLQJSHUVRQVRISURSHUW\ZLWKRXW³GXHSURFHVVRI

Stephens  and  Scheb  1-47  

ODZ´The  Dred  Scott  opinion  embraces  the  doctrine  of  substantive  due  process,  
under  which  courts  examine  the  reasonableness  of  governmental  policies.  The  more  
conventional  interpretation  of  the  Due  Process  Clause  is  that  government  must  follow  
certain  procedureVEHIRUHWDNLQJDSHUVRQ¶VOLIHOLEHUW\RUSURSHUW\,QDred  Scott  the  
Court  used  the  Due  Process  Clause  not  to  scrutinize  government  procedures,  but  to  
condemn  the  very  substance  of  a  government  policy.  This  controversial  doctrine  
would  later  be  used  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  very  different  contexts  from  slavery.  
The  Dred  Scott  decision  is  also  an  extreme  form  of  judicial  activism.  The  
decision  was  activist  in  the  sense  that  the  Court  invalidated  an  act  of  Congress  by  
invoking  a  novel,  some  would  say  dubious,  constitutional  doctrine.  More  
fundamentally,  it  was  activist  in  that  the  Court  inserted  itself  into  the  slavery  
controversy,  a  deeply  divisive  issue  that  it  could  well  have  avoided.  Far  from  
UHVROYLQJWKHVODYHU\LVVXHWKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQJUHDWO\LQWensified  the  sectional  
conflict.  A  large  and  growing  segment  of  the  public  simply  rejected  the  legitimacy  of  
WKH&RXUW¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDOWKHRUL]LQJRQWKHVODYHU\TXHVWLRQ7KHDred  Scott  decision  
and  Chief  Justice  Taney  soon  became  objects  of  ridicule  in  Abolitionist  circles.  The  
&RXUW¶VLQWHPSHUDWHGHFLVLRQWKXVQRWRQO\KDVWHQHGWKHDUULYDORIWKH&LYLO:DUEXW
VHYHUHO\GDPDJHGWKH&RXUW¶VSUHVWLJHDQGFUHGLELOLW\  
The  Dred  Scott  decision  itself  was  eventually  nullified  by  the  ratification  of  the  
Thirteenth  Amendment,  which  outlawed  slavery,  and  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  
ZKLFKSURYLGHVWKDW³>D@OOSHUVRQVERUQRUQDWXUDOL]HGLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV«  are  
FLWL]HQVRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGRIWKH6WDWHZKHUHLQWKH\UHVLGH´  
  
Judicial  Review  in  the  Latter  Part  of  the  Nineteenth  Century  
In  light  of  the  furor  produced  by  the  Dred  Scott  decision,  it  is  significant  that  the  

Stephens  and  Scheb  1-48  

institution  of  judicial  review  survived  the  Civil  War  intact.  While  the  Supreme  Court  
conspicuously  avoided  conflict  with  Congress  and  the  president  during  the  Civil  War  
era  (see,  in  particular,  the  later  discussion  of  Ex  parte  McCardle),  the  Court  soon  
reasserted  its  authority  to  invalidate  acts  of  Congress.  In  the  decades  to  follow,  it  
would  exercise  the  power  of  judicial  review  much  more  frequently  than  it  did  in  the  
early  nineteenth  century.  Yet  it  managed  to  avoid  the  great  issues  of  public  debate,  
and,  accordingly,  avoided  the  conflict  that  had  characterized  the  Dred  Scott  decision.  
The  period  from  1865  to  1890  was  thus  one  in  which  the  Court  quietly  went  about  the  
task  of  rebuilding  its  prestige  and  credibility.  
Judicial  review  again  became  a  subject  of  political  controversy  near  the  end  of  the  
nineteenth  century  as  the  Supreme  Court  exercised  its  power  to  limit  government  
activity  in  the  economic  realm  (see  Chapter  2).  A  tendency  to  insulate  laissez-faire  
capitalism  from  government  intervention  brought  the  Court,  and  its  power  of  judicial  
review,  under  an  increasing  barrage  of  criticism  from  Populists  and  Progressives.  
The  Income  Tax  Case  In  PROORFNY)DUPHU¶V/RDQDQG7UXVW&RPSDQ\(1895),  the  
Court  invalidated  a  federal  law  that  imposed  a  2  percent  tax  on  incomes  of  more  than  
$4,000  a  year.  Fourteen  years  earlier,  in  Springer  v.  United  States  (1881),  the  Court  
had  upheld  an  income  tax  measure  adopted  by  Congress  during  the  Civil  War.  Article  
,RIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQUHTXLUHVWKDW³GLUHFW7D[HVVKDOOEHDSSRUWLRQHGDPRQJWKH
several  States«  DFFRUGLQJWRWKHLUUHVSHFWLYH1XPEHUV´,QSpringer,  the  Court  had  
concluded  that  the  income  tax  was  an  indirect  tax  not  subject  to  the  apportionment  
requirement.  But  in  Pollock  the  Court,  by  a  5-to-4  margin,  changed  direction.  The  
Court  held  that  the  new  income  tax  was  a  direct  tax  insofar  as  it  was  based  on  
incomes  derived  from  land  and,  as  such,  had  to  be  apportioned  among  the  states.  
Since  the  law  did  not  provide  for  apportionment,  it  was  unconstitutional.  
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Nationally  prominent  corporate  attorneys,  including  Joseph  H.  Choate,  submitted  
elaborate  briefs  in  opposition  to  the  income  tax.  They  branded  the  income  tax  as  a  
populist  assault  on  the  institutions  of  capitalism.  Choate  condemned  the  tax  as  part  of  
WKH³&RPPXQLVWPDUFK´ZKLFKLIQRWEORFNHGZRXOGOHDGWRIXUWKHULQFXUVLRQVRQ
SULYDWHSURSHUW\³WKHYHU\NH\VWRQHRIWKHDUFKXSRQZKLFKDOOFLYLOL]HGJRYHUnment  
UHVWV´7KH&RXUWPDMRULW\ZDVKHDYLO\LQIOXHQFHGE\WKLVSRLQWRIYLHZDVHYLGHQFHG
by  the  following  passage  from  a  concurring  opinion  by  Justice  Stephen  J.  Field:  
The  present  assault  upon  capital  is  but  the  beginning.  It  will  be  a  stepping  stone  to  
others  larger  and  more  sweeping  till  our  political  contests  will  become  a  war  of  
the  poor  against  the  rich,  a  war  constantly  growing  in  intensity  and  bitterness.  
  
The  Pollock  decision  was  assailed  by  numerous  critics  as  proof  that  the  Court  was  
aligning  itself  with  business  interests  and  in  opposition  to  a  moderate  tax  broadly  
supported  by  the  American  people.  The  Court  itself  had  exhibited  deep  internal  
division  in  reaching  final  disposition  of  the  case.  With  Justice  Howell  Jackson  not  
participating  due  to  illness,  the  Court  was  evenly  split  when  the  case  was  first  argued.  
Prior  to  reargument  before  a  full  Court  later  in  the  year,  one  of  the  justices  changed  
his  position,  underscoring  the  shakiness  of  the  majority.  Consequently,  Pollock  was  
regarded  as  a  dubious  precedent.  
Some  observers  believed  that  if  Congress  enacted  another  income  tax  measure,  the  
Court  would  return  to  the  Springer  rationale  and  uphold  the  tax.  This  view  was  
furthered  by  the  replacement  of  several  members  of  the  Pollock  majority  in  the  late  
1890s,  Justice  Field  among  them.  In  1900  the  Court  upheld  a  graduated  inheritance  
tax  in  Knowlton  v.  Moore.  Then,  in  Flint  v.  Stone  Tracy  Company  (1911),  the  Court  
sustained  a  tax  levied  on  corporations  as  an  excise  tax  on  the  privilege  of  doing  
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business,  even  though  the  tax  was  measured  by  income.  Before  this  ruling,  however,  
Congress  had  proposed  the  Sixteenth  Amendment,  specifically  authorizing  taxation  of  
income  from  any  source  without  the  requirement  of  apportionment  among  the  states.  
By  early  1913  the  requisite  three-fourths  of  the  states  had  ratified  the  amendment,  
thus  formally  overruling  the  Pollock  decision.  As  in  the  case  of  Dred  Scott  v.  
Sandford,  a  controversial  Supreme  Court  decision  had  been  nullified  through  
constitutional  amendment.  
  
Judicial  Review  in  the  Twentieth  Century  
One  of  the  most  controversial  decisions  of  the  early  twentieth  century  was  Lochner  v.  
New  York  (1905),  in  which  the  Supreme  Court  struck  down  a  state  law  regulating  
ZRUNLQJKRXUVLQEDNHULHV,QWKH&RXUW¶VYLHZWKe  law  was  an  unjustified  
LQWHUIHUHQFHZLWK³WKHULJKWWRODERUDQGZLWKWKHµOLEHUW\RIFRQWUDFW¶RQWKHSDUWRI
WKHLQGLYLGXDOHLWKHUDVHPSOR\HURUHPSOR\HH´,QDQRIW-quoted  dissent,  Justice  
Oliver  Wendell  Holmes,  Jr.,  argued  for  judicial  restraint:  
This  case  is  decided  upon  an  economic  theory  which  a  large  part  of  the  country  
does  not  entertain.  If  it  were  a  question  of  whether  I  agreed  with  that  theory,  I  
should  desire  to  study  it  further  and  long  before  making  up  my  mind.  But  I  do  not  
conceive  that  to  be  my  duty,  because  I  strongly  believe  that  my  agreement  or  
disagreement  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  right  of  a  majority  to  embody  their  
opinions  in  law.  
,Q-XVWLFH+ROPHV¶VYLHZWKH&RXUWLQLochner  had  transcended  the  proper  
judicial  role  and  usurped  the  function  of  the  legislature.  Lochner,  like  Dred  Scott,  is  
an  example  of  judicial  activism  in  support  of  a  politically  conservative  result.  It  is  
important  to  recognize  that  the  term  activism  alone  carries  no  ideological  connotation.  
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It  may  be  applied  to  liberal  and  conservative  decisions  alike.  
Throughout  the  early  twentieth  century  the  Supreme  Court  continued  to  use  its  
power  of  judicial  review  to  frustrate  state  and  federal  attempts  at  economic  regulation.  
In  Hammer  v.  Dagenhart  (1918),  for  example,  the  Court  struck  down  an  act  of  
Congress  that  sought  to  discourage  the  industrial  exploitation  of  child  labor.  Relying  
on  its  earlier  decision  in  United  States  v.  E.  C.  Knight  (1895),  the  Court  found  that  the  
federal  law  went  beyond  the  regulation  of  interstate  commerce  and  invaded  the  
legislative  realm  reserved  to  the  states  under  the  Tenth  Amendment.  
  
The  Constitutional  Battle  over  the  New  Deal    The  age  of  laissez-faire  activism  
entered  its  final  phase  in  a  constitutional  showdown  between  the  Supreme  Court  and  
President  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt.  In  1932,  in  the  depths  of  the  Great  Depression,  
Roosevelt  was  elected  in  a  landslide  over  the  Republican  incumbent,  Herbert  Hoover.  
)'5SURPLVHGWKH$PHULFDQSHRSOHD³1HZ'HDO´$EROGGHSDUWXUHIURPWKH
traditional  theory  of  laissez-faire  capitalism,  the  New  Deal  greatly  expanded  the  role  
of  the  federal  government  in  the  economic  life  of  the  nation.  Inevitably,  the  New  Deal  
would  face  a  serious  challenge  in  the  Supreme  Court,  which  in  the  1930s  was  still  
dominated  by  justices  with  conservative  views  on  economic  matters.  
The  first  New  Deal  program  to  be  struck  down  was  the  National  Recovery  
Administration  (NRA).  In  Schechter  Poultry  Corporation  v.  United  States  (1935),  the  
Supreme  Court  held  that  Congress  had  exceeded  its  authority  under  the  Commerce  
Clause  and  had  gone  too  far  in  delegating  legislative  power  to  the  executive  branch  
(see  Chapter  4).  In  1935  and  1936  a  host  of  New  Deal  programs  were  declared  
unconstitutional  by  the  Supreme  Court  (see  Table  1.1).  
President  Roosevelt  responded  to  the  adverse  judicial  decisions  by  trying  to  
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enlarge  the  Court  and  change  its  direction  through  new  appointments.  Although  the  
infamous  Court-packing  plan  ultimately  failed  to  win  approval  in  Congress,  the  
Supreme  Court  may  have  gotten  the  message.  In  an  abrupt  turnabout,  the  Court  
approved  two  key  New  Deal  measures,  the  National  Labor  Relations  Act  and  the  
Social  Security  Act,  as  well  as  a  state  minimum  wage  law  (see  Chapter  2).  
  
The  Constitutional  Revolution  of  1937  
7KH&RXUW¶VVXGden  turnabout  signaled  the  beginning  of  a  constitutional  revolution.  
For  decades  to  come,  the  Court  would  cease  to  interpret  the  Constitution  as  a  barrier  
to  social  and  economic  legislation.  After  1937  the  Court  consistently  upheld  even  
more  sweeping  federal  legislation  affecting  labor  relations,  agricultural  production,  
and  social  welfare.  The  Court  exercised  similar  restraint  with  respect  to  state  laws  
regulating  economic  activity.  
7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VSRVW-1937  restraint  in  the  area  of  economic  regulation  was  
counterbalanced  by  a  heightened  concern  for  civil  rights  and  liberties.  This  concern  
ZDVIRUHVKDGRZHGLQDIRRWQRWHLQ-XVWLFH+DUODQ)LVNH6WRQH¶VPDMRULW\RSLQLRQLQ
United  States  v.  Carolene  Products  (1938),  upholding  a  federal  regulation  of  the  
coQWHQWRIPLONVROGWRWKHSXEOLF,QIRRWQRWH-XVWLFH6WRQHPDLQWDLQHGWKDW³>W@KHUH
PD\EHDQDUURZHUVFRSHIRUWKH«SUHVXPSWLRQRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\ZKHQOHJLVODWLRQ
appears  on  its  face  to  be  within  a  specific  prohibition  of  the  Constitution,  such  as  
WKRVHRIWKHILUVWWHQDPHQGPHQWV´,QHVVHQFH-XVWLFH6WRQHZDVVXJJHVWLQJWKDWWKH
traditional  presumption  of  validity  accorded  to  legislation  ought  to  be  reversed  when  
WKDWOHJLVODWLRQWRXFKHVRQIUHHGRPVSURWHFWHGE\WKH%LOORI5LJKWV6WRQH¶VIRRWQRte  
DOVRH[SUHVVHGWKH&RXUW¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWREHHVSHFLDOO\VROLFLWRXVWRWKHFODLPV  of  
PLQRULWLHVVD\LQJWKDW³SUHMXGLFHDJDLQVWdiscrete  and  insular  minorities  [emphasis  
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added]  may  be  a  special  condition,  which  tends  seriously  to  curtail  the  operation  of  
WKRVHSROLWLFDOSURFHVVHVRUGLQDULO\WREHUHOLHGXSRQWRSURWHFWPLQRULWLHVDQG«PD\
FDOOIRUDPRUHVHDUFKLQJMXGLFLDOVFUXWLQ\´  
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[Start  Table  1.1  here]  
TABLE  1.1  SUPREME  COURT  DECISIONS  INVALIDATING  NEW  DEAL  
PROGRAMS  
Case  

Year  

Law  Invalidated  

Schechter  Corp.  v.  United  States  

1935  

National  Industrial  Recovery  Act  of  
1933  (48  Stat.  195)  

Hopkins  Savings  Assoc.  v.  Cleary  

1935  

3URYLVLRQ+RPH2ZQHUV¶/RDQ$FWRI
1933  (48  Stat.  646,  Sec.  6)  

Railroad  Retirement  Board  v.  Alton   1935  

Railroad  Retirement  Act  of  1934  (48  
Stat.  1283)  

Louisville  Bank  v.  Radford  

1935  

Frazier-Lemke  Act  of  1934,  Amending  
the  Bankruptcy  Act  (48  Stat.  1289,  Ch.  
869)  

United  States  v.  Butler  

1936  

Agricultural  Adjustment  Act  of  1933  
(48  Stat.  31)  

Rickert  Rice  Mills  v.  Fontenot  

1936  

1935  Amendments  to  the  Agricultural  
Adjustment  Act  of  1933  (49  Stat.  750)  

Carter  v.  Carter  Coal  Company  

1936  

Bituminous  Coal  Act  of  1935  (49  Stat.  
991)  

Ashton  v.  Cameron  County  District  

1936  

Act  of  May  24,  1934,  Amending  
Bankruptcy  Act  (48  Stat.  798)  

Notes:  1.  Other  federal  statutes  were  invalidated  by  the  Court  during  the  period  1935  
to  1937,  but  these  laws  were  enacted  prior  to  the  New  Deal.  2.  Stat.  refers  to  U.S.  
Statutes-at-Large.  
[End  Table  1.1  here]  
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The  Impact  of  the  Warren  Court  
Supreme  Court  activity  in  the  modern  era,  at  least  up  until  the  1980s,  tended  to  follow  
the  philosophy  stated  in  Carolene  Products.  This  was  especially  the  case  under  the  
leadership  of  Chief  Justice  Earl  Warren  from  1953  to  1969.  The  Warren  Court  had  an  
enormous  impact  on  civil  rights  and  liberties.  Its  most  notable  decision  was  Brown  v.  
Board  of  Education  (1954),  where  the  Court  declared  racially  segregated  public  
schools  unconstitutional.  In  Brown  and  numerous  other  decisions,  the  Warren  Court  
expressed  its  commitment  to  ending  discrimination  against  African  Americans.  
The  Warren  Court  used  its  power  of  judicial  review  liberally  to  expand  the  rights  
not  only  of  racial  minorities  but  of  persons  accused  of  crimes,  members  of  unpopular  
political  groups,  and  the  poor.  Moreover,  the  Court  revolutionized  American  politics  
E\HQWHULQJWKH³SROLWLFDOWKLFNHW´RIOHJLVODWLYHUHDSSRUWLRQPHQWLQBaker  v.  Carr  
(1962)  and  subsequent  cases.  Without  question,  the  Warren  era  represents  the  most  
significant  period  of  liberal  judicial  activism  in  Supreme  Court  history.  The  Warren  
Court  was  praised  as  heroic  and  idealistic;;  it  was  also  denounced  as  lawless  and  
DFFXVHGRI³PRUDOLPSHULDOLVP´  
  
The  Burger  and  Rehnquist  Courts  
3UHVLGHQW5LFKDUG1L[RQ¶VDSSRLQWPHQWRI&KLHI-XVWLFH:DUUHQ(%XUJHUand  three  
associate  justices  (Harry  Blackmun,  Lewis  Powell,  and  William  Rehnquist)  had  the  
effect  of  tempering  somewhat  the  liberal  activism  of  the  Warren  Court.  Yet  it  was  the  
Burger  Court  that  handed  down  the  blockbuster  decision  in  Roe  v.  Wade  (1973),  
effectively  legalizing  abortion  throughout  the  United  States.  
In  the  1980s  the  Supreme  Court  became  increasingly  conservative  as  older  
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members  retired  and  were  replaced  with  appointments  made  by  Presidents  Ronald  
Reagan  and  George  H.  W.  Bush.  In  1986,  Associate  Justice  William  Rehnquist  was  
elevated  to  chief  justice  when  Warren  Burger  resigned  to  work  on  the  national  
celebration  of  the  bicentennial  of  the  Constitution.  The  Rehnquist  Court  continued  the  
%XUJHU&RXUW¶VPRYHPHQWWRWKHULJKWDOWKRXJKLWGLGQRt  dismantle  most  of  what  was  
accomplished  by  the  Warren  Court  in  the  realm  of  civil  rights  and  liberties.  Indeed,  
WKH&RXUW¶V-to-4  decision  in  Texas  v.  Johnson  (1989),  invalidating  a  state  law  
making  it  a  crime  to  desecrate  the  American  flag,  was  surprisingly  reminiscent  of  the  
Warren  Era.  
7ZRRI3UHVLGHQW5RQDOG5HDJDQ¶VWKUHH6XSUHPH&RXUWDSSRLQWHHV-XVWLFHV
6DQGUD'D\2¶&RQQRUDQG$QWKRQ\.HQQHG\HPHUJHGDVOHDGLQJPRGHUDWHVRQWKH
5HKQTXLVW&RXUW3UHVLGHQW*HRUJH+:%XVK¶VILUVW6XSUHPH&RXUWDppointee,  
'DYLG6RXWHUFDPHWRRFFXS\DSRVLWLRQVOLJKWO\OHIWRIWKH&RXUW¶VFHQWHUZKLOH
&ODUHQFH7KRPDV%XVK¶VVHFRQGDSSRLQWHHMRLQHG&KLHI-XVWLFH5HKQTXLVWDQG
5HDJDQDSSRLQWHH$QWRQLQ6FDOLDWRIRUPWKH&RXUW¶VFRQVHUYDWLYHEORF3UHVLGHQW%LOO
&OLQWRQ¶VDSSRLQWPHQWVRI5XWK%DGHU*LQVEXUJLQDQG6WHSKHQ%UH\HULQ
had  the  general  effect  of  preventing  the  conservative  bloc  from  gaining  a  position  of  
GRPLQDQFH7KHYRWHVRI2¶&RQQRUDQG.HQQHG\FDPHWREHPRUHFULWLFDOLQ
determining  the  &RXUW¶VUHVSRQVHWRPDMRUFRQVWLWXWLRQDOTXHVWLRQVLQWKHV
These  two  justices  sided  with  the  conservatives  to  place  outer  limits  on  the  
congressional  power  under  the  Commerce  Clause  (see  United  States  v.  Lopez  [1995]  
and  United  States  v.  Morrison  [2000])  and  in  striking  down  a  provision  of  the  Brady  
Gun  Control  Act  in  1997  (see  Chapter  2).  The  same  five-member  majority  expanded  
the  scope  of  state  sovereign  immunity  under  the  Eleventh  Amendment,  striking  down  
significant  federal  legislation  including  provisions  of  the  Age  Discrimination  in  
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Employment  Act  and  the  Americans  with  Disabilities  Act  (see  Kimel  v.  Florida  
[2000]  and  Board  of  Trustees  of  the  University  of  Alabama  v.  Garrett  [2001],  both  of  
which  are  discussed  in  Chapter  5).  On  the  other  hand,  JXVWLFH2¶&RQQRUMRLQHGWKH
more  liberal  justices,  Stevens,  Souter,  Ginsburg,  and  Breyer,  in  holding  that  a  private  
individual  can  successfully  sue  a  state  under  Title  II  of  the  Americans  with  
Disabilities  Act  for  violation  of  the  right  of  access  to  courts.  The  majority  ruled  that  
this  right  is  protected  by  the  Due  Process  Clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  (see  
Tennessee  v.  Lane  [2004],  discussed  and  reprinted  in  Chapter  5).  Further  illustrating  
the  critical  role  of  the  moderates  on  the  Rehnquist  Court,  Justice  Kennedy  cast  a  key  
vote  siding  with  the  more  liberal  wing  in  blocking  the  effort  to  impose  term  limits  on  
members  of  the  U.S.  House  of  Representatives  (see  U.S.  Term  Limits,  Inc.  v.  Thornton  
[1995],  discussed  and  reprinted  in  Chapter  2).  
In  Bush  v.  Gore    -XVWLFHV.HQQHG\DQG2¶&RQQRUMRLQHGZLWKWKH
conservatives  in  ruling  in  favor  of  candidate  George  W.  Bush  in  a  sensational  case  
stemming  from  the  disputed  presidential  election  of  2000.  Yet  in  several  important  
cases  involving  social  issues,  KeQQHG\DQGRU2¶&RQQRUMRLQHGZLWKWKH&RXUW¶V
liberal  bloc,  thus  producing  a  majority.  Most  notably,  in  Lawrence  v.  Texas  (2003),  
ERWK.HQQHG\DQG2¶&RQQRUMRLQHGZLWKWKHOLEHUDOVDVWKH&RXUWVSOLW±3  in  striking  
down  a  Texas  law  criminalizing  homosexual  conduct.  In  Roper  v.  Simmons  (2005),  
Kennedy  sided  with  the  liberals  as  the  Court  split  5±4  in  striking  down  the  death  
penalty  for  juvenile  offenders.  And  in  McCreary  County  v.  ACLU    2¶&RQQRU
sided  with  the  liberal  bloc  in  a  5±4  decision  invalidating  a  public  display  of  the  Ten  
Commandments  inside  a  Kentucky  courthouse.  These  and  similar  decisions  produced  
outrage  among  social  conservatives  and  demonstrated  that,  contrary  to  the  hyperbolic  
claims  of  some  liberal  commentators,  the  Rehnquist  Court  was,  on  the  whole,  
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anything  but  reactionary.  
  
The  Roberts  Court  
The  membership  of  the  Supreme  Court  did  not  change  for  eleven  years  after  the  
appointment  of  Justice  Stephen  Breyer.  Then,  in  the  fall  of  2005,  the  Court  changed  
dramatically  as  the  result  of  one  death  and  one  retirement,  neither  of  which  was  
XQH[SHFWHG,Q-XO\-XVWLFH6DQGUD'D\2¶&RQQRUDQQRXQFHGWKDWVKHZRXOG
step  down  as  soon  as  a  successor  could  be  confirmed.  To  succeed  her,  President  
George  W.  Bush  nominated  Judge  John  G.  Roberts,  Jr.,  of  the  U.S.  Court  of  Appeals  
for  the  D.C.  Circuit.  But  shortly  before  the  Roberts  confirmation  hearing  was  to  
begin,  Chief  Justice  Rehnquist  died  in  office  on  September  3,  2005.  President  Bush  
decided  to  nominate  Roberts  for  the  vacant  chief  justiceship.  Widely  praised  for  his  
legal  acumen  and  judicial  temperament,  Roberts  was  easily  confirmed  by  the  Senate  
RQ6HSWHPEHU7RUHSODFH-XVWLFH2¶&RQQRU3UHVLGHQW%XVKILUVWQRPLQDWHG
White  House  counsel  Harriet  Myers,  but  the  nomination  was  withdrawn  after  a  
barrage  of  criticism  focusing  on,  among  other  things,  her  relative  lack  of  
qualifications  for  the  position.  Instead,  Bush  nominated  Judge  Samuel  Alito  of  the  
WKLUGIHGHUDOFLUFXLW-XGJH$OLWR¶VQRPLQDWLRQSURYHGWREHIDUPRUHFRQWHQWLRXVWKDQ
that  of  John  Roberts.  Despite  opposition  by  most  Democrats,  who  were  concerned  
DERYHDOODERXW$OLWR¶VSURSHQVLWLHVZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHDERUWLRQLVVXHWKHQHZHVW
justice  was  confirmed  by  a  58±42  vote.  
Under  the  new  chief  justice  the  Supreme  Court  continued  to  move,  with  notable  
exceptions,  in  a  conservative  direction.  The  most  conscpicuous  change  from  the  
Rehnquist  Court  occurred  in  April  2007  when  the  justices,  by  a  five-four  vote  upheld  
D³SDUWLDOELUWK´DERUWLRQODZ  that  Congress  enacted  in  2003  in  respRQVHWRWKH&RXUW¶V
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decision  in  2000  invalidating  a  Nebraska  partial  birth  abortion  statute.  The  federal  and  
state  statutes  at  issue  in  these  cases  were  almost  identical,  and  commentators  
recognized  the  abrupt  change  in  direction  as  a  reflection  of  ideological  or  
SKLORVRSKLFDOGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQ-XVWLFH6DQGUD'D\2¶&RQQRUZKRKDGFDVWWKH
pivotal  vote  striking  down  the  Nebraska  law,  and  her  successor,  Justice  Samuel  Alito,  
who  supported  the  new  federal  legislation.    
In  2007  the  Roberts  Court,  again  by  a  five-four  vote,  virtually  removed  affirmative  
action  considerations  in  public  school  desegregation  cases  by  striking  down  race-
based  pupil  reassignment  programs  in  Louisville,  Kentucky  and  Seattle,  Washington.  
In  2008  the  Court,  again  by  a  five-four  vote,  with  Chief  Justice  Roberts  dissenting  and  
Justice  Kennedy  casting  the  pivotal  vote,  invalidated  a  provision  of  the  Military  
&RPPLVVLRQV$FWWKDW&RQJUHVVKDGSDVVHGLQUHVSRQVHWRWKH&RXUW¶VHamdan  
decision  of  2006.  In  this  decision,  Boumediene  v.  Bush,  the  Court  concluded  that  the  
Military  Commissions  Act  violated  the  right  to  habeas  corpus  guaranteed  in  Article  I,  
Section  9  of  the  federal  Constitution.  Also  in  2008,  the  Supreme  Court  recognized  for  
the  first  time,  that  the  Second  Amendment  granted  an  individual,  as  distinguished  
IURPD³FROOHFWLYH´ULJKWWREHDUDUPVDistrict  of  Columbia  v.  Heller,  128  S.  Ct.  2783  
(2008).  Writing  for  a  five  member  majority,  Justice  Scalia,  emphasized  that  this  
individual  right  is  far  from  absolute  and  is  subject  to  a  number  of  regulatory  
exceptions  designed  to  ensure  public  safety.  In  still  another  2008  decision,  the  
Supreme  Court  held  unconstitutional  a  Louisiana  law  permitting  the  imposition  of  the  
death  penalty  for  child  rape  where  the  victim  did  not  die.  Justice  Kennedy  wrote  for  
the  majority,  while  Justice  Scalia  and  Chief  Justice  Roberts  filed  sharp  dissenting  
opinions.  Kennedy  v.  Louisiana,  128  S.  Ct.  2641  (2008).    
2QHRIWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWRIWKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQVZDV&DSHUWRQY0DVVH\
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Coal.  Here  the  Court  held  that  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  West  Virginia  Supreme  Court  
had  violated  the  due  process  clause  of  the  14th  Amendment  by  refusing  to  recuse  
himself  in  the  case  involving  a  litigant  who  contributed  over  three  million  dollars  to  
WKH&KLHI-XVWLFH¶VMXGLFLDO  election  campaign.  It  can  be  seen  from  this  incomplete  
summary  of  major  constitutional  decisions  that  the  record  of  the  Roberts  Court  is  
mixed  and  that  the  Chief  Justice  has  been  unable  to  bring  greater  consensus  to  the  
high  bench.    
In  the  late  spring  of  2009,  Justice  David  Souter  retired,  providing  President  Barak  
Obama  his  first  opportunity  to  fill  a  vacancy  on  the  Court.  President  Obama  then  used  
this  opportunity  to  nominate  the  first  Latino  woman  to  the  Court,  then-Judge  Sonia  
Sotomayor.  The  confirmation  process  was  filled  with  some  controversy  focused  on  a  
comment  she  had  made  in  an  previous  speech,  suggesting  that  a  Latino  woman  would  
be  able  to  decide  issues  brought  to  the  Supreme  Court  better  than  a  white  male  based  
upon  experience  and  perspective.  While  the  Republican  opposition  attempted  to  make  
this  a  defining  issue,  Sotomayor  was  overwhelmingly  confirmed  by  the  Senate  by  a  
vote  of  68-31  on  August  6,  2009.    
TO  SUMMARIZE:  
Judicial  review  is  the  power  of  a  court  of  law  to  invalidate  governmental  policies  
that  are  contrary  to  constitutional  principles.  
The  Framers  of  the  Constitution  did  not  explicitly  provide  for  the  power  of  
judicial  review.  The  Supreme  Court  asserted  this  authority  in  Marbury  v.  Madison  
(1803),  although  the  full  reach  of  the  power  of  judicial  review  was  not  realized  
until  the  twentieth  century.  
In  Scott  v.  Sandford  (1857),  the  Court  damaged  its  credibility  and  prestige  by  
invalidating  a  legislative  compromise  on  the  divisive  issue  of  slavery.  
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Judicial  review  again  became  a  subject  of  political  controversy  in  the  late  
nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  centuries  as  the  Supreme  Court  exercised  its  power  
to  limit  government  activity  in  the  economic  realm.  This  age  of  laissez-faire  
activism  entered  its  final  phase  in  a  showdown  between  the  Supreme  Court  and  
President  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt  over  the  constitutionality  of  the  New  Deal.  
From  1937  until  the  mid-1990s,  the  Court  consistently  upheld  sweeping  federal  
legislation  affecting  commerce.  The  Court  exercised  similar  restraint  with  respect  
to  state  laws  regulating  economic  activity.  
The  modern  Court  has  shown  heightened  concern  for  civil  rights  and  liberties.  
This  concern  was  especially  pronounced  during  the  Warren  era  (1953±1969).  The  
Burger  Court  (1969±1986)  and  the  Rehnquist  Court  (1986±2005)  attenuated  
somewhat  the  scope  of  civil  rights  and  liberties.  The  Roberts  Court  (2005-  )  has  
demonstrated  a  continued  move  in  a  more  conservative  direction  and  has  been  
unable  to  build  a  consensus  with  regard  to  numerous  issues.    
  
THE  ART  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  INTERPRETATION  
$VWKHIRUHJRLQJKLVWRULFDOVNHWFKLQGLFDWHVWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VSRZHURIMXGLFLDO
review  may  be  used  boldly  or  with  caution.  To  some  extent,  the  approach  the  Court  
adopts  in  a  given  case  depends  on  the  nature  of  the  issue  and  the  complexion  of  
political  forces  surrounding  the  case.  It  also  depends,  however,  on  the  philosophies  of  
the  justices  who  happen  to  be  on  the  Court  at  a  given  time.  The  justices  have  varying  
views  about  the  role  of  the  Court  in  the  political  system  and  the  conditions  under  
which  judicial  review  ought  to  be  exercised.  They  also  differ  in  their  understandings  
of  the  Constitution  and  their  theories  as  to  how  the  Constitution  should  be  interpreted.  
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Interpretivism  and  Originalism  
The  most  orthodox  judicial  philosophy  is  known  as  interpretivism,  so  called  because  
of  its  insistence  that  the  proper  judicial  function  is  interpretation,  as  opposed  to  
lawmaking.  Interpretivism  holds  that  judicial  review  is  legitimate  only  insofar  as  
judges  base  their  decisions  squarely  on  the  Constitution.  Interpretivists  argue  that  
judges  must  be  guided  by  the  plain  meaning  of  the  constitutional  text  when  it  is  clear.  
In  the  absence  of  plain  textual  meaning,  judges  should  attempt  to  determine  the  
original  meaning  of  the  language  of  the  Framers.  This  element  of  the  interpretivist  
perspective  is  often  referred  to  as  originalism  or  the  doctrine  of  original  intent.  
,QDOHWWHUWR:LOVRQ1LFKRODV3UHVLGHQW7KRPDV-HIIHUVRQZURWHLQ³2XU
peculiar  security  is  in  the  possession  of  a  written  Constitution.  Let  us  not  make  it  a  
EODQNSDSHUE\FRQVWUXFWLRQ´6LPLODUO\LQDQOHWWHUWR+HQU\/HH-DPHV
0DGLVRQDSSHDUHGWRHQGRUVHWKHGRFWULQHRIRULJLQDOLQWHQWE\DUJXLQJWKDWLI³WKH
sense  in  which  the  Constitution  was  accepted  and  ratified  by  the  Nation«  be  not  the  
guide  in  expounding  it,  there  can  be  no  security  for  a  consistent  and  stable  
JRYHUQPHQW>QRU@IRUDIDLWKIXOH[HUFLVHRILWVSRZHUV´/LNHZLVH&KLHI-XVWLFH-RKQ
Marshall,  in  Marbury  v.  Madison  and  other  opinions,  stressed  the  need  for  judicial  
fidelity  to  the  original  understanding  of  the  Constitution.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  
that  Marshall  often  disagreed  with  Jefferson  and  Madison  as  to  the  intentions  of  the  
Framers,  just  as  judges,  legislators,  presidents  and  scholars  have  often  disagreed  on  
original  intent  in  the  more  than  two  centuries  since  the  Constitution  was  framed.  
The  doctrine  of  original  intent  took  on  a  distinctly  political  aspect  during  the  
V,WZDVYHU\PXFKDSDUWRIWKH5HDJDQDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VMXGLFLDOSKLORsophy.  
Attorney  General  Edwin  Meese  made  a  series  of  public  speeches  in  1985  in  which  he  
castigated  the  modern  Court  for  allegedly  ignoring  original  intent.  In  a  highly  
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publicized  speech  at  Georgetown  University,  Justice  William  Brennan  rebutted  
Meese,  sayLQJ³,WLVDUURJDQWWRSUHWHQGWKDWIURPRXUYDQWDJHSRLQWZHFDQJDXJH
accurately  the  intent  of  the  Framers  on  application  of  principle  to  specific,  
FRQWHPSRUDU\TXHVWLRQV´%UHQQDQDUJXHGWKDWMXGJHVPXVW³UHDGWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQWKH
only  way  we  can:  as  tZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\$PHULFDQV´ Newsweek,  October  28,  1985,  pp.  
97±98).  
The  doctrine  of  original  intent  also  played  an  important  role  in  the  Reagan  
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VDWWHPSWWRUHVKDSHWKHIHGHUDOMXGLFLDU\,WZDVLQODUJHPHDVXUHGXH
to  his  adherence  to  this  doctrine  that  Robert  Bork  was  nominated  to  the  Supreme  
&RXUWZKHQ-XVWLFH3RZHOOUHWLUHGLQ%RUN¶VGHIHQVHRIVWULFWRULJLQDOLVPZDV
one  of  several  factors  contributing  to  his  rejection  by  the  Senate  following  a  heated  
confirmation  battle.  
In  recent  \HDUVKRZHYHUWKHHPSKDVLVKDVVKLIWHGIURP³RULJLQDOLQWHQW´WR
³RULJLQDOPHDQLQJ´LQIOXHQFHGPRVWVLJQLILFDQWO\E\WKHYLHZVRI-XVWLFH$QWRQLQ
Scalia.  In  addition  to  its  emphasis  on  original  meaning,  interpretivism  stresses  the  
need  for  judges  to  respect  history  and  tradition  and,  in  particular,  legal  precedent.  
Essentially,  interpretivism  calls  for  judges  to  maintain  as  best  they  can  the  original  
Constitution,  with  a  minimum  of  judicial  modification.  
  
Noninterpretivism  
Many  judges  and  constitutional  scholars  do  not  accept  the  interpretivist  view.  They  
raise  serious  questions  about  the  practicability  and  desirability  of  interpretivism,  
HVSHFLDOO\RQWKHLVVXHRIRULJLQDOLQWHQW,WLVRIWHQDUJXHGWKDWWKH³LQWHQWRIWKH
)UDPHUV´LVLPSRVVLEOHWRGLVFHUQRQPDQ\LVVXHV-XVWLFH6FDOLD¶VUHOLDQFHRQRULJLQDO
meaning  underscores  acknowledgment  of  the  perceived  shortcomings  of  the  search  
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for  original  intent.  Many  would  argue  that  original  intent,  even  if  knowable,  should  
not  control  contemporary  constitutional  decision  making.  These  commentators  tend  to  
view  the  Constitution  as  a  living  document,  the  meaning  of  which  evolves  according  
WRZKDW-XVWLFH2OLYHU:HQGHOO+ROPHVFDOOHGWKH³IHOWQHFHVVLWLHV´RIWKHWLPHV  
Numerous  noninterpretive  theories  have  been  developed,  drawing  on  a  number  of  
schools  of  legal  thought.  Some  have  suggested  that  the  Court  should  strive  to  reflect  
societal  consensus.  Others  have  urged  that  the  Court  adopt  an  explicit  position  of  
moral  leadership,  striving  to  elevate  and  enlighten  society  rather  than  merely  reflect  
prevailing  norms.  Noninterpretivists,  whatever  their  particular  philosophies,  are  
united  in  their  rejection  of  the  idea  that  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution  is  rigid  and  
static.  A  contemporary  example  of  this  dynamic  view  of  the  Constitution  is  provided  
by  Justice  Stephen  G.  Breyer  in  his  book  Active  Liberty:  Interpreting  Our  Democratic  
Constitution  (2005).  
  
Natural  Law  
Another  perspective,  not  easily  identified  with  either  interpretivism  or  
noninterpretivism,  is  one  that  argues  for  judicial  reliance  on  natural  law.  Natural  law  
is  a  complex  term  with  many  connotations,  but  it  generally  refers  to  a  set  of  principles  
transcending  human  authority  that  may  be  discovered  through  reason.  Natural  law  is  
often  associated  with  religion  and,  in  particular,  the  moral  and  ethical  values  of  the  
Judeo-Christian  tradition.  Although  occasionally  invoked  by  individual  justices,  the  
natural  law  perspective  has,  for  the  most  part,  been  eschewed  by  the  modern  Supreme  
Court.  Students  should  recall,  however,  that  natural  law  and  the  related  concept  of  
natural  rights,  with  its  emphasis  on  inalienable  freedoms,  contributed  significantly  to  
the  intellectual  foundations  of  the  American  republic.  
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An  Ongoing  Dialogue  
The  Supreme  Court  has  never  wed  itself  to  any  one  judicial  philosophy  or  theory  of  
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ5DWKHUWKH&RXUW¶VQXPHURXVFRQVWLWXWLRQDOGHFLVLRQV
reflect  an  ongoing  philosophical  and  theoretical  dialogue,  both  from  within  and  
ZLWKRXWWKH&RXUW7KH&RXUW¶VRSLQLRQVDre  rife  with  arguments  about  fidelity  to  the  
³LQWHQWRIWKH)UDPHUV´RUWKH³RULJLQDOPHDQLQJ´RIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQYHUVXVWKHQHHG
WRNHHSWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ³LQWXQHZLWKWKHWLPHV´7KHVHGHEDWHVDUHIXQGDPHQWDOO\
about  the  proper  role  of  a  powerful,  life-tenured,  black-robed  elite  within  a  democratic  
polity,  and  about  the  duty  of  that  elite  to  ensure  that  our  eighteenth  century  
Constitution  is  both  meaningful  and  relevant  in  the  twenty-first  century.  
TO  SUMMARIZE:  
Interpretivism  holds  that  in  interpreting  the  Constitution,  judges  must  be  guided  
by  the  plain  meaning  of  the  text  when  it  is  clear.  In  the  absence  of  plain  textual  
meaning,  judges  should  attempt  to  determine  the  original  intentions  of  the  Framers  
or  the  original  meaning  of  constitutional  language.  Interpretivism  also  stresses  
history  and  tradition  and,  in  particular,  legal  precedent.  Essentially,  interpretivism  
calls  for  judges  to  maintain  as  best  they  can  the  original  Constitution,  with  a  
minimum  of  judicial  modification.  
Noninterpretivists  argue  that  original  intent,  even  if  knowable,  should  not  control  
contemporary  constitutional  decision  making.  They  view  the  Constitution  as  a  
living  document,  the  meaning  of  which  evolves  according  to  what  Justice  Oliver  
:HQGHOO+ROPHVFDOOHGWKH³IHOWQHFHVVLWLHV´RIWKHWLPHV  
The  Supreme  Court  has  never  adhered  to  any  one  judicial  philosophy  or  theory  of  
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ5DWKHUWKH&RXUW¶VQXPHURXVFRQVWLWXWLRQDOGHFLVLRQV
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reflect  an  ongoing  philosophical  and  theoretical  dialogue,  both  from  within  and  
without  the  Court.  
  
JUDICIAL  ACTIVISM  AND  RESTRAINT  
Scholarly  commentary  on  the  Supreme  Court  often  uses  the  terms  activism  and  
restraint²sometimes  referred  to  as  maximalism  and  minimalism²to  describe  
SDUWLFXODUGHFLVLRQVGRFWULQHVRUMXVWLFHV¶Dpproaches.  These  terms  denote  opposing  
philosophies  regarding  the  exercise  of  judicial  power.  Under  the  philosophy  of  
judicial  restraint,  federal  courts  are  viewed  as  performing  a  circumscribed  role  in  the  
political  system.  Judges  are  not  seen  as  Platonic  *XDUGLDQVRU³SKLORVRSKHUNLQJV´
They  are  not  the  primary  custodians  of  the  general  welfare,  since  that  role  belongs  to  
Congress  and  the  state  legislatures.  Doctrines  like  standing,  mootness,  ripeness,  and  
the  like  are  reflections  of  judicial  restraint  in  that  they  serve  to  limit  judicial  inquiry  
into  constitutional  matters.  
The  countervailing  philosophy  to  judicial  restraint  is  judicial  activism.  Activist  
judges  tend  to  see  the  courts  as  coequal  participants,  along  with  the  legislative  and  
executive  branches,  in  the  process  of  public  policy  making.  Activists  are  thus  
impatient  with  self-imposed  limitations  on  judicial  review,  and  tend  to  brush  aside  
doctrinal  restraints.  A  jurist  of  activist  views,  Justice  William  O.  Douglas  once  
UHPDUNHGWKDW³>L@WLVIDU  more  important  to  be  respectful  to  the  Constitution  than  to  a  
FRRUGLQDWHEUDQFKRIJRYHUQPHQW´ Massachusetts  v.  Laird  [1970],  dissenting  
opinion).  Dissenting  in  Paul  v.  Davis  (1976),  Justice  Brennan  expressed  similar  
sentiments  regarding  the  role  of  the  Supreme  Court:  
,KDGDOZD\VWKRXJKWWKDWRQHRIWKLVFRXUW¶VPRVWLPSRUWDQWUROHVZDVWRSURYLGHD
bulwark  against  governmental  violation  of  the  constitutional  safeguards  securing  
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in  our  free  society  the  legitimate  expectations  of  every  person  to  innate  human  
dignity  and  a  sense  of  worth.  
  
One  should  remember  that  judicial  power  can  be  used  for  liberal  or  conservative  
policy  goals.  The  debate  over  judicial  activism  is  a  long-standing  one,  and  can  be  
traced  to  decisions  like  Scott  v.  Sandford  (1857),  in  which  a  conservative  Supreme  
Court  actively  defended  the  institution  of  slavery  on  dubious  constitutional  grounds.  
Along  the  same  lines,  in  Lochner  v.  New  York  (1905),  a  conservative  Court  used  its  
power  without  restraint  to  frustrate  the  implementation  of  progressive  economic  
legislation.  
Much  of  American  constitutional  law  can  be  seen  as  an  ongoing  debate  between  
judicial  activism  and  judicial  restraint.  In  a  system  committed  both  to  representative  
democracy  and  avoidance  of  the  tyranny  of  the  majority,  it  is  inevitable  that  the  courts  
will  wrestle  with  the  problem  of  defining  the  proper  judicial  role.  This  dynamic  
WHQVLRQLVPRVWYLVLEOHLQWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VH[HUFLVHRIWKHSRZHURIMXGLFLDO
review.  
  
The  Ashwander  Rules  
The  philosophy  of  judicial  restraint  counsels  judges  to  avoid  broad  or  dramatic  
constitutional  pronouncements.  Accordingly,  various  doctrines  limit  the  exercise  of  
judicial  review,  even  after  a  federal  court  has  reached  the  merits  of  a  case.  Some  of  
these  rules  are  codified  in  Justice  Louis  BUDQGHLV¶VRIW-cited  concurring  opinion  in  
Ashwander  v.  Tennessee  Valley  Authority  (1936).  In  Ashwander,  the  Supreme  Court  
XSKHOGWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQW¶VSURJUDPRIEXLOGLQJGDPVWRJHQHUDWHHOHFWULFDO
power  in  the  Tennessee  Valley  region.  Justice  Brandeis¶VFRQFXUULQJRSLQLRQKDV
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become  a  classic  statement  of  the  principles  of  judicial  restraint.  The  Ashwander  
rules,  as  they  have  come  to  be  known,  seek  to  protect  judicial  power  not  only  by  
deflecting  constitutional  questions  but  by  making  narrow  rulings  when  constitutional  
issues  are  considered.  

[Start  ³6LGHEDUThe  Ashwander  Rules´  box  here]  
Sidebar:  The  Ashwander  Rules  
The  court  will  not  pass  upon  the  constitutionality  of  legislation  in  a  friendly,  
nonadversary  proceeding,  declining  because  to  decide  such  questions  is  legitimate  
only  in  the  last  resort,  and  as  a  necessity  in  the  determination  of  a  real,  earnest,  
and  vital  controversy  between  individuals.  
The  Court  will  not  anticipate  a  question  of  constitutional  law  in  advance  of  the  
necessity  of  deciding  it.  
It  is  not  the  habit  of  the  Court  to  decide  questions  of  a  constitutional  nature  unless  
absolutely  necessary  to  a  decision  of  the  case.  
The  Court  will  not  formulate  a  rule  of  constitutional  law  broader  than  is  required  
by  the  precise  facts  to  which  it  is  to  be  applied.  
The  Court  will  not  pass  upon  a  constitutional  question  although  properly  
presented  by  the  record,  if  there  is  also  present  some  other  ground  upon  which  the  
case  may  be  disposed  of.  
The  Court  will  not  pass  upon  the  validity  of  a  statute  upon  complaint  of  one  who  
fails  to  show  that  he  is  injured  by  its  operation.  
The  Court  will  not  pass  upon  the  constitutionality  of  a  statute  at  the  instance  of  
one  who  has  availed  himself  of  its  benefits.  
When  the  validity  of  an  act  of  the  Congress  is  drawn  in  question,  and  even  if  a  
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serious  doubt  of  constitutionality  is  raised,  it  is  a  cardinal  principle  that  this  Court  
will  first  ascertain  whether  a  construction  of  the  statute  is  fairly  possible  by  which  
the  question  may  be  avoided.  
[End  ³6LGHEDUThe  Ashwander  Rules´  box  here]  
  
The  Doctrine  of  Strict  Necessity  
Under  the  doctrine  of  strict  necessity,  federal  courts  will  attempt  to  avoid  a  
constitutional  question  if  a  case  can  be  decided  on  nonconstitutional  grounds.  For  
example,  in  Communist  Party  of  the  United  States  v.  Subversive  Activities  Control  
Board  (1956),  the  Supreme  Court  remanded  a  case  to  a  government  agency  for  further  
proceedings  rather  than  reach  the  sensitive  political  issue  of  whether  the  Communist  
Party  enjoyed  constitutional  protection.  Similarly,  in  Hurd  v.  Hodge  (1948),  the  Court  
DGGUHVVHGWKHLVVXHRI³UHVWULFWLYHFRYHQDQWV´SULYDWHDJUHHPHQWVSURKLELWLQJWKHVDOH
and  rental  of  housing  to  blacks  and  other  minorities.  The  Court  held  that  enforcement  
of  restrictive  covenants  by  federal  courts  in  the  District  of  Columbia  would  violate  
national  public  policy,  but  it  did  not  reach  the  question  of  whether  such  enforcement  
ZRXOGYLRODWHWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ7KH&RXUWVDLG³,WLVDZHOOVHWWOHGSULQFLSOHWKDWWKLV
court  will  not  decide  constitutional  questions  where  other  grounds  are  available  and  
GLVSRVLWLYHRIWKHLVVXHVRIWKHFDVH´7KH&RXUWFKRVHQRWWRDYRLGWKLVFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
issue  in  a  similar  case  arising  in  a  state  court,  however,  ruling  that  state  judicial  
enforcement  violates  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  (see  
Shelley  v.  Kraemer  [1948],  discussed  in  Chapter  7,  Volume  II).  
  
The  Doctrine  of  Saving  Construction  
Before  a  court  can  determine  the  constitutionality  of  a  statute,  it  must  first  determine  
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its  exact  meaning.  This  is  known  as  statutory  construction.  In  construing  statutes,  
courts  often  look  beyond  the  language  of  the  law  to  the  intent  of  the  legislature.  
Sometimes,  the  intent  is  clearly  revealed  in  the  legislative  debate  surrounding  the  
adoption  of  the  law.  Often,  however,  legislative  intent  is  not  clear,  and  courts  must  
exercise  discretion  in  deciding  what  the  law  means.  Sometimes,  the  judicial  
interpretation  of  the  statute  may  determine  its  constitutionality.  Where  a  challenged  
law  is  subject  to  different  interpretations,  judicial  restraint  demands  that  a  court  
choose  an  interpretation  that  preserves  the  constitutionality  of  the  law.  This  is  known  
as  the  doctrine  of  saving  construction.  In  National  Labor  Relations  Board  v.  Jones  
&  Laughlin  Steel  Corporation  (1937),  the  Supreme  Court  upheld  the  Wagner  Act  of  
1935,  a  controversial  federal  statute  regulating  labor  management  relations  in  major  
industries  (see  Chapter  2).  The  Jones  &  Laughlin  Steel  Corporation  argued  that  the  act  
was  a  thinly  disguised  attempt  to  regulate  all  industries,  rather  than  merely  those  that  
DIIHFWHGLQWHUVWDWHFRPPHUFH7KLVSRLQWZDVFUXFLDOEHFDXVH&RQJUHVV¶VSRZHULQ
this  field  is  limited  to  the  regulation  of  interstate  commerce.  Given  the  choice  between  
two  interpretations  of  the  act,  the  Court  chose  the  narrower  one,  leading  to  a  
conclusion  that  the  act  was  valid.  Writing  for  the  majority,  Chief  Justice  Charles  
Evans  Hughes  observed:  
The  cardinal  principle  of  statutory  construction  is  to  save  and  not  to  destroy.  We  
have  repeatedly  held  that  as  between  two  possible  interpretations  of  a  statute,  by  
one  of  which  it  would  be  unconstitutional  and  by  the  other  valid,  our  plain  duty  is  
to  adopt  that  which  will  save  the  act.  
  
On  April  24,  1996,  President  Clinton  signed  into  law  the  Antiterrorism  and  
Effective  Death  Penalty  Act  of  1996.  One  of  the  provisions  of  this  statute  curtails  

Stephens  and  Scheb  1-71  

second  habeas  corpus  petitions  by  state  prisoners  who  have  already  filed  such  
petitions  in  federal  court.  Under  the  new  statute,  any  second  or  subsequent  habeas  
petition  must  meet  a  particularly  high  standard  and  must  pass  through  a  gatekeeping  
function  exercised  by  the  U.S.  Courts  of  Appeals.  A  circuit  court  must  grant  a  motion  
giving  the  inmate  permission  to  file  the  petition  in  a  district  court;;  denial  of  this  
motion  is  not  appealable  to  the  Supreme  Court.  A  prisoner  on  death  row  in  Georgia  
challenged  the  constitutionality  of  this  provision,  posing  two  constitutional  objections:  
(1)  that  the  new  law  amounted  to  an  unconstitutional  suspension  of  the  writ  of  habeas  
FRUSXVDQG  WKDWWKHSURKLELWLRQDJDLQVW6XSUHPH&RXUWUHYLHZRIDFLUFXLWFRXUW¶V
denial  of  permission  to  file  a  subsequent  habeas  petition  is  an  unconstitutional  
LQWHUIHUHQFHZLWKWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQDVGHILQHGLQ$UWLFOH,,,RIWKH
Constitution.  In  Felker  v.  Turpin  (1996),  the  Supreme  Court  unanimously  rejected  
these  challenges  to  the  statute.  In  a  saving  construction,  the  Court  interpreted  the  
statute  in  such  a  way  as  to  preserve  the  right  of  state  prisoners  to  file  habeas  petitions  
directly  in  the  Supreme  Court.  The  Court  stated,  however,  that  it  would  exercise  this  
MXULVGLFWLRQRQO\LQ³H[FHSWLRQDOFLUFXPVWDQFHV´  
  
The  Presumption  of  Constitutionality  
Perhaps  the  most  fundamental  self-imposed  limitation  on  the  exercise  of  judicial  
review  is  the  presumption  of  constitutionality.  Under  this  doctrine,  courts  will  
presume  a  challenged  statute  is  valid  until  it  is  demonstrated  otherwise.  In  other  
words,  the  party  attacking  the  validity  of  the  law  carries  the  burden  of  persuasion.  
This  doctrine  is  based  on  an  appreciation  for  the  countermajoritarian  character  of  
judicial  review  and  a  fundamental  respect  for  the  legislative  bodies  in  a  democratic  
system.  
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The  modern  Supreme  Court  has  modified  the  doctrine  of  presumptive  
constitutionality  with  respect  to  laws  discriminating  against  citizens  on  grounds  such  
as  race,  religion,  and  national  origin.  Such  laws  are  now  seen  as  inherently  suspect  
and  are  subjected  to  strict  scrutiny.  Similarly,  laws  abridging  fundamental  rights  
are  not  afforded  the  traditional  presumption  of  validity.  
  
The  Narrowness  Doctrine  
When  a  federal  court  invalidates  a  statute,  it  usually  does  so  on  fairly  narrow  grounds.  
The  narrowness  doctrine  counsels  courts  to  avoid  broad  pronouncements  that  might  
carry  unforeseen  implications  for  future  cases.  A  narrowly  grounded  decision  
accomplishes  the  desired  result,  striking  down  an  unconstitutional  statute,  while  
preserving  future  judicial  and  legislative  options.  
In  Bowsher  v.  Synar  (1986),  the  Supreme  Court  struck  down  a  provision  of  the  
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings  Act,  a  law  designed  to  reduce  the  federal  deficit  through  
automatic  spending  cuts.  The  plaintiff,  Congressman  Mike  Synar,  asked  the  Court  to  
LQYDOLGDWHWKHVWDWXWHRQWKHJURXQGVWKDWLWXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\GHOHJDWHG&RQJUHVV¶V
lawmaking  power  to  the  comptroller  general,  an  appointed  official.  Instead,  the  Court  
held  that  Congress  could  not  exercise  removal  powers  over  the  comptroller  general  
since  he  performed  executive  functions  under  the  act.  Thus  the  Court  avoided  the  
issue  of  congressional  delegation  of  legislative  power  altogether.  The  delegation  issue  
is  potentially  explosive  because  so  many  of  the  regulations  promulgated  by  the  federal  
bureaucracy  are  based  on  authority  delegated  by  Congress  to  the  executive  branch  
(see  Chapter  4).  
  
Avoiding  the  Creation  of  New  Principles  
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A  variation  on  the  narrowness  doctrine  is  that  courts  should  not  create  a  new  principle  
if  a  case  may  be  decided  on  the  basis  of  an  existing  one.  Thus,  in  Stanley  v.  Georgia  
(1969),  the  Supreme  Court  struck  down  a  state  law  making  it  a  crime  to  possess  
obscene  material  in  the  home.  Stretching  the  boundaries  of  the  First  Amendment,  the  
Court  held  that  this  law  was  a  violation  of  the  freedom  of  expression.  Alternatively,  
the  Court  could  have  created  a  right  of  privacy  to  engage  in  certain  activities  in  the  
home  that  might  be  subject  to  arrest  outside  the  home.  This,  however,  would  have  
required  the  Court  to  consider  the  constitutionality  of  numerous  criminal  prohibitions,  
including  laws  governing  possession  and  XVHRI³UHFUHDWLRQDO´GUXJV  
The  federal  appellate  courts  are  not  bound  to  address  constitutional  issues  
precisely  as  they  have  been  framed  by  the  litigants.  In  its  grant  of  certiorari,  the  
Supreme  Court  may  direct  the  parties  to  address  certain  issues,  and  then  refuse  to  
decide  these  issues.  For  example,  in  Illinois  v.  Gates  (1983),  the  Supreme  Court  
directed  the  parties  to  argue  the  so-FDOOHG³JRRGIDLWKH[FHSWLRQ´WRWKH)RXUWK
Amendment  exclusionary  rule  (see  Chapter  5,  Volume  II).  In  its  final  decision  in  
Gates,  the  Court  did  not  address  the  highly  controversial  good  faith  exception,  but  
decided  the  case  on  other  grounds,  thus  postponing  for  one  year  the  creation  of  a  new  
principle  of  constitutional  law.  
  
Stare  Decisis    
The  term  stare  decisis   ³VWDQGE\  GHFLGHGPDWWHUV´ UHIHUVWRWKHGRFWULQHRISUHFHGHQW
It  is  axiomatic  that  American  courts  of  law  should  follow  precedent  whenever  
possible,  thus  maintaining  stability  and  continuity  in  the  law.  As  Justice  Louis  
%UDQGHLVRQFHUHPDUNHG³Stare  decisis  is  usually  the  wise  policy,  because  in  most  
matters  it  is  more  important  that  the  applicable  rule  of  law  be  settled  than  that  it  be  
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VHWWOHGULJKW´ Burnett  v.  Coronado  Oil  Company  [1932],  dissenting  opinion).  
Devotion  to  precedent  is  considered  a  hallmark  of  judicial  restraint.  Obviously,  
IROORZLQJSUHFHGHQWOLPLWVDMXGJH¶VDELOLW\WRGHWHUPLQHWKHRXWFRPHRIDFDVHLQD
way  that  he  or  she  might  choose  if  it  were  a  matter  of  first  impression.  The  decision  in  
Roe  v.  Wade  poses  an  interesting  problem  for  new  Supreme  Court  justices  who  
believe  the  decision  legalizing  abortion  was  incorrect.  Should  a  new  justice  who  
believes  Roe  was  wrongly  decided  vote  to  overrule  it,  or  should  stare  decisis  be  
observed?  
Although  the  doctrine  of  stare  decisis  applies  to  American  constitutional  law,  it  is  
not  uncommon  for  the  Court  to  depart  from  precedent.  Perhaps  the  most  famous  
reversal  is  Brown  v.  Board  of  Education  (1954),  in  which  the  Supreme  Court  
repudiated  the  separate  but  equal  doctrine  of  Plessy  v.  Ferguson  (1896).  The  separate  
but  equal  doctrine  had  legitimized  racial  segregation  in  this  country  for  nearly  six  
decades.  Beginning  with  the  Brown  decision,  official  segregation  was  invalidated  as  a  
denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  
  
The  Severability  Doctrine  
Under  the  doctrine  of  severability,  federal  courts  will  generally  attempt  to  excise  the  
unconstitutional  elements  of  a  statute  while  leaving  the  rest  of  the  law  intact.  In  
Champlin  Refining  Company  v.  Corporation  Commission  of  Oklahoma  (1932),  the  
Supreme  Court  VDLGWKDWLQYDOLGSURYLVLRQVRIDODZDUHWREHVHYHUHG³XQOHVVLWLV
evident  that  the  Legislature  would  not  have  enacted  those  provisions  which  are  within  
LWVSRZHULQGHSHQGHQWO\RIWKDWZKLFKLVQRW´7KHVHYHUDELOLW\GRFWULQHLVFRQVLVWHQW
with  the  philosophy  of  judicial  restraint,  in  that  judicial  review  is  employed  with  a  
PLQLPXPRI³GDPDJH´WRWKHZRUNRIWKHOHJLVODWXUH  
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In  Immigration  and  Naturalization  Service  v.  Chadha  (1983),  for  example,  the  
Supreme  Court  invalidated  Section  244(c)(2)  of  the  Immigration  and  Nationality  Act.  
This  specific  provision  permitted  one  house  of  Congress  to  veto  decisions  of  the  
H[HFXWLYHEUDQFKUHJDUGLQJGHSRUWDWLRQRIDOLHQV7KH&RXUWIRXQGWKLV³OHJLVODWLYH
YHWR´WREHDQXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOH[HUFLVHRISRZHUE\&RQJUHVs  (see  Chapter  4).  The  
remainder  of  the  Immigration  and  Nationality  Act,  a  very  important  statute  from  the  
standpoint  of  immigration  policy,  was  left  intact.  
Frequently  Congress  will  attach  a  severability  clause  to  a  piece  of  legislation,  
indicating  its  desire  that  any  unconstitutional  provisions  be  severed  from  the  rest  of  
the  statute.  Absent  a  severability  clause,  federal  courts  may  presume  an  enactment  
was  intended  to  be  judged  as  a  whole.  
5HODWHGWRWKHFRQFHSWRIVHYHUDELOLW\LVWKHLQFOXVLRQRID³VDYLQJ´FODXVHLQPDQ\
statutes.  In  attempting  to  keep  pace  with  social  change  and  current  demands  on  
government,  Congress  routinely  enacts  legislation  repealing  earlier  statutes.  
Logically,  a  repeal  would  set  aside  or  bring  to  an  end  all  pending  matters  governed  by  
the  repealed  statute.  The  saving  clause  simply  indicates  that  repeal  of  the  earlier  
statute  is  subject  to  certain  exceptions.  For  example,  in  repealing  criminal  statutes,  
Congress  often  provides  that  prosecutions  initiated  prior  to  repeal  may  be  pursued  
under  repealed  provisions.  
Although  serious  constitutional  questions  may  be  raised  with  respect  to  such  
clauses,  the  Supreme  Court  generally  recognizes  their  validity.  The  point  is  well  
illustrated  by  the  decision  in  Bradley  v.  United  States  (1973).  Bradley  was  convicted  
in  1971  of  conspiring  to  sell  cocaine  in  violation  of  a  federal  statute  that  imposed  a  
mandatory  five-year  prison  term  on  offenders.  The  statute  under  which  he  was  
prosecuted  was  repealed  five  days  before  his  conviction  and  sentencing.  The  new  law  
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contained  less  punitive  sentencing  requirements.  Nevertheless,  Bradley  was  sentenced  
to  the  mandatory  five-year  term  under  the  original  statute.  The  Supreme  Court  
affirmed  his  conviction  and  sentence,  upholding  the  validity  of  the  saving  clause  
contained  in  the  act  of  repeal.  
  
³8QFRQVWLWXWLRQDODV$SSOLHG´  
The  severability  clause  from  the  Immigration  and  Nationality  Act  just  discussed  
distinguishes  between  judicial  invalidation  of  a  law  as  inherently  unconstitutional  and  
invalidation  of  a  law  as  applied  to  particular  persons  or  circumstances.  The  
philosophy  of  judicial  restraint  suggests  that,  if  possible,  courts  refrain  from  making  
GHFODUDWLRQVWKDWDFKDOOHQJHGVWDWXWHLVLQYDOLG³RQLWVIDFH´:KHWKHUDIHGHUDOFRXUW
will  invalidate  a  statute  on  its  face  or  as  applied  depends  on  the  language  of  the  law  
and  the  facts  of  the  case  in  which  the  law  is  challenged.  
%\ZD\RILOOXVWUDWLRQFRQVLGHUWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQCohen  v.  
California  (1971).  There,  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  a  state  ³RIIHQVLYHFRQGXFW´ODZ
was  unconstitutional  as  applied  to  a  case  where  a  man  was  prosecuted  for  wearing  a  
MDFNHWEHDULQJWKHVORJDQ³)XFNWKH'UDIW´7KH&RXUWKHOGWKDWWRSXQLVK&RKHQ¶V
³LPPDWXUHDQWLF´DVRIIHQVLYHFRQGXFWZRXOGEHWRGHQ\KLVULJKWRf  free  speech  
guaranteed  by  the  First  Amendment.  On  the  other  hand,  in  Brandenburg  v.  Ohio  
(1969),  the  Court  struck  down  a  state  criminal  syndicalism  law  as  inherently  
XQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOXQGHUWKH)LUVW$PHQGPHQWEHFDXVHWKHODZSURKLELWHGWKH³PHUH
advocac\´RIYLROHQFH %RWKCohen  and  Brandenburg  are  discussed  in  Chapter  3,  
Volume  II.)  
It  must  be  noted  that  all  of  the  limiting  doctrines  are  subject  to  a  degree  of  
manipulation  to  achieve  desired  outcomes.  The  doctrines  are  sufficiently  complex  and  
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imprecise  to  permit  two  judges  to  reach  opposite  conclusions  about  their  application  
to  a  given  case.  Nevertheless,  the  creation  and  continuance  of  these  doctrines  suggest  
sensitivity  on  the  part  of  the  federal  judiciary  to  the  inherent  tensions  surrounding  the  
exercise  of  judicial  review  in  a  democratic  polity.  
  
TO  SUMMARIZE:  
Constitutional  lawmaking  involves  an  ongoing  debate  between  judicial  activism  
and  judicial  restraint.  Today,  these  perspectives  are  sometimes  labeled  
maximalism  and  minimalism.  
Under  the  philosophy  of  judicial  restraint,  federal  courts  are  viewed  as  performing  
a  circumscribed  role  in  the  political  system.  Activist  judges  tend  to  see  the  courts  
as  coequal  participants,  along  with  the  legislative  and  executive  branches,  in  the  
process  of  public  policy  making.  
The  philosophy  of  judicial  restraint  counsels  judges  to  avoid  broad  or  dramatic  
constitutional  pronouncements.  Accordingly,  various  doctrines  limit  the  exercise  
of  judicial  review,  even  after  a  federal  court  has  reached  the  merits  of  a  case.  
6RPHRIWKHVHUXOHVDUHFRGLILHGLQ-XVWLFH%UDQGHLV¶VFRQFXUULQJRSLQLRQLQ
Ashwander  v.  Tennessee  Valley  Authority  (1936).  
The  most  important  principles  of  judicial  restraint  are  the  doctrine  of  strict  
necessity,  the  doctrine  of  saving  construction,  the  narrowness  doctrine,  the  
presumption  of  constitutionality,  the  severability  doctrine,  and  stare  decisis.  
  
EXTERNAL  CONSTRAINTS  ON  JUDICIAL  POWER  
Although  the  federal  courts,  and  the  Supreme  Court  in  particular,  are  often  
characterized  as  guardians  of  the  Constitution,  the  judicial  branch  is  by  no  means  
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immune  to  the  abuse  of  power.  Accordingly,  the  federal  judiciary  is  subject  to  
constraints  imposed  by  Congress  and  the  president.  In  a  constitutional  system  that  
seeks  to  prevent  any  agency  of  government  from  exercising  unchecked  power,  even  
the  Supreme  Court  is  subject  to  checks  and  balances.  
  
Judicial  Dependency  on  Congress  
Article  III  of  the  Constitution  recognizes  the  judiciary  as  a  separate  branch  of  
government,  but  it  also  requires  the  courts  to  depend  on  Congress  in  a  number  of  
ways.  The  federal  courts,  including  the  Supreme  Court,  depend  on  Congress  for  their  
budgets,  although  Congress  is  prohibited  from  reducing  the  salaries  of  federal  judges.  
The  organization  and  jurisdiction,  indeed  the  very  existence,  of  the  lower  federal  
courts  are  left  entirely  to  Congress  by  Article  III.  It  is  quite  conceivable  that  Congress  
might  have  chosen  not  to  create  a  system  of  lower  federal  courts  at  all.  It  could  have  
granted  existing  state  tribunals  original  jurisdiction  in  federal  cases,  although  it  
certainly  would  have  been  required  to  provide  some  degree  of  appellate  review  by  the  
U.S.  Supreme  Court,  the  one  federal  tribunal  recognized  by  the  Constitution.  Rather  
quickly,  however,  Congress  passed  the  Judiciary  Act  of  1789,  which  provided  the  
basis  for  the  contemporary  system  of  lower  federal  courts.  
  
5HVWULFWLRQRIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V-XULVGLFWLRQ  
7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VRULJLQDOMXULVGLFWLRQLVIL[HGE\$UWLFOH,,,RIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ
Marbury  v.  Madison  made  clear  that  CRQJUHVVPD\QRWDOWHUWKH&RXUW¶VRULJLQDO
jurisdiction.  Congress  may,  however,  authorize  lower  federal  courts  to  share  this  
MXULVGLFWLRQ7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VDSSHOODWHMXULVGLFWLRQLVDQRWKHUPDWWHU$UWLFOH,,,
LQGLFDWHVWKDWWKH&RXUW³VKDOOKDYHDSSHOOate  Jurisdiction,  both  as  to  Law  and  Fact,  
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ZLWKVXFK([FHSWLRQVDQGXQGHUVXFK5HJXODWLRQVDVWKH&RQJUHVVVKDOOPDNH´2Q
only  one  occasion  since  1789  has  Congress  significantly  limited  the  appellate  
jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court.  It  happened  during  the  turbulent  Reconstruction  
period.  After  the  Civil  War,  Congress  passed  the  Reconstruction  Acts,  which,  among  
other  things,  imposed  military  rule  on  most  of  the  southern  states  formerly  comprising  
the  Confederacy.  As  part  of  this  program,  military  tribunals  were  authorized  to  try  
civilians  who  interfered  with  Reconstruction.  William  H.  McCardle,  editor  of  the  
Vicksburg  Times,  published  a  series  of  editorials  highly  critical  of  Reconstruction.  
Consequently,  he  was  arrested  by  the  military  and  held  for  trial  by  a  military  tribunal.  
McCardle  sought  release  from  custody  through  a  petition  for  habeas  corpus  in  federal  
court.  Congress  in  1867  had  extended  federal  habeas  corpus  jurisdiction  to  cover  state  
prisoners.  Since  McCardle  was  in  the  custody  of  the  military  government  of  
Mississippi,  the  1867  act  applied  to  him.  It  also  provided  a  right  of  appeal  to  the  
Supreme  Court.  Having  lost  his  bid  for  relief  in  the  lower  court,  McCardle  exercised  
his  right  to  appeal.  
After  Ex  parte  McCardle  was  argued  in  the  Supreme  Court,  Congress  enacted  
OHJLVODWLRQRYHU3UHVLGHQW$QGUHZ-RKQVRQ¶VYHWRZLWKGUDZLQJWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V
appellate  jurisdiction  in  habeas  corpus  cases.  The  legislation  went  so  far  as  to  deny  
WKH&RXUW¶VDXWKRULW\WRGHFLGHDFDVHDOUHDG\DUJXHG7KHREYious  motive  was  to  
prevent  the  Court  from  ruling  on  the  constitutionality  of  the  Reconstruction  Acts,  
which  McCardle  had  challenged  in  his  appeal.  The  Court  could  have  invalidated  this  
blatant  attempt  to  prevent  it  from  exercising  its  power  of  judicial  review.  But  the  
Court  chose  to  capitulate.  By  acquiescing  in  the  withdrawal  of  its  jurisdiction  in  
McCardle,  the  Court  avoided  a  direct  confrontation  with  Congress  at  a  time  when  that  
institution  was  dominant  in  the  national  government.  Shortly  before  McCardle  was  
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decided,  the  House  of  Representatives  had  impeached  President  Andrew  Johnson,  and  
KHHVFDSHGFRQYLFWLRQLQWKH6HQDWHE\RQO\RQHYRWH,WLVOLNHO\WKDWWKH&RXUW¶V
decision  to  back  down  was  somewhat  influenced  by  the  Johnson  impeachment.  
Does  Ex  parte  McCardle  imply  that  Congress  could  completely  abolish  the  
&RXUW¶VDSSHOODWHMXULVGLFWLRQ":KDWHYHUWKHDQVZHUPLJKWKDYHEHHQDWWKHWLPHWKH
answer  today  would  certainly  be  no.  It  is  highly  unlikely  that  Congress  would  ever  
undertake  such  a  radical  measure,  but  if  it  did  the  Supreme  Court  would  almost  
FHUWDLQO\GHFODUHWKHDFWLQYDOLG6LQFHWKH&RXUW¶VPDMRUGHFLVLRQPDNLQJUROHLVD
function  of  its  appellate  jurisdiction,  any  serious  curtailment  of  that  jurisdiction  would  
in  effect  deny  the  Court  the  ability  to  perform  its  essential  function  in  the  
constitutional  system.  
There  is  even  doubt  that  the  McCardle  decision  would  be  reaffirmed  if  the  
contemporary  Supreme  Court  were  faced  with  a  similar  question.  In  Glidden  v.  
Zdanok  (1962),  Justice  William  2'RXJODVPXVHGWKDW³WKHUHLVDVHULRXVTXHVWLRQ
whether  the  McCardle  FDVHFRXOGFRPPDQGDPDMRULW\WRGD\´2QHFDQDUJXHWKDWWKH
Court  would  not,  and  should  not,  permit  Congress  to  restrict  its  appellate  jurisdiction  
if  by  so  doing  Congress  would  curtaLOWKH&RXUW¶VDELOLW\WRHQIRUFHFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
SULQFLSOHVRUSURWHFWFLWL]HQV¶IXQGDPHQWDOULJKWV,QKLVGLVVHQWLQJRSLQLRQLQHamdan  
v.  Rumsfeld  (2006),  Justice  Scalia  quoted  approvingly  from  the  McCardle  case  in  
asserting  that  Congress  had  removed  the  6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQLQDOOSHQGLQJ
habeas  corpus  cases  involving  detainees.  The  majority,  however,  speaking  through  
-XVWLFH6WHYHQVUHMHFWHG6FDOLD¶VDWWHPSWWRUHYLYHWKH0F&DUGOHSUHFHGHQW  
Congress  has,  on  many  occasions,  debated  limitations  RQWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V
appellate  jurisdiction.  In  the  late  1950s,  there  was  a  movement  in  Congress  to  deny  
the  Supreme  Court  appellate  jurisdiction  in  cases  involving  national  security,  a  
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reaction  to  Warren  Court  decisions  protecting  the  rights  of  suspected  Communists.  
Although  the  major  legislative  proposals  were  narrowly  defeated,  the  Court  retreated  
from  the  most  controversial  decisions  of  1956  and  1957.  In  this  regard,  it  is  instructive  
to  compare  Pennsylvania  v.  Nelson  (1956)  and  Watkins  v.  United  States  (1957)  with  
Uphaus  v.  Wyman  (1959)  and  Barenblatt  v.  United  States  (1959).  
In  the  early  1980s,  a  flurry  of  activity  in  Congress  was  aimed  at  restricting  
Supreme  Court  jurisdiction  to  hear  appeals  in  cases  dealing  with  abortion  and  school  
prayer.  A  number  of  proposals  surfaced,  but  none  was  adopted.  The  constitutionality  
of  such  proposals  is  open  to  question,  in  that  they  might  be  construed  as  undermining  
WKH&RXUW¶VDELOLW\WRSURWHFWIXQGDPHQWDOFRQVWLWXWLRQDOULJKWV7KHTXHVWLRQUHPDLQV
academic,  however,  because  Congress  has  not  enacted  such  a  restriction  on  the  Court.  
Denial  of  jurisdiction  as  a  limiting  strategy  depends  greatly  on  the  substantive  
issue  area  involved,  what  the  Court  has  done  in  the  area  thus  far,  and  what  it  is  likely  
to  do  in  the  future.  As  retaliation  against  the  Court  for  one  controversial  decision,  the  
curtailment  of  appellate  jurisdiction  is  not  likely  to  be  an  effective  strategy.  
  
>%HJLQ³&DVHLQ3RLQW´  box  here]  
Case  in  Point  
Can  Congress  Override  Constitutional  Interpretation  via  Statute?  
City  of  Boerne  v.  Flores  (1997)  
Although  it  is  generally  conceded  that  the  Supreme  Court  has  final  authority  to  
interpret  the  Constitution,  Congress  persists  in  occasionally  attempting  to  substitute  
its  own  collective  judgment  on  controversial  questions  for  that  of  the  justices.  This  
OHJLVODWLYHUHYLVLRQRIMXGLFLDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQLVZHOOLOOXVWUDWHGE\&RQJUHVV¶VSDVVDJH
of  the  Religious  Freedom  Restoration  Act  of  1993  (RFRA).  This  statute  was  enacted  
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LQGLUHFWUHVSRQVHWRWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V1990  decision  in  Employment  Division  v.  
Smith.  
In  Smith,  WKH&RXUWXSKHOG2UHJRQ¶VSURKLELWLRQRQWKHXVHRISH\RWHHYHQDV
applied  to  sacramental  use  by  members  of  the  Native  American  Church.  In  
determining  that  Oregon  had  not  violated  the  Free  Exercise  Clause,  the  Court  
departed  from  precedent  in  refusing  to  consider  whether  the  challenged  state  policy  
³VXEVWDQWLDOO\EXUGHQHG´UHOLJLRXVSUDFWLFHVDQGLIVRZKHWKHUWKHEXUGHQFRXOGEH
MXVWLILHGE\D³FRPSHOOLQJJRYHUQPHQWDOLQWHUHVW´8QGHUSmith,  no  one  can  claim  a  
religion-based  exemption  from  a  generally  applicable  criminal  law.  
Negative  reaction  to  Smith  convinced  a  majority  in  Congress  to  vote  in  favor  of  a  
law  designed  to  reinstate  the  compelling  government  interest  standard.  In  thus  
enacting  RFRA,  &RQJUHVVFKDOOHQJHG-XVWLFH6FDOLD¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
history  and  of  the  requirements  of  the  Free  Exercise  Clause  of  the  First  Amendment,  
as  applied  to  the  states  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  
In  City  of  Boerne  v.  Flores  (1997)  (excerpted  in  Chapter  2),  the  Supreme  Court,  
dividing  6  to  3,  declared  RFRA  unconstitutional.  While  conceding  that  Congress  has  
broad  power  to  enforce  the  provisions  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  Justice  
.HQQHG\ZULWLQJIRUWKHPDMRULW\FRQFOXGHGWKDW³5)5$FRQWUDGLFts  vital  principles  
QHFHVVDU\WRPDLQWDLQVHSDUDWLRQRISRZHUVDQGWKHIHGHUDOEDODQFH´,QWKLVGHFLVLRQ
the  Court  stressed  the  primacy  of  its  role  as  interpreter  of  the  Constitution.  It  was  firm  
and  unequivocal  in  rejecting,  on  broad  institutional  grounds,  a  direct  congressional  
challenge  of  final  judicial  authority  on  a  question  of  constitutional  interpretation.  
>(QG³&DVHLQ3RLQW´  box  here]  
  
Constitutional  Amendment  
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Without  question,  the  only  conclusive  means  of  overruling  a  Supreme  Court  or  any  
federal  court  decision  is  through  adoption  of  a  constitutional  amendment.  If  Congress  
disapproves  of  a  particular  judicial  decision,  it  may  be  able  to  override  that  decision  
through  a  simple  statute,  but  only  if  the  decision  was  based  on  statutory  interpretation.  
It  is  much  more  difficult  to  override  a  federal  court  decision  that  is  based  on  the  
U.S.  Constitution.  Congress  alone  cannot  do  so.  Our  system  of  government  concedes  
WRWKHFRXUWVWKHSRZHUWRLQWHUSUHWDXWKRULWDWLYHO\WKHQDWLRQ¶VFKDUWHU$6XSUHPH
Court  decision  interpreting  the  Constitution  is  therefore  final  unless  and  until  one  of  
two  things  occurs.  First,  the  Court  may  overrule  itself  in  a  later  case.  This  has  
happened  numerous  times  historically.  The  only  other  way  to  overturn  a  constitutional  
decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  is  through  constitutional  amendment.  This  is  not  easily  
done,  because  Article  V  of  the  Constitution  prescribes  a  two-thirds  majority  in  both  
houses  of  Congress  followed  by  ratification  by  three-fourths  of  the  states.  
Yet  on  several  occasions  in  our  history,  specific  Supreme  Court  decisions  have  
been  overturned  in  this  manner.  
  
The  Eleventh  Amendment  The  first  ten  amendments  to  the  Constitution  were  
proposed  simultaneously  in  1789  (ratified  in  1791)  and  are  known  collectively  as  the  
Bill  of  Rights.  These  amendments  were  not  responses  to  judicial  decisions,  but  rather  
to  a  perception  that  the  original  Constitution  was  incomplete.  The  Eleventh  
Amendment,  however,  was  added  to  the  Constitution  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Supreme  
&RXUW¶VILrst  major  decision²Chisholm  v.  Georgia  (1793).  
Alexander  Chisholm  brought  suit  against  the  state  of  Georgia  in  the  Supreme  
Court  to  recover  a  sum  of  money  owed  to  an  estate  of  which  he  was  executor.  
Chisholm  was  a  citizen  of  South  Carolina,  and  since  he  was  suing  the  state  of  
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Georgia,  he  maintained  that  the  Supreme  Court  had  original  jurisdiction  under  Article  
III  of  the  Constitution.  The  state  of  Georgia  denied  that  the  Supreme  Court  had  
jurisdiction,  claiming  sovereign  immunity.  The  state  relied  on  statements  made  by  
James  Madison,  John  Marshall,  and  Alexander  Hamilton  during  the  debates  over  
ratification  of  the  Constitution  that  states  could  not  be  made  parties  to  federal  cases  
against  their  consent.  Indeed,  Georgia  failed  to  send  a  legal  representative  to  defend  
its  position  when  Chisholm  v.  Georgia  came  up  for  oral  argument  in  the  Supreme  
Court.  Dividing  4  to  1,  the  Supreme  Court  decided  that  the  state  of  Georgia  was  
subject  to  the  lawsuit,  sovereign  immunity  notwithstanding.  This  decision  precipitated  
considerable  outrage  in  the  state  legislatures,  which  feared  an  explosion  of  federal  
litigation  at  their  expense.  One  newspaper,  the  Independent  Chronicle,  predicted  that  
³UHIXJHHV7RULHVHWF«  will  introduce  such  a  series  of  litigations  as  will  throw  every  
6WDWHLQWKH8QLRQLQWRWKHJUHDWHVWFRQIXVLRQ´)LYH\HDUVODWHULQWKH(OHYHQWK
$PHQGPHQWZDVUDWLILHG,WUHDGV³7KH-XGLFLDOSRZHURIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVVKDOOQRW
be  construed  to  extend  to  any  suit  in  law  or  equity,  commenced  or  prosecuted  against  
one  of  the  United  States  by  Citizens  of  another  State,  or  by  Citizens  or  Subjects  of  any  
)RUHLJQ6WDWHV´  
The  adoption  of  the  Eleventh  Amendment  assuaged  widespread  fears  of  the  new  
national  government,  and  of  the  federal  courts  in  particular.  The  amendment  also  
demonstrated  that  an  unpopular  Supreme  Court  decision  was  reversible,  given  
sufficient  political  consensus.  (For  a  discussion  of  the  Eleventh  Amendment,  see  
Chapter  5).  
  
The  Civil  War  Amendments  As  previously  noted,  the  Dred  Scott  decision  was  
effectively  overruled  by  adoption  of  the  Thirteenth  Amendment,  abolishing  slavery,  
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and  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  granting  citizenship  to  all  persons  born  or  naturalized  
in  the  United  States.  
  
The  Sixteenth  Amendment  Recall  also  that  the  Sixteenth  Amendment,  granting  
&RQJUHVVWKHSRZHUWR³OD\DQGFROOHFW´LQFRPHWD[HVRYHUUXOHGWKHPollock  decision  
of  1895  in  which  the  Court  had  declared  a  federal  income  tax  law  unconstitutional.  
The  Twenty-sixth  Amendment  In  1970  Congress  enacted  a  statute  lowering  the  
voting  age  to  18  in  both  state  and  federal  elections.  The  states  of  Oregon  and  Texas  
filed  suit  under  the  original  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court  seeking  an  injunction  
preventing  the  attorney  general  from  enforcing  the  statute  with  respect  to  the  states.  In  
Oregon  v.  Mitchell  (1970),  the  Supreme  Court  ruled  that  Congress  had  no  power  to  
regulate  the  voting  age  in  state  elections.  The  Twenty-sixth  amendment,  ratified  in  
1971,  accomplished  what  Congress  was  not  permitted  to  do  through  statute.  The  
amendment  SURYLGHV³7KHULJKWRIFLWL]HQVRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVZKRDUHHLJKWHHQ
years  of  age  or  older,  to  vote  shall  not  be  denied  or  abridged  by  the  United  States  or  
E\DQ\6WDWHRQDFFRXQWRIDJH´  
Other  Proposed  Constitutional  Amendments  Over  the  years  numerous  
unsuccessful  attempts  have  been  made  to  overrule  Supreme  Court  decisions  through  
FRQVWLWXWLRQDODPHQGPHQWV,QDQDPHQGPHQWSURYLGLQJWKDW³>W@KHULJKWWRDQ
DERUWLRQLVQRWVHFXUHGE\WKLV&RQVWLWXWLRQ´REYLRXVO\DLPHGDWRoe  v.  Wade,  failed  
to  pass  the  Senate  by  only  one  vote.  In  November  1971,  a  proposal  designed  to  
RYHUUXOHWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VVFKRROSUD\HUGHFLVLRQV VHHIRUH[DPSOHAbington  
Township  v.  Schempp  [1963])  fell  twenty-eight  votes  short  of  the  necessary  two-thirds  
majority  in  the  House  of  Representatives.  In  his  1980  presidential  campaign,  Ronald  
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Reagan  called  on  Congress  to  resurrect  the  school  prayer  amendment,  but  Congress  
proved  unwilling  to  give  the  measure  serious  consideration.  In  the  mid-1960s,  a  
widely  publicized  effort  WRRYHUUXOHWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VUHDSSRUWLRQPHQWGHFLVLRQV
(for  example,  Reynolds  v.  Sims,  [1964])  was  spearheaded  by  Senate  minority  leader  
Everett  Dirksen  (R±Ill.).  Despite  auspicious  beginnings,  the  Dirksen  amendment  
ultimately  proved  to  be  a  flash  in  the  pan.  
The  most  recent  example  of  a  proposed  constitutional  amendment  aimed  at  a  
Supreme  Court  decision  dealt  with  the  emotional  public  issue  of  flag  burning.  In  
Texas  v.  Johnson  (1989),  the  Court  held  that  burning  the  American  flag  as  part  of  a  
public  protest  was  a  form  of  symbolic  speech  protected  by  the  First  Amendment.  
Many,  including  President  Bush,  called  on  Congress  to  overrule  the  Court.  Congress  
FRQVLGHUHGDQDPHQGPHQWWKDWUHDG³7KH&RQJUHVVDQGWKH6WDWHVVKDOOKDYHSRZHUWR
prohibit  the  physicaOGHVHFUDWLRQRIWKHIODJRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´9RWHVZHUHWDNHQLQ
both  houses,  but  neither  achieved  the  necessary  two-thirds  majority.  In  the  wake  of  
the  failed  constitutional  amendment,  Congress  adopted  a  statute  making  flag  
desecration  a  federal  offense.  Like  the  state  law  struck  down  in  Texas  v.  Johnson,  this  
measure  was  declared  unconstitutional  by  the  Supreme  Court  (see  United  States  v.  
Eichman,  1990).  As  recently  as  July  2005,  the  U.S.  House  of  Representatives  passed  
another  proposed  constitutional  DPHQGPHQWGHVLJQHGWRRYHUUXOHWKH&RXUW¶VIODJ
burning  decisions.  The  Senate  has  not  yet  approved  such  an  Amendment,  although  it  
fell  only  one  vote  short  of  doing  so  in  June  2006.  
  
The  Appointment  Power  
All  federal  judges  (including  justices  of  the  Supreme  Court)  are  appointed  by  the  
president  subject  to  the  consent  of  the  Senate.  Normally,  the  Senate  consents  to  
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presidential  judicial  appointments  with  a  minimum  of  controversy.  However,  
senatorial  approval  is  by  no  means  pro  forma,  especially  when  the  opposing  political  
party  controls  the  Senate.  In  fact,  historically  the  Senate  has  rejected  about  20  percent  
of  presidential  nominations  to  the  Supreme  Court.  
$UWLFOH,,,6HFWLRQRIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQVWDWHVWKDW³-XGJHVERWKRIWKHVXSUHPH
and  inferior  CoXUWVVKDOOKROGWKHLU2IILFHVGXULQJJRRG%HKDYLRXU´7KLVJUDQWRIOLIH
tenure  to  federal  judges  was  intended  to  make  the  federal  courts  independent  of  
partisan  forces  and  transitory  public  passions  so  that  they  could  dispense  justice  
impartially,  according  to  the  law.  In  The  Federalist,  No.  78,  Alexander  Hamilton  
argued  that:  
The  standard  of  good  behavior  for  the  continuance  in  office  of  the  judicial  
magistracy  is  certainly  one  of  the  most  valuable  of  the  modern  improvements  in  
the  practice  of  government.  In  a  monarchy  it  is  an  excellent  barrier  to  the  
despotism  of  the  prince;;  in  a  republic  it  is  a  no  less  excellent  barrier  to  the  
encroachments  and  oppressions  of  the  representative  body.  And  it  is  the  best  
expedient  which  can  be  devised  in  any  government  to  secure  a  steady,  upright  and  
impartial  administration  of  the  laws.  
  
+DPLOWRQ¶VYLHZVRQWKHQHHGIRUDOLIH-tenured,  appointed  federal  judiciary  were  
not  universally  accepted  in  1788  nor  are  they  today.  In  a  democratic  nation  that  extols  
WKH³ZLOORIWKHSHRSOH´VXFKVHQWLPHQWVDUHDSWWREHYLHZHGDVHOLWLVWHYHQ
aristocratic.  
While  the  states  vary  widely  in  their  mechanisms  for  judicial  selection,  only  in  
Rhode  Island  are  judges  given  life  tenure.  From  time  to  time  proposals  have  surfaced  
to  impose  limitations  on  the  terms  of  federal  judges,  but  no  such  effort  has  ever  
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gained  serious  political  momentum.  Life  tenure  for  federal  judges,  like  most  of  the  
elements  of  our  eighteenth  century  Constitution,  remains  a  firmly  established  
principle  of  the  political  order.  
The  shared  presidential±senatorial  power  of  appointing  federal  judges  is  an  
important  means  of  influencing  the  judiciary.  For  example,  President  Richard  Nixon  
made  a  significant  impact  on  the  Supreme  Court  and  on  American  constitutional  law  
through  his  appointment  of  four  justices.  During  the  1968  presidential  campaign,  
1L[RQFULWLFL]HGWKH:DUUHQ&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQVHVSHFLDOO\LQWKHFULPLQDOODZDUHDDQG
SURPLVHGWRDSSRLQW³VWULFWFRQVWUXFWLRQLVWV´ ZLGHO\LQWHUSUHWHGWRPHDQ
³FRQVHUYDWLYHV´ WRWKHEHQFK3UHVLGHQW1L[RQ¶VILUVWDSSRLQWPHQWFDPHLQ
when  Warren  Earl  Burger  was  selected  to  succeed  Earl  Warren  as  chief  justice.  In  
1970,  after  the  abortive  nominations  of  Clement  Haynsworth  and  G.  Harold  Carswell,  
Harry  Blackmun  was  appointed  to  succeed  Justice  Abe  Fortas,  who  had  resigned  from  
the  Court  amid  scandal  in  1969.  Then,  in  1972,  President  Nixon  appointed  Lewis  
3RZHOOWRILOOWKHYDFDQF\OHIWE\+XJR%ODFN¶VUHWLUHPHQWDQG:LOOLDP5HKQTXLVWWR
succeed  John  M.  Harlan,  who  had  also  retired.  The  four  Nixon  appointments  had  a  
definite  impact  on  the  Supreme  Court,  although  the  resulting  swing  to  the  right  was  
less  dramatic  than  many  observers  had  predicted.  
  
)'5¶V&RXUW-Packing  Plan  Unquestionably,  the  most  dramatic  attempt  by  a  
president  to  control  the  Supreme  Court  through  the  appointment  power  was  launched  
by  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt  in  1937.  The  Court,  as  previously  mentioned,  had  
LQYDOLGDWHGDQXPEHURINH\HOHPHQWVRI)'5¶V1HZ'HDOSURJUDPEHJLQQLQJLQ
1935  with  the  National  Industrial  Recovery  Act.  FDR  criticized  the  Court  for  being  
RXWRIWRXFKZLWKWKHUHDOLWLHVRIDQLQGXVWULDOL]HGHFRQRP\DQGKROGLQJWRD³KRUVH-
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and-EXJJ\GHILQLWLRQRILQWHUVWDWHFRPPHUFH´3ULYDWHO\)'5ZKRUHIHUUHGWRWKH
MXVWLFHVDVWKH³QLQHROGPHQ´EHJDQto  plan  a  strategy  to  curb  the  Court.  His  resolve  
ZDVVWUHQJWKHQHGE\KLVODQGVOLGHUHHOHFWLRQLQDQGE\WKH&RXUW¶VFRQWLQXLQJ
willingness  to  invalidate  New  Deal  legislation.  Finally,  in  early  1937  Roosevelt  
unveiled  his  court-packing  plan,  which  called  for  Congress  to  increase  the  number  of  
justices  by  allowing  the  president  to  nominate  a  new  justice  for  each  incumbent  
beyond  the  age  of  70  who  refused  to  retire.  This  could  have  given  Roosevelt  the  
opportunity  to  appoint  as  many  as  six  additional  justices,  raising  the  membership  of  
the  Court  to  fifteen.  
FDR  initially  attempted  to  sell  his  plan  to  Congress  and  the  American  people  by  
portraying  it  merely  as  a  measure  to  enhance  the  efficiency  of  the  Supreme  Court.  He  
suggested  that  some  of  the  incumbent  justices  were  too  old  or  infirm  to  stay  abreast  of  
WKHLUFDVHORDGV5RRVHYHOWVRRQDGPLWWHGLQRQHRIKLVIDPRXV³ILUHVLGHFKDWV´WKDWKLV
PRWLYDWLRQZDVWRSURGXFHD6XSUHPH&RXUWWKDWZRXOG³QRWXQGHUWDNHWRRYHUULGHWKH
judgment  of  Congress  on  legislatiYHSROLF\´5HVSRQGLQJWRWKHSUHVLGHQW¶VDVVDXOWRQ
the  Court,  Chief  Justice  Charles  Evans  Hughes  sent  a  carefully  timed  letter  to  Senator  
Burton  K.  Wheeler,  chairman  of  the  Senate  Judiciary  Committee,  stating  that  the  
Court  was  fully  abreast  of  its  docket  and  implying  that  the  court-packing  plan  might  
be  unconstitutional.  Senator  Wheeler  read  this  letter  aloud  at  a  session  of  the  Judiciary  
Committee  that  was  being  broadcast  by  radio  into  millions  of  homes  around  the  
country.  
)'5¶VFRXUW-packing  plan  was  denounced  by  the  Senate  Judiciary  Committee  as  
³QHHGOHVVIXWLOHDQGXWWHUO\GDQJHURXV´7KHSODQIDLOHGWRZLQDSSURYDOE\&RQJUHVV
In  the  meantime,  however,  the  Supreme  Court  manifested  a  dramatic  about-face  in  the  
spring  of  1937  when  it  upheld  the  National  Labor  Relations  Act,  another  important  
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element  of  New  Deal  policy  (see  National  Labor  Relations  Board  v.  Jones  &  
Laughlin  Steel  Corporation 7KH&RXUW¶VIDPRXV³VZLWFKLQWLPHWKDWVDYHGQLQH´
obviated  the  need  for  FDR  to  pack  the  Court.  Within  five  yHDUVVHYHQRIWKH³QLQHROG
PHQ´KDGUHWLUHGRUGLHGLQRIILFHDQG5RRVHYHOWZDVDEOHWR³SDFN´WKH&RXUW
through  normal  procedures.  The  Roosevelt  Court,  as  it  came  to  be  known,  brought  
about  a  revolution  in  American  constitutional  law.  
Without  question,  the  shared  presidential±senatorial  power  to  appoint  judges  and  
justices  is  the  most  effective  means  of  controlling  the  federal  judiciary.  Congress  and  
the  president  may  not  be  able  to  achieve  immediate  results  using  the  appointment  
power,  but  they  can  bring  about  long-WHUPFKDQJHVLQWKH&RXUW¶VGLUHFWLRQ7KH
appointment  power  ensures  that  the  Supreme  Court  and  the  other  federal  courts  may  
not  continue  for  very  long  to  defy  a  clear  national  consensus.  
  
Impeachment  
The  only  means  of  removing  a  federal  judge  or  Supreme  Court  justice  is  through  the  
impeachment  process  provided  in  the  Constitution.  First,  the  House  of  
Representatives  must  approve  one  or  more  articles  of  impeachment  by  at  least  a  
majority  vote.  Then,  a  trial  is  held  in  the  Senate.  To  be  removed  from  office,  a  judge  
must  be  convicted  by  a  vote  of  at  least  two-thirds  of  the  Senate.  
Since  1789  the  House  of  Representatives  has  impeached  fewer  than  twenty  federal  
judges,  and  fewer  than  ten  of  these  were  convicted  in  the  Senate.  Only  once  has  a  
Supreme  Court  Justice  been  impeached  by  the  House.  In  1804,  Justice  Samuel  Chase  
IHOOYLFWLPWR3UHVLGHQW-HIIHUVRQ¶VDWWHPSWWRFRQWURODIHGHUDOMXGLFLDU\ODUJHO\
comprised  of  Washington  and  Adams  appointees.  Justice  Chase  had  irritated  the  
Jeffersonians  by  his  haughty  and  arrogant  personality  and  his  extreme  partisanship.  

Stephens  and  Scheb  1-91  

Nevertheless,  there  was  no  evidence  that  he  was  guilty  of  any  crime.  Consequently,  
Chase  narrowly  escaped  conviction  in  the  Senate.  
The  Chase  affair  set  an  important  precedent:  A  federal  judge  may  not  be  removed  
simply  for  reasons  of  partisanship,  ideology,  or  personality.  Thus,  despite  strong  
support  in  ultraconservative  quarters  for  the  impeachment  of  Chief  Justice  Earl  
:DUUHQGXULQJWKHVWKHUHZDVQHYHUDQ\UHDOSURVSHFWRI:DUUHQ¶VUemoval.  
Barring  criminal  conduct  or  serious  breaches  of  judicial  ethics,  federal  judges  do  not  
have  to  worry  that  their  decisions  might  cost  them  their  jobs.  
  
Enforcement  of  Judicial  Decisions  
Courts  generally  have  adequate  means  of  enforcing  their  decisions  on  the  parties  
directly  involved  in  litigation.  Any  party  who  fails  to  comply  with  a  court  order,  such  
as  a  subpoena  or  an  injunction,  may  be  held  in  contempt.  7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V
decisions  interpreting  the  federal  Constitution  are  typically  nationwide  in  scope.  As  
such  they  automatically  elicit  the  compliance  of  state  and  federal  judges.  Occasionally  
one  hears  of  a  recalcitrant  judge  who,  for  one  reason  or  another,  defies  a  Supreme  
Court  decision,  but  this  phenomenon,  while  not  uncommon  in  the  early  days  of  the  
republic,  is  an  eccentric  curiosity  today.  
On  the  other  hand,  courts  have  greater  difficulty  enlisting  the  compliance  of  the  
general  public,  especially  when  they  render  unpopular  decisions.  Despite  the  Supreme  
&RXUW¶VUHSHDWHGUXOLQJVDJDLQVWRIILcially  sponsored  prayer  in  the  public  schools,  such  
activities  continue  at  the  present  time  in  some  parts  of  the  country.  The  school  prayer  
decisions,  even  after  more  than  four  decades,  have  failed  to  generate  public  
acceptance  (see  Chapter  4,  Volume  II).  Without  the  assistance  of  local  school  
officials,  there  is  little  the  Court  can  do  to  effect  compliance  with  its  mandates  
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regarding  school  prayer  unless  and  until  an  unhappy  parent  files  a  lawsuit.  
Sometimes  the  Supreme  Court  must  depend  on  congressional  and/or  presidential  
cooperation  to  secure  compliance  with  its  decisions.  This  is  particularly  true  when  
such  decisions  are  actively  resisted  by  state  and  local  officials.  For  example,  the  
efforts  of  Arkansas  governor  Orval  Faubus  to  block  the  court-ordered  desegregation  
of  Central  High  School  in  Little  Rock  in  1957  resulted  in  President  Dwight  D.  
(LVHQKRZHU¶VFRPPLWPHQWRIIHGHUDOWURRSVWRHQIRUFHWKHFRXUWRUGHU$\HDUODWHULQ
Cooper  v.  Aaron  (1958),  the  Supreme  Court  issued  a  stern  rebuke  to  Governor  
Faubus,  reminding  him  of  his  duty  to  uphold  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  
Would  the  Court  have  been  able  to  take  the  constitutional  high  ground  if  Eisenhower,  
who  had  reservations  about  court-ordered  desegregation,  had  decided  not  to  send  the  
troops  to  Little  Rock?  In  using  military  force  to  implement  a  Supreme  Court  decision  
about  which  he  had  doubts,  Eisenhower  was  recognizing  the  authority  of  the  Court  to  
speak  with  finality  on  matters  of  constitutional  interpretation.  However,  the  ultimate  
decisLRQWRHQIRUFHWKH&RXUW¶VDXWKRULW\EHORQJHGWRWKHSUHVLGHQW$FFRUGLQJO\
Cooper  v.  Aaron  is  more  a  testament  to  judicial  dependency  on  the  executive  than  an  
assertion  of  judicial  power.  
Unlike  the  president,  Congress  is  seldom  in  a  position  to  enforce  a  decision  of  the  
Supreme  Court.  On  the  other  hand,  Congress  has  often  enacted  legislation  without  
ZKLFKWKHEURDGREMHFWLYHVRIWKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQVFRXOGQRWKDYHEHHQIXOO\UHDOL]HG
This  was  certainly  true  during  the  1960s  in  the  field  of  civil  rights.  The  Supreme  
Court  in  a  series  of  decisions  had  stated  the  general  policy  objective  of  eradicating  
racial  discrimination.  It  remained  for  Congress  to  adopt  sweeping  legislation  in  
pursuit  of  this  goal²namely,  the  Civil  Rights  Act  of  1964,  the  Voting  Rights  Act  of  
1965,  and  the  Fair  Housing  Act  of  1968.  
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The  Supreme  Court  often  depends  on  the  president  to  enforce  and  the  Congress  to  
³IOHVKRXW´LWVGHFLVLRQV%XWWKH&RXUWFDQQRWIRUFHHLWKHURIWKHFRRUGLQDWHEUDQFKHV
of  the  national  government  to  do  anything.  This  limitation  is  perhaps  best  
HQFDSVXODWHGLQDIDPRXVFRPPHQWDWWULEXWHGWR3UHVLGHQW$QGUHZ-DFNVRQ³:HOO
-RKQ0DUVKDOOKDVPDGHKLVGHFLVLRQ1RZOHWKLPHQIRUFHLW´,QWorcester  v.  
Georgia    WKH&RXUWKDGKHOGWKDWWKHVWDWHRI*HRUJLD¶V  attempt  to  regulate  the  
Cherokee  Indian  nation  violated  the  Constitution  and  certain  treaties.  The  decision  
required  Georgia  to  release  missionaries  whom  it  had  prosecuted  for  ministering  to  
WKH&KHURNHHVLQYLRODWLRQRIVWDWHODZ*HRUJLD¶VUHIXVDOWRFRmply  with  the  decision  
RIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWOHGWR3UHVLGHQW-DFNVRQ¶VDOOHJHGUHPDUN  
7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VODFNRIHQIRUFHPHQWSRZHULVDQLQKHUHQWOLPLWDWLRQRQWKH
power  of  the  Court,  but  one  that  makes  sense  in  terms  of  the  principle  of  separation  of  
powers.  Law  enforcement,  after  all,  is  an  aspect  of  executive  power.  To  permit  a  court  
of  law  to  mobilize  law  enforcement  authorities  without  the  consent  of  the  chief  
executive  would  be  to  concentrate  governmental  powers  in  a  manner  flatly  
inconsistent  with  WKH)UDPHUV¶SODQ$V-DPHV0DGLVRQREVHUYHGLQThe  Federalist,  
1R³>W@KHDFFXPXODWLRQRIDOOSRZHUVOHJLVODWLYHH[HFXWLYHDQGMXGLFLDU\LQWKH
same  hands«  PD\MXVWO\EHSURQRXQFHGWKHYHU\GHILQLWLRQRIW\UDQQ\´  
  
TO  SUMMARIZE:  
Like  the  other  branches,  the  judiciary  is  subject  to  checks  and  balances.  The  
organization  and  jurisdiction  of  the  lower  federal  courts  are  left  entirely  to  
Congress  by  Article  III.  Congress  may  regulate  the  appellate  jurisdiction  of  the  
Supreme  Court,  but  it  is  unclear  how  far  Congress  may  go  in  this  regard.  
Supreme  Court  decisions  based  on  statutory  interpretation  may  be  overridden  by  
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Congress  through  the  ordinary  legislative  process.  Court  decisions  based  on  
constitutional  interpretation  may  be  overridden  only  by  the  Court  itself,  or  by  
constitutional  amendment.  Historically,  at  least  four  Supreme  Court  decisions  
have  been  overturned  by  constitutional  amendments.  
Because  impeachment  of  federal  judges  is  limited  to  cases  of  criminal  misconduct,  
the  most  significant  control  over  the  personnel  on  the  Supreme  Court  is  the  
appointment  power  shared  by  the  president  and  the  Senate.  Presidents  have  used  
the  appointment  power  to  change  the  direction  of  the  Court.  
The  Court  often  depends  on  the  other  branches  of  government  to  enforce  and  
LPSOHPHQWLWVGHFLVLRQV8OWLPDWHO\WKH&RXUWUHOLHVRQWKHSXEOLF¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWR
comply.  
  
(;3/$,1,1*7+(&2857¶6%(+$9,25  
Since  Marbury  v.  Madison  (1803),  commentators  have  sought  to  explain  and  predict,  
as  well  as  evaluate,  Supreme  Court  decision  making.  Traditional  legal  commentary  
relied  almost  exclusively  on  legal  factors²principles,  provisions,  procedures,  and  
precedents.  Modern  analysis  tends  to  look  beyond  the  law  to  explain  judicial  decision  
making.  Political  scientists  in  particular  are  interested  in  the  political  factors  that  
influence  judicial  behavior.  Indeed,  the  study  of  judicial  behavior  is  a  subfield  of  the  
public  law  field  of  contemporary  political  science.  

[Insert  Figure  1.4  here]  
  
The  law  is  complex,  rich,  and  subtle.  Judicial  decision  making,  especially  at  the  
level  of  the  Supreme  Court,  is  hardly  a  mechanical  process.  Legal  reasoning  is  
certainly  important,  but  it  is  inevitably  colored  by  extralegal  factors  as  well  (see  
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Figure  1.4).  It  is  not  unlikely  that  two  judges,  equally  well  trained  and  capable  in  legal  
research,  will  reach  different  conclusions  about  what  the  law  requires  in  a  given  case.  
The  fluidity  of  judicial  choice  is  most  apparent  when  the  Supreme  Court  is  called  
on  to  interpret  the  many  open-ended  clauses  of  the  ConVWLWXWLRQ$OWKRXJKWKH&RXUW¶V
constitutional  decisions  are  rendered  in  a  legal  context,  they  cannot  be  fully  explained  
by  legalistic  analysis.  To  believe  otherwise  is  to  subscribe  to  the  myth  of  legality,  the  
idea  that  judicial  decisions  are  wholly  a  function  of  legal  rules,  procedures,  and  
precedents.  
  
Ideologies  of  the  Justices  
Political  scientists  who  have  studied  Supreme  Court  decision  making  have  amassed  
FRQVLGHUDEOHHYLGHQFHWKDWWKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQVDUHLQIOXHQFHGE\WKHLGHRORJLHVRI
the  justices.  To  a  great  extent,  this  is  inferred  from  regularities  in  the  voting  behavior  
of  the  justices,  mainly  the  tendency  of  certain  groups  of  justices  to  form  voting  blocs.  
During  the  period  1994±2005,  for  example,  Chief  Justice  Rehnquist  and  Justices  
Scalia  and  Thomas  comprised  a  conservative  bloc,  often  opposed  by  a  liberal  bloc  
FRQVLVWLQJRI-XVWLFHV6WHYHQV6RXWHU*LQVEXUJDQG%UH\HU-XVWLFHV2¶&RQQRUDQG
Kennedy  occupied  a  commanding  position  in  the  middle,  sometimes  joining  
Rehnquist,  Scalia,  and  Thomas  to  form  a  conservative  majority,  and  sometimes,  either  
individually  or  in  tandem,  joining  the  other  four  justices  in  support  of  a  more  liberal  
UHVXOW)ROORZLQJ-XVWLFH2¶&RQQRU¶VUHWLUHPHQWLQ-DQXDU\DQGWKHDSSRLQWPHQW
of  Justice  Samuel  Alito  as  her  successor,  Justice  Kennedy  alone  held  a  key  position  
between  the  liberal  and  conservative  blocs  on  the  Court.  His  vote  was  critical  in  
determining  the  outcomes  of  several  important  decisions  during  the  remainder  of  the  
2005±2006  Term.  
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Although  many  observers  characterize  Supreme  Court  decisions  and  voting  
patterns  in  simplistic  liberal±conservative  terms,  judicial  ideology  may  well  include  
more  than  general  political  attitudes  or  views  on  specific  issues  of  public  policy  (for  
example,  school  prayer  or  abortion).  It  may  also  embrace  philosophies  regarding  the  
proper  role  of  courts  in  a  democratic  society.  There  is  reason  to  believe  that,  at  least  
IRUVRPHMXVWLFHVFRQVLGHUDWLRQVRIMXGLFLDODFWLYLVPYHUVXVUHVWUDLQW ³PD[LPDOLVP´
YHUVXV³PLQLPDOLVP´ ZHigh  as  heavily  as  policy  preferences  in  determining  how  the  
vote  will  be  cast  in  a  given  case.  Justices  inclined  toward  activism,  or  maximalism,  
DUHPRUHOLNHO\WRVXSSRUWH[SDQVLRQRIWKH&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQDQGSRZHUVDQGPRUH
likely  to  embrace  innovative  constitutional  doctrines  and  policy  choices.  These  
justices  are  less  likely  than  restraintists,  or  minimalists,  to  follow  precedent  or  defer  to  
the  judgment  of  elected  officials.  
  
The  Political  Environment  
In  addition  to  the  ideologies  of  the  justices,  research  has  pointed  to  a  number  of  
political  factors  that  appear  to  influence  Supreme  Court  decision  making.  While  the  
Court  is  often  characterized  as  a  counter-majoritarian  institution,  there  is  reason  to  
believe  that  public  opinion  does  influence  the  Court.  Extensive  evidence  indicates  that  
the  actions,  or  threatened  actions,  of  Congress  and  the  president  can  have  an  impact  
on  its  decisions.  And  in  a  constitutional  system  emphasizing  checks  and  balances,  one  
should  not  expect  that  it  would  be  otherwise!  The  political  environment,  in  short,  
strongly  influences  Supreme  Court  decision  making.  
  
The  Internal  Politics  of  the  Court  
)LQDOO\WKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJLVLQWHQVHO\SROLWLFDOLQWKHVHQVHWKDWWKHLQWHUQDO
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dynamics  of  the  Court  are  characterized  by  conflict,  bargaining,  and  compromise²
the  very  essence  of  politics.  Such  activities  are  difficult  to  observe  because  they  occur  
EHKLQGWKH³SXUSOHFXUWDLQ´WKDWVHSDUDWHVWKH&RXUWIURPLWVDWWHQWLYHSXEOLF  
Conferences  are  held  in  private,  votes  on  certiorari  are  not  routinely  made  public,  
and  the  justices  tend  to  be  tight-lipped  about  what  goes  on  behind  the  scenes  in  the  
³PDUEOHWHPSOH´<HWIURPWLPHWRWLPHHYLGHQFHRIWKH&RXUW¶VLQWHUQDOSROLWLFV
appears²in  the  form  of  memoirs,  autobiographies,  posthumously  opened  papers,  
other  writings  of  the  justices,  and  in  the  occasional  interviews  the  justices  and  their  
clerks  give  to  journalists  and  academicians.  Some  may  be  offended  at  the  attempt  of  
journalists  and  scholars  to  penetrate  the  purple  curtain,  to  examine  the  political  
realities  lurking  behind  the  veil  of  law  and  mythology  in  which  the  Supreme  Court  is  
shrouded.  However,  in  a  democratic  society  it  is  the  right,  and  arguably  the  duty,  of  
citizens  to  have  a  realistic  understanding  of  the  institutions  of  their  government.  
Armed  with  such  an  understanding  of  the  Supreme  Court,  one  can  begin  to  make  
reasonable  judgments  about  its  decisions.  Realism  does  not  lead  inexorably  to  
cynicism.  
Some  observers  believe  that  the  Supreme  Court  is  nothing  more  than  a  miniature  
OHJLVODWXUHDQGWKDWWKHMXVWLFHVDUHQRWKLQJPRUHWKDQ³SROLWLFLDQVLQEODFNUREHV´7KH
&RXUW¶VHQRUPRXVO\FRQWURYHUVLDOGHFLVLRQLQBush  v.  Gore  (2000)  may  be  cited  in  
support  of  this  perspective.  However,  it  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  Supreme  
Court  is  at  once  a  legal  and  a  political  institution,  which  makes  it  unique  in  the  
VFKHPHRI$PHULFDQJRYHUQPHQW$VDOHJDOHQWLW\WKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQVDUHXVXDOO\
characterized  by  reason  and  principle,  characteristics  not  regarded  as  essential  to  the  
legislative  process.  This  distinctive  character  may  also  account  for  the  reverence  with  
which  the  American  people  (even  the  most  jaded  political  scientists)  tend  to  regard  
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the  Court.  
  
TO  SUMMARIZE:  
The  Supreme  Court  is  at  once  a  legal  and  a  political  institution.  Therefore  its  
decisions  are  affected  both  by  legal  and  political  factors.  
7KHSROLWLFDOIDFWRUVLQFOXGHWKHMXVWLFHV¶RZQSKLORVRSKLFDORULHQWDWLRQVDQG
policy  preferences,  the  internal  politics  of  the  Court,  and  the  external  political  
environment.  
7KHUHODWLYHSULYDF\LQZKLFKWKH&RXUW¶VNH\EXVLQHVVLVFRQGXFWHGPDNHVLWPRUH
difficult  to  observe  the  interplay  of  political  factors.  
  
CONCLUSION  
The  Supreme  Court  has  evolved  considerably  over  two  centuries.  It  began  as  a  
vaguely  conceived  tribunal,  with  no  cases  to  decide,  and  no  permanent  home.  Over  
WKH\HDUVWKH&RXUW¶VFDVHORDGLQFUHDVHGDVGLGLWVSURPLQHQFHLQQDWLRQDODIIDLUV
The  Court  assumed  increasing  power  and  managed  to  hold  its  own  against  the  
legislative  and  executive  branches  of  government.  Eventually,  the  Court  found  a  
home  in  the  Capitol,  although  its  chambers  were  less  than  spectacular.  In  1935  the  
&RXUWPRYHGLQWRLWVRZQEXLOGLQJ7KHPDMHVWLF³PDUEOHWHPSOH´DFURVVWKHVWUHHW
from  the  Capitol  houses  not  only  a  coequal  branch  of  the  national  government,  but  the  
most  powerful  and  prestigious  judicial  body  in  the  world.  
The  tremendous  growth  in  the  power  and  prestige  of  the  Supreme  Court  was  the  
inevitable  consequence  of  the  constitutional  design  that  created  the  judiciary  as  a  
VHSDUDWHEUDQFKRIWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQW,WLVDOVRDIXQFWLRQRIWKH&RXUW¶V
institutional  development,  which  was  accomplished  through  numerous  assertions  of  
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power  and  equally  numerous  instances  of  prudent  self-restraint.  Throughout  American  
history,  moreover,  the  elected  branches  of  government  have  found  it  useful  to  permit  
the  life-tenured  Court  to  decide  difficult  and  controversial  issues.  Perhaps  most  
IXQGDPHQWDOO\WKHJURZWKLQWKH&RXUW¶VSRZHUDQGSUHVWLJHFDQEHDWWULEXWHGWRWKH
degree  to  which  the  American  people  and  their  elected  representatives  have  accepted  
the  political  role  that  the  Court  has  established  for  itself.  
Students  of  American  government  must  consider  whether  the  power  of  judicial  
review  is  compatible,  not  only  with  the  intentions  of  the  Framers  of  the  Constitution,  
but  with  our  modern  notions  of  democracy.  Is  judicial  review  an  arrogation  of  power  
by  the  courts?  Is  it  a  vestige  of  aristocracy?  Or  is  it  a  necessary  and  desirable  element  
of  constitutional  democracy?  Before  reaching  conclusions  on  these  questions,  one  
should  examine  the  ways  in  which  judicial  review  has  been  applied  over  the  years  
since  Marbury  v.  Madison.  It  is  also  important  to  take  into  account  the  constraints,  
both  external  and  self-imposed,  under  which  judicial  review  is  exercised.  
The  concept  of  checks  and  balances  is  one  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  
American  Constitution.  Each  branch  of  the  national  government  is  provided  specific  
means  of  limiting  the  exercise  of  power  by  the  other  branches.  For  example,  the  
president  may  veto  acts  of  Congress,  which  will  not  become  law  unless  the  veto  is  
overridden  by  a  two-thirds  vote  in  both  Houses.  Although  the  federal  courts,  and  the  
Supreme  Court  in  particular,  are  often  characterized  as  guardians  of  the  Constitution,  
the  judicial  branch  is  by  no  means  immune  to  the  abuse  of  power.  Accordingly,  the  
federal  judiciary  is  subject  to  checks  and  balances  imposed  by  Congress  and  the  
president.  In  a  constitutional  system  that  seeks  to  prevent  any  agency  of  government  
from  exercising  unchecked  power,  even  the  Supreme  Court  is  subject  to  external  
limitations.  
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In  The  Federalist,  No.  78,  Alexander  Hamilton  sought  to  persuade  his  countrymen  
WKDWWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWZRXOGEHWKH³OHDVWGDQJHURXV´EUDQFKRIWKHQDWLRQDO
government  under  the  new  Constitution,  which  had  yet  to  be  ratified.  Hamilton  
observed  that:  
[T]he  judiciary«  has  no  influence  over  either  the  sword  or  the  purse;;  no  direction  
of  the  strength  or  of  the  wealth  of  a  society;;  and  can  take  no  active  resolution  
whatever.  It  may  be  truly  said  to  have  neither  force  nor  will,  but  merely  judgment.  
,WLVWUXHWKDWWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VSRZHURIHQIRUFHPHQWLVOLPLWHGLWLVDOVRWUXH
that  the  Court  does  not  determine  taxing  and  spending  policies.  Yet  the  almost  
hallowed  cKDUDFWHURIWKH&RXUW¶V³PHUHMXGJPHQW´PDNHVWKH&RXUWDVOLNHO\WR
secure  compliance  with  its  policy  pronouncements  as  institutions  having  direct  control  
over  appropriations  or  law  enforcement  agencies.  Clearly,  the  power  of  the  federal  
courts,  and  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  particular,  to  secure  compliance  goes  far  beyond  
the  issuance  of  orders  and  decrees  and  the  availability  of  a  few  federal  marshals  to  
enforce  them.  
The  power  and  prestige  of  the  Supreme  Court,  indeed  of  the  entire  federal  
judiciary,  have  grown  tremendously  during  the  past  two  centuries.  Nevertheless,  the  
Court  works  within  a  constitutional  and  political  system  that  imposes  significant  
constraints  on  its  power.  
The  Supreme  Court  can,  and  occasionally  does,  speak  with  finality  on  important  
questions  of  constitutional  law  and  public  policy.  But  it  must  consider  the  probable  
responses  of  Congress,  the  president,  and,  ultimately,  the  American  people.  More  than  
\HDUVDIWHUWKHUDWLILFDWLRQRIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ$OH[DQGHU+DPLOWRQ¶V
characteri]DWLRQRIWKHIHGHUDOMXGLFLDU\DVWKH³OHDVWGDQJHURXV´EUDQFKRIWKH
national  government  remains  credible.  
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[Start  A  Note  On  Briefing  Cases  Box  here]  
A  NOTE  ON  BRIEFING  CASES  
Each  chapter  in  this  book  includes  a  number  of  excerpts  from  Supreme  Court  
decisions.  These  excerpts  have  been  chosen  to  illustrate  some  of  the  important  
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concepts  and  principles  described  in  the  chapters.  Some  instructors  may  wish  to  have  
WKHLUVWXGHQWV³EULHI´VRPHRUDOORIWKHVHFDVHV:KHWKHURUQRWWKHLQVWUXFWRUUHTXLUHV
case  briefs,  students  may  find  briefing  cases  useful  for  learning  material  and  preparing  
for  examinations.  
A  case  brief  is  simply  a  summary  of  a  court  decision,  usually  in  outline  format.  
Typically,  a  case  brief  contains  the  following  elements:  
The  name  of  the  case  and  the  date  of  the  decision  
The  essential  facts  of  the  case  
The  key  issue(s)  of  law  involved    
The  holding  of  the  Court  
$EULHIVXPPDU\RIWKH&RXUW¶VRSLQLRQHVSHFLDOO\DVLWUHODWHVWRWKHNH\
issue(s)  in  the  case  
Summaries  of  concurring  and  dissenting  opinions,  if  any  
A  statement  commenting  on  the  significance  of  the  decision  and/or  stating  the  
VWXGHQW¶VYLHZDVWRWKHFRUUHFWQHVVRIWKHGHFLVLRQ  
  
Here  is  a  sample  case  brief:  
PLESSY  V.  FERGUSON  (1896)  
Issue:  ,VDVWDWHODZUHTXLULQJ³HTXDOEXWVHSDUDWH´IDFLOLWLHVIRUZKLWHVDQGEODFNVD
violation  of  the  Thirteenth  or  Fourteenth  Amendment?  
Facts:  Homer  Plessy,  who  was  seven-eighths  white  and  one-eighth  black,  was  
arrested  after  refusing  to  vacate  a  seat  in  a  railroad  car  reserved  for  whites.  He  was  
FRQYLFWHGXQGHUD/RXLVLDQDVWDWXWHPDQGDWLQJ³HTXDOEXWVHSDUDWH´DFFRPPRGDWLRQV
on  railroads.  After  unsuccessfully  attacking  the  statute  in  the  Louisiana  state  courts,  
Plessy  appealed  to  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court.  
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Supreme  Court  Decision:  Judgment  of  state  court  affirmed;;  conviction  and  statute  
upheld.  Vote:  7±1  (Justice  Brewer  not  participating).  
Opinions:  
Majority  (Brown):  6HJUHJDWLRQLVDUHDVRQDEOHH[HUFLVHRIWKHVWDWH¶VSROLFHSRZHU
in  that  it  is  conducive  to  the  maintenance  of  public  order  and  peace.  Segregation  is  not  
per  se  D³EDGJHRIVODYHU\´DQGLVWKHUHfore  not  a  violation  of  the  Thirteenth  
Amendment.  The  compulsory  segregation  of  the  races  is  permissible  under  the  Equal  
Protection  Clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  as  long  as  equal  accommodations  are  
provided.  The  Fourteenth  Amendment  was  not  intended  to  abolish  all  distinctions  
based  on  color,  nor  was  it  intended  to  enforce  social  as  distinct  from  political  equality.  
Dissenting  (Harlan):  Compulsory  segregation  is  an  infringement  on  the  personal  
liberties  of  persons  of  African  descent.  The  Constitution  is  color-blind;;  therefore,  
government  is  prohibited  from  treating  people  differently  merely  on  account  of  their  
race.  Forcible  segregation  is  a  badge  of  inferiority,  a  vestige  of  slavery,  and  therefore  
a  violation  of  the  Thirteenth  Amendment.  
Comment:  
7KH³VHSDUDWHEXWHTXDO´GRFWULQHSURSRXQGHGLQPlessy  provided  a  justification  for  
the  entire  regime  of  Jim  Crow  laws  enacted  in  the  late  nineteenth  century.  The  
Supreme  Court  eventually  repudiated  this  doctrine,  beginning  with  Brown  v.  Board  of  
Education  (1954).  
[End  A  Note  On  Briefing  Cases  Box  here]  
Case  
MARBURY  V.  MADISON  
1  Cranch  (5  U.S.)  137;;  2  L.Ed.  60  (1803)    
Vote:  4±0  
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In  this,  the  most  significant  opinion  in  American  constitutional  law,  Chief  Justice  
John  Marshall  asserts  the  power  of  the  federal  judiciary  to  invalidate  acts  of  
Congress  that  are  determined  to  be  unconstitutional.  The  facts  of  the  case  are  
discussed  in  some  detail  on  pages  36±38.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that,  in  order  to  
accommodate  Justice  Samuel  Chase,  who  was  ill  at  the  time,  Chief  Justice  Marshall  
UHDGWKH2SLQLRQRIWKH&RXUWQRWLQWKH&RXUW¶VFKDPEHUORFDWHGLQWKH&DSLWROEXW
EHIRUHDQDWWHQWLYHDXGLHQFHLQWKHOLYLQJURRPRI6WHOOH¶V+RWHOORFDWHGRQWKH
present  site  of  the  Library  of  Congress.  For  a  fascinating  account  of  the  details  
surrounding  Marbury  v.  Madison,  see  Jean  Edward  Smith,  John  Marshall:  Definer  of  
a  Nation,  New  York:  Henry  Holt,  1996,  chapter  13.  
Mr.  Chief  Justice  Marshall  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court.  
It  is«  the  opinion  of  the  Court  that  by  signing  the  commission  of  Mr.  Marbury,  
the  President«  appointed  him  a  justice  of  peace«  in  the  District  of  Columbia;;  and  
that  the  seal  of  the  United  States,  affixed  thereto  by  the  Secretary  of  State,  is  
conclusive  testimony  of  the  verity  of  the  signature,  and  of  the  completion  of  the  
appointment;;  and  that  the  appointment  conferred  on  him  a  legal  right  to  the  office  for  
the  space  of  five  years.  
«[H]aving  this  legal  title  to  the  office,  [Marbury]  has  a  consequent  right  to  the  
commission;;  a  refusal  to  deliver  which  is  a  plain  violation  of  the  right,  for  which  the  
laws  of  his  country  afford  him  a  remedy.  
«It  remains  to  be  inquired  whether,  [Marbury]  is  entitled  to  the  remedy  for  which  
he  applies.  This  depends  on  1st.  The  nature  of  the  writ  applied  for;;  and,  2d.  The  power  
of  this  court.  
[After  a  lengthy  discussion  of  the  nature  of  the  writ  of  mandamus  and  its  historical  
basis,  Marshall  continues:]  
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«The  act  [the  Judiciary  Act  of  1789]  to  establish  the  judicial  courts  of  the  United  
6WDWHVDXWKRUL]HVWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW³WRLVVXHwrits  of  mandamus,  in  cases  warranted  
by  the  principles  and  usages  of  law,  to  any  courts  appointed  or  persons  holding  office,  
XQGHUWKHDXWKRULW\RIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´>6HFWLRQ@  
The  Secretary  of  State,  being  a  person  holding  an  office  under  the  authority  of  the  
United  States,  is  precisely  within  the  letter  of  this  description;;  and  if  this  court  is  not  
authorized  to  issue  a  writ  of  mandamus  to  such  an  officer,  it  must  be  because  the  law  
is  unconstitutional  and,  therefore,  absolutely  incapable  of  conferring  the  authority,  
and  assigning  the  duties  which  its  words  purport  to  confer  and  assign.  
The  Constitution  vests  the  whole  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  in  one  
Supreme  Court,  and  such  inferior  courts  as  Congress  shall,  from  time  to  time,  ordain  
and  establish.  This  power  is  expressly  extended  to  all  cases  arising  under  the  laws  of  
the  United  States;;  and  consequently,  in  some  form,  may  be  exercised  over  the  present  
case;;  because  the  right  claimed  is  given  by  a  law  of  the  United  States.  
In  the  distributioQRIWKLVSRZHULWLVGHFODUHGWKDW³WKH6XSUHPH&RXUWVKDOOKDYH
original  jurisdiction,  in  all  cases  affecting  ambassadors,  other  public  ministers  and  
consuls,  and  those  in  which  a  state  shall  be  a  party.  In  all  other  cases,  the  Supreme  
Court  shall  have  DSSHOODWHMXULVGLFWLRQ´«  
To  enable  this  Court,  then,  to  issue  a  mandamus,  it  must  be  shown  to  be  an  
exercise  of  appellate  jurisdiction;;  or  to  be  necessary  to  enable  them  to  exercise  
appellate  jurisdiction.  
It  has  been  stated  at  the  bar,  that  the  appellate  jurisdiction  may  be  exercised  in  a  
variety  of  forms,  and  that  if  it  be  the  will  of  the  legislature  that  a  mandamus  should  be  
used  for  that  purpose,  that  will  must  be  obeyed.  This  is  true,  yet  the  jurisdiction  must  
be  appellate,  not  original.  
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It  is  the  essential  criterion  of  appellate  jurisdiction,  that  it  revises  and  corrects  the  
proceedings  in  a  cause  already  instituted,  and  does  not  create  that  cause.  Although,  
therefore,  a  mandamus  may  be  directed  to  courts,  yet  to  issue  such  a  writ  to  an  officer,  
for  the  delivery  of  a  paper,  is,  in  effect,  the  same  as  to  sustain  an  original  action  for  
that  paper,  and  therefore,  seems  not  to  belong  to  appellate,  but  to  original  jurisdiction.  
Neither  is  it  necessary  in  such  a  case  as  this,  to  enable  the  court  to  exercise  its  
appellate  jurisdiction.  
The  authority,  therefore,  given  to  the  Supreme  Court  by  the  act  establishing  the  
judicial  courts  of  the  United  States,  to  issue  writs  of  mandamus  to  public  officers,  
appears  not  to  be  warranted  by  the  Constitution;;  and  it  becomes  necessary  to  inquire,  
whether  a  jurisdiction  so  conferred  can  be  exercised.  
The  question,  whether  an  act,  repugnant  to  the  Constitution,  can  become  the  law  
of  the  land,  is  a  question  deeply  interesting  to  the  United  States;;  but,  happily,  not  of  
an  intricacy  proportioned  to  its  interest.  It  seems  only  necessary  to  recognize  certain  
principles,  supposed  to  have  been  long  and  well  established,  to  decide  it.  
That  the  people  have  an  original  right  to  establish,  for  their  future  government,  
such  principles  as,  in  their  opinion,  shall  most  conduce  to  their  own  happiness,  is  the  
basis  on  which  the  whole  American  fabric  has  been  erected.  The  exercise  of  this  
original  right  is  a  very  great  exertion;;  nor  can  it,  nor  ought  it,  to  be  frequently  
repeated.  The  principles,  therefore,  so  established,  are  deemed  fundamental.  And  as  
the  authority  from  which  they  proceed  is  supreme,  and  can  seldom  act,  they  are  
designed  to  be  permanent.  
This  original  and  supreme  will  organizes  the  government,  and  assigns  to  different  
departments  their  respective  powers.  It  may  either  stop  here,  or  establish  certain  limits  
not  to  be  transcended  by  those  departments.  
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The  government  of  the  United  States  is  of  the  latter  description.  The  powers  of  the  
legislature  are  defined  and  limited;;  and  that  those  limits  may  not  be  mistaken  or  
forgotten,  the  Constitution  is  written.  To  what  purpose  are  powers  limited,  and  to  
what  purpose  is  that  limitation  committed  to  writing,  if  these  limits  may,  at  any  time,  
be  passed  by  those  intended  to  be  restrained?  The  distinction  between  a  government  
with  limited  and  unlimited  powers  is  abolished,  if  those  limits  do  not  confine  the  
persons  on  whom  they  are  imposed,  and  if  acts  prohibited  and  acts  allowed,  are  of  
equal  obligation.  It  is  a  proposition  too  plain  to  be  contested,  that  the  constitution  
controls  any  legislative  act  repugnant  to  it;;  or  that  the  legislature  may  alter  the  
Constitution  by  an  ordinary  act.  
Between  these  alternatives,  there  is  no  middle  ground.  The  Constitution  is  either  a  
superior  paramount  law,  unchangeable  by  ordinary  means,  or  it  is  on  a  level  with  
ordinary  legislative  acts,  and,  like  other  acts,  is  alterable  when  the  legislature  shall  
please  to  alter  it.  
If  the  former  part  of  the  alternative  be  true,  then  a  legislative  act,  contrary  to  the  
Constitution,  is  not  law;;  if  the  latter  part  be  true,  then  written  constitutions  are  absurd  
attempts,  on  the  part  of  the  people,  to  limit  a  power,  in  its  own  nature,  illimitable.  
Certainly,  all  those  who  have  framed  written  constitutions  contemplate  them  as  
forming  the  fundamental  and  paramount  law  of  the  nation,  and  consequently,  the  
theory  of  every  such  government  must  be,  that  an  act  of  the  legislature,  repugnant  to  
the  Constitution,  is  void.  
This  theory  is  essentially  attached  to  a  written  constitution,  and  is,  consequently,  
to  be  considered,  by  this  Court,  as  one  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  our  society.  It  
is  not,  therefore,  to  be  lost  sight  of,  in  the  further  consideration  of  this  subject.  
If  an  act  of  the  legislature,  repugnant  to  the  Constitution,  is  void,  does  it  
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notwithstanding  its  invalidity,  bind  the  courts,  and  oblige  them  to  give  it  effect?  Or,  in  
other  words,  though  it  be  not  law,  does  it  constitute  a  rule  as  operative  as  if  it  was  a  
law?  This  would  be  to  overthrow,  in  fact,  what  was  established  in  theory;;  and  would  
seem,  at  first  view,  an  absurdity  too  gross  to  be  insisted  on.  It  shall,  however,  receive  
a  more  attentive  consideration.  
It  is  emphatically  the  province  and  duty  of  the  judicial  department  to  say  what  the  
law  is.  Those  who  apply  the  rule  to  particular  cases,  must  of  necessity  expound  and  
interpret  that  rule.  If  two  laws  conflict  with  each  other,  the  courts  must  decide  on  the  
operation  of  each.  
So  if  a  law  be  in  opposition  to  the  Constitution;;  if  both  the  law  and  the  
Constitution  apply  to  a  particular  case,  so  that  the  court  must  either  decide  that  case,  
conformable  to  the  law,  disregarding  the  Constitution;;  or  conformable  to  the  
Constitution,  disregarding  the  law;;  the  court  must  determine  which  of  these  
conflicting  rules  governs  the  case.  This  is  of  the  very  essence  of  judicial  duty.  
If  then,  the  courts  are  to  regard  the  Constitution,  and  the  constitution  is  superior  to  
any  ordinary  act  of  the  legislature,  the  Constitution,  and  not  such  ordinary  act,  must  
govern  the  case  to  which  they  both  apply.  
Those  then  who  controvert  the  principle  that  the  Constitution  is  to  be  considered,  
in  court,  as  a  paramount  law,  are  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  maintaining  that  courts  
must  close  their  eyes  on  the  Constitution,  and  see  only  the  law.  
This  doctrine  would  subvert  the  very  foundation  of  all  written  constitutions.  It  
would  declare  that  an  act  which,  according  to  the  principles  and  theory  of  our  
government,  is  entirely  void,  is  yet,  in  practice,  completely  obligatory.  It  would  
declare,  that  if  the  legislature  shall  do  what  is  expressly  forbidden,  such  act,  
notwithstanding  the  express  prohibition,  is  in  reality  effectual.  It  would  be  given  to  
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the  legislature  a  practical  and  real  omnipotence,  with  the  same  breath  which  professes  
to  restrict  their  powers  within  narrow  limits.  It  is  prescribing  limits,  and  declaring  that  
those  limits  may  be  passed  at  pleasure«  
The  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  is  extended  to  all  cases  arising  under  the  
Constitution.  Could  it  be  the  intention  of  those  who  gave  this  power,  to  say,  that  in  
using  it,  the  Constitution  should  not  be  looked  into?  That  a  case  arising  under  the  
Constitution  should  be  decided,  without  examining  the  instrument  under  which  it  
arises?  This  is  too  extravagant  to  be  maintained.  
In  some  cases,  then,  the  constitution  must  be  looked  into  by  the  judges.  And  if  
they  can  open  it  at  all,  what  part  of  it  are  they  forbidden  to  read  or  to  obey?«  
«[I]t  is  apparent,  that  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  contemplated  that  
instrument  as  a  rule  for  the  government  of  courts,  as  well  as  the  legislature.  
Why  otherwise  does  it  direct  the  judges  to  take  an  oath  to  support  it?  This  oath  
certainly  applies  in  an  especial  manner,  to  their  conduct  in  their  official  character.  
How  immoral  to  impose  it  on  them,  if  they  were  to  be  used  as  the  instruments,  and  the  
knowing  instruments,  for  violating  what  they  swear  to  support!  
«Why  does  a  judge  swear  to  discharge  his  duties  agreeable  to  the  Constitution  of  
the  United  States,  if  that  constitution  forms  no  rule  for  his  government?  If  it  is  closed  
upon  him,  and  cannot  be  inspected  by  him?  
If  such  be  the  real  state  of  things,  this  is  worse  than  solemn  mockery.  To  
prescribe,  or  to  take  this  oath,  becomes  equally  a  crime.  
It  is  also  not  entirely  unworthy  of  observation,  that  in  declaring  what  shall  be  the  
supreme  law  of  the  land,  the  Constitution  itself  is  first  mentioned;;  and  not  the  laws  of  
the  United  States  generally,  but  those  only  which  shall  be  made  in  pursuance  of  the  
Constitution,  have  that  rank.  
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Thus,  the  particular  phraseology  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  confirms  
and  strengthens  the  principle,  supposed  to  be  essential  to  all  written  constitutions,  that  
a  law  repugnant  to  the  Constitution  is  void;;  and  that  courts,  as  well  as  other  
departments,  are  bound  by  that  instrument.  
The  rule  must  be  discharged.  
[Justice  Cushing  and  Justice  Moore  did  not  participate  in  this  decision.]  
  
Case  
EAKIN  V.  RAUB  
12  Sergeant  &  Rawle  (Pennsylvania  Supreme  Court)  330  (1825)  
Although  the  specific  issue  before  the  Pennsylvania  Supreme  Court  is  of  little  interest  
WRGD\-XVWLFH*LEVRQ¶VGLVVHQWLQJRSLQLRQLVVWLOOFRQVLGHUHGWREHWKHPRVWHIIHFWLYH
UHMRLQGHUWR&KLHI-XVWLFH0DUVKDOO¶VDUJXPHQWLQVXSSRUWRIMXGLFLDOUHYLHZ  
Gibson,  J.  [dissenting].  
«I  am  aware,  that  a  right  to  declare  all  unconstitutional  acts  void«  is  generally  
held  as  a  professional  dogma;;  but,  I  apprehend  rather  as  a  matter  of  faith  than  of  
reason.  I  admit  that  I  once  embraced  the  same  doctrine,  but  without  examination,  and  
I  shall  therefore  state  the  arguments  that  impelled  me  to  abandon  it,  with  great  respect  
for  those  by  whom  it  is  still  maintained«  
«The  Constitution  and  the  right  of  the  legislature  to  pass  the  act,  may  be  in  
collision.  But  is  that  a  legitimate  subject  for  judicial  determination?  If  it  be,  the  
judiciary  must  be  a  peculiar  organ,  to  revise  the  proceedings  of  the  legislature,  and  to  
correct  its  mistakes;;  and  in  what  part  of  the  Constitution  are  we  to  look  for  this  proud  
preeminence?  Viewing  the  matter  in  the  opposite  direction,  what  would  be  thought  of  
an  act  of  assembly  in  which  it  should  be  declared  that  the  Supreme  Court  had,  in  a  
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particular  case,  put  a  wrong  construction  on  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  
that  the  judgment  should  therefore  be  reversed?  It  would  doubtless  be  thought  a  
usurpation  of  judicial  power.  But  it  is  by  no  means  clear,  that  to  declare  a  law  void  
which  has  been  enacted  according  to  the  forms  prescribed  in  the  Constitution,  is  not  a  
usurpation  of  legislative  power«  
«But  it  has  been  said  to  be  emphatically  the  business  of  the  judiciary,  to  ascertain  
and  pronounce  what  the  law  is;;  and  that  this  necessarily  involves  a  consideration  of  
the  Constitution.  It  does  so:  but  how  far?  If  the  judiciary  will  inquire  into  any  thing  
beside  the  form  of  enactment,  where  shall  it  stop?  There  must  be  some  point  of  
limitation  to  such  an  inquiry;;  for  no  one  will  pretend  that  a  judge  would  be  justifiable  
in  calling  for  the  election  returns,  or  scrutinizing  the  qualifications  of  those  who  
composed  the  legislature«  
But  the  judges  are  sworn  to  support  the  Constitution,  and  are  they  not  bound  by  it  
as  the  law  of  the  land?  In  some  respects  they  are.  In  the  very  few  cases  in  which  the  
judiciary,  and  not  the  legislature,  is  the  immediate  organ  to  execute  its  provisions,  
they  are  bound  by  it  in  preference  to  any  act  of  assembly  to  the  contrary.  In  such  
cases,  the  Constitution  is  a  rule  to  the  courts.  But  what  I  have  in  view  in  this  inquiry,  
is  the  supposed  right  of  the  judiciary,  to  interfere,  in  cases  where  the  Constitution  is  to  
be  carried  into  effect  through  the  instrumentality  of  the  legislature,  and  where  that  
organ  must  necessarily  first  decide  on  the  constitutionality  of  its  own  act.  The  oath  to  
support  the  Constitution  is  not  peculiar  to  the  judges,  but  is  taken  indiscriminately  by  
every  officer  of  the  government,  and  is  designed  rather  as  a  test  of  the  political  
principles  of  the  man,  than  to  bind  the  officer  in  the  discharge  of  his  duty;;  otherwise  it  
were  difficult  to  determine  what  operation  it  is  to  have  in  the  case  of  a  recorder  of  
deeds,  for  instance,  who,  in  the  execution  of  his  office,  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  
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Constitution.  But  granting  it  to  relate  to  the  official  conduct  of  the  judge,  as  well  as  
every  other  officer,  and  not  to  his  political  principles,  still  it  must  be  understood  in  
reference  to  supporting  the  Constitution,  only  as  far  as  that  may  be  involved  in  his  
official  duty;;  and  consequently,  if  his  official  duty  does  not  comprehend  an  inquiry  
into  the  authority  of  the  legislature,  neither  does  his  oath«  
But  do  not  the  judges  do  a  positive  act  in  violation  of  the  Constitution,  when  they  
give  effect  to  an  unconstitutional  law?  Not  if  the  law  has  been  passed  according  to  the  
forms  established  in  the  Constitution.  The  fallacy  of  the  question  is  in  supposing  that  
the  judiciary  adopts  the  acts  of  the  legislature  as  its  own;;  whereas  the  enactment  of  a  
law  and  the  interpretation  of  it  are  not  concurrent  acts,  and  as  the  judiciary  is  not  
required  to  concur  in  the  enactment,  neither  is  it  in  the  breach  of  the  Constitution  
which  may  be  the  consequence  of  the  enactment;;  the  fault  is  imputable  to  the  
legislature,  and  on  it  the  responsibility  exclusively  rests.  In  this  respect,  the  judges  are  
in  the  predicament  of  jurors  who  are  bound  to  serve  in  capital  cases,  although  unable,  
under  any  circumstance,  to  reconcile  it  to  their  duty  to  deprive  a  human  being  of  life.  
To  one  of  these,  who  applied  to  be  discharged  from  the  panel,  I  once  heard  it  
UHPDUNHGE\DQHPLQHQWDQGKXPDQHMXGJH³<RXGRQRWGHSULYHDSULVRQHURIOLIHE\
finding  him  guilty  of  a  capital  crime;;  you  but  pronounce  his  case  to  be  within  the  law,  
DQGLWLVWKHUHIRUHWKRVHZKRGHFODUHWKHODZDQGQRW\RXZKRGHSULYHKLPRIOLIH´  
«But  it  has  been  said  that  this  construction  would  deprive  the  citizen  of  the  
advantages  which  are  peculiar  to  written  constitution,  by  at  once  declaring  the  power  
of  the  legislature,  in  practice,  to  be  illimitable.  I  ask,  what  are  those  advantages?  The  
principles  of  a  written  constitution  are  more  fixed  and  certain,  and  more  apparent  to  
the  apprehension  of  the  people,  than  principles  which  depend  on  tradition  and  the  
vague  comprehension  of  the  individuals  who  compose  the  nation,  and  who  cannot  all  
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be  expected  to  receive  the  same  impressions  or  entertain  the  same  notions  on  any  
given  subject.  But  there  is  no  magic  or  inherent  power  in  parchment  and  ink,  to  
command  respect  and  protect  principles  from  violation.  In  the  business  of  
government,  a  recurrence  to  first  principles  answers  the  end  of  an  observation  at  sea  
with  a  view  to  correct  the  dead  reckoning;;  and,  for  this  purpose,  a  written  constitution  
is  an  instrument  of  inestimable  value.  It  is  of  inestimable  value,  also,  in  rendering  its  
principles  familiar  to  the  mass  of  the  people;;  for,  after  all,  there  is  no  effectual  guard  
against  legislative  usurpation  but  public  opinion,  the  force  of  which,  in  this  country,  is  
inconceivably  great.  Happily  this  is  proved,  by  experience,  to  be  a  sufficient  guard  
against  palpable  infractions.  The  Constitution  of  this  state  has  withstood  the  shocks  of  
strong  party  excitement  for  thirty  years,  during  which  no  act  of  the  legislature  has  
been  declared  unconstitutional,  although  the  judiciary  has  constantly  asserted  a  right  
to  do  so  in  clear  cases.  But  it  would  be  absurd  to  say,  that  this  remarkable  observance  
of  the  Constitution  has  been  produced,  not  by  the  responsibility  of  the  legislature  to  
the  people,  but  by  an  apprehension  of  control  by  the  judiciary.  Once  let  public  opinion  
be  so  corrupt  as  to  sanction  every  misconstruction  of  the  Constitution  and  abuse  of  
power  which  the  temptation  of  the  moment  may  dictate,  and  the  party  which  may  
happen  to  be  predominant,  will  laugh  at  the  puny  effort  of  a  dependent  power  to  arrest  
it  in  its  course.  
For  these  reasons,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  it  rests  with  the  people,  in  whom  full  
and  absolute  sovereign  power  resides  to  correct  abuses  in  legislation,  by  instructing  
their  representatives  to  repeal  the  obnoxious  act.  What  is  wanting  to  plenary  power  in  
the  government,  is  reserved  by  the  people  for  their  own  immediate  use;;  and  to  redress  
an  infringement  of  their  rights  in  this  respect,  would  seem  to  be  an  accessory  of  the  
power  thus  reserved.  It  might,  perhaps,  have  been  better  to  vest  the  power  in  the  
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judiciary;;  as  it  might  be  expected  that  its  habits  of  deliberation,  and  the  aid  derived  
from  the  arguments  of  counsel,  would  more  frequently  lead  to  accurate  conclusions.  
On  the  other  hand,  the  judiciary  is  not  infallible;;  and  an  error  by  it  would  admit  of  no  
remedy  but  a  more  distinct  expression  of  the  public  will,  through  the  extraordinary  
medium  of  a  convention;;  whereas,  an  error  by  the  legislature  admits  of  a  remedy  by  
an  exertion  of  the  same  will,  in  the  ordinary  exercise  of  the  right  of  suffrage²a  mode  
better  calculated  to  attain  the  end,  without  popular  excitement.  It  may  be  said,  the  
people  would  probably  not  notice  an  error  of  their  representatives.  But  they  would  as  
probably  do  so,  as  notice  an  error  of  the  judiciary;;  and,  beside,  it  is  a  postulate  in  the  
theory  of  our  government,  and  the  very  basis  of  the  superstructure,  that  the  people  are  
wise,  virtuous,  and  competent  to  manage  their  own  affairs;;  and  if  they  are  not  so,  in  
fact,  still  every  question  of  this  sort  must  be  determined  according  to  the  principles  of  
the  Constitution,  as  it  came  from  the  hands  of  its  framers,  and  the  existence  of  a  defect  
which  was  not  foreseen,  would  not  justify  those  who  administer  the  government,  in  
applying  a  corrective  in  practice,  which  can  be  provided  only  by  a  convention«  
  
Case  
SCOTT  V.  SANDFORD  
(THE  DRED  SCOTT  CASE)  
19  Howard  (60  U.S.)  393;;  15  L.Ed.  691  (1857)    
Vote:  7±2  
Dred  Scott  was  a  slave  belonging  to  a  surgeon  in  the  U.S.  Army.  He  was  taken  by  his  
master  into  territories  in  which  slavery  was  forbidden  by  the  Missouri  Compromise  of  
1820.  Several  years  after  his  return  to  Missouri,  Dred  Scott  brought  suit  to  obtain  his  
IUHHGRPDUJXLQJWKDWKLVWHPSRUDU\UHVLGHQFHLQD³IUHH´WHUULWRU\KDGDEROLVKHGKLV
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servitude.  After  an  adverse  ruling  in  the  U.S.  Circuit  Court,  Scott  took  the  case  to  the  
Supreme  Court  on  a  writ  of  error.  
The  U.S.  Supreme  Court  first  heard  oral  arguments  in  Scott  v.  Sandford  in  February  
1856.  By  this  time,  the  case  had  achieved  notoriety  in  the  stormy  sectional  
controversy  over  slavery.  Reluctant  to  announce  its  decision  during  what  promised  to  
be  a  bitterly  fought  presidential  election  campaign,  the  Court  ordered  that  the  case  be  
reargued  at  the  beginning  of  its  next  term,  in  December  1856.  One  of  the  most  
controversial  questions  addressed  on  reargument  was  whether  Congress  had  acted  
constitutionally  in  passing  the  Missouri  Compromise  of  1820,  thereby  asserting  the  
power  to  regulate  slavery  in  the  territories.  
President-Elect  James  Buchanan,  whose  position  on  the  territorial  issue  had  
EHHQHTXLYRFDOVWDWHGWKDWWKH³JUHDWREMHFW´RIKLVDGPLQLVWUDWLRQZRXOGEH³WR
destroy  the  dangerous  slavery  agitation  and  thus  restore  peace  to  our  distracted  
FRXQWU\´+HDUGHQWO\KRSHGWKDWWKURXJKLWVDQWLFLSDWHGGHFLVLRQLQWKH'UHG6FRWW
case,  the  Supreme  Court  would  help  him  achieve  this  objective.  
Acting  on  this  hope,  Buchanan  wrote  his  old  friend,  Justice  John  Catron,  on  
February  3,  1857,  wanting  to  know  whether  the  Court  would  deliver  its  decision  
before  March  4,  Inauguration  Day,  so  that  he  could  take  it  into  account  in  preparing  
his  inaugural  address.  In  responding  to  this  highly  unusual  inquiry,  Catron  said  that  
the  Court  had  not  yet  taken  action  on  the  case,  but  that  he  would  try  to  obtain  this  
information,  since  he  believed  Buchanan  was  entitled  to  it.  Professor  Don  E.  
Fehrenbacher,  in  his  authoritative  study  of  the  Dred  Scott  case  (The  Dred  Scott  Case:  
Its  Significance  in  American  Law  and  Politics),  has  argued  convincingly  that  only  a  
decision  on  the  constitutionality  of  the  Missouri  Compromise  would  have  been  
important  to  Buchanan  in  preparing  his  inauguration  speech.  
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On  February  10,  Catron  wrote  Buchanan,  advising  him  that  the  case  would  be  
decided  in  conference  on  February  14  but  that  the  justices  probably  would  not  rule  on  
the  power  of  Congress  over  slavery  in  the  territories.  This  prediction  seemed  to  be  
confirmed  when  the  majority  opinion  was  assigned  to  Justice  Samuel  Nelson,  a  
northern  centrist  on  the  Taney  Court.  In  his  narrowly  focused  draft  opinion,  Nelson  
maintained  that  there  was  no  need  to  consider  the  constitutionality  of  the  Missouri  
&RPSURPLVH¶VUHVWULFWLRQRQVODYHU\LQWKHWHUULtories.  In  a  sudden  about-face,  a  
Court  majority  decided  to  take  on  the  territorial  issue  as  well  as  all  other  
constitutional  questions  raised  in  the  case.  The  formidable  task  of  writing  a  new  
majority  opinion  was  assigned  to  Chief  Justice  Taney.  On  February  19,  Catron  again  
ZURWHWR%XFKDQDQLQIRUPLQJKLPRIWKHGUDPDWLFFKDQJHLQWKH&RXUW¶VSODQVDQG
VXJJHVWLQJWKDW%XFKDQDQ¶VLQDXJXUDODGGUHVVPLJKWLQFOXGHDSDVVDJHOHDYLQJWKH
WHUULWRULDOPDWWHUZLWKWKH³DSSURSULDWHWULEXQDO´DQGGHFOLQLQJWR³H[SUHss  any  
RSLQLRQRQWKHVXEMHFW´,QWKHVDPHOHWWHU&DWURQXUJHG%XFKDQDQWRKHOSSHUVXDGH
his  fellow  Pennsylvanian,  Justice  Robert  C.  Grier,  to  support  the  broad  approach  
taken  by  Taney  and  his  four  southern  colleagues.  Buchanan  immediately  wrote  to  
Grier  urging  him  to  fall  into  line.  Grier  then  conferred  with  Taney  and  wrote  to  
%XFKDQDQRQ)HEUXDU\LQGLFDWLQJWKDWKHZRXOGVXSSRUW7DQH\¶VRSLQLRQZKLFK
ZRXOGKROGWKH0LVVRXUL&RPSURPLVH³WREHRIQRQ-HIIHFW´+HDQGKLVFROOHDJXH
Justice  James  M.  WayQHZRXOGWU\³WRJHW%URWKHUV'DQLHODQG&DPSEHOODQG&DWURQ
WRGRWKHVDPH´$IWHULQIRUPLQJ%XFKDQDQWKDWWKHGHFLVLRQZRXOGQRWEHGHOLYHUHG
before  March  6,  Grier  concluded  his  lengthy  letter  with  the  following  revealing  
FRPPHQWV³:HZLOOQRWOHWDQ\Rthers  of  our  brethren  know  anything  about  the  cause  
of  our  anxiety  to  produce  this  result  [a  majority  opinion  supported  by  six  or  possibly  
seven  justices],  and  though  contrary  to  our  usual  practice,  we  have  thought  due  to  
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you  to  state  to  you  in  candor  and  FRQILGHQFHWKHUHDOVWDWHRIWKHPDWWHU´,WLVFOHDU
IURPWKLVVHOHFWLYHVXPPDU\RIHYHQWVOHDGLQJXSWR%XFKDQDQ¶VLQDXJXUDWLRQWKDWWKH
president-elect  was  fully  informed  by  two  members  of  the  Supreme  Court²each  
LQLWLDOO\XQDZDUHRIWKHRWKHU¶VDFWLRQV²of  the  substance  of  the  forthcoming  Dred  
Scott  decision.  
On  March  4,  1857,  Chief  Justice  Taney  administered  the  oath  of  office  to  
President-Elect  Buchanan.  During  a  pause  in  the  ceremonies,  the  two  men  had  a  brief  
conversation,  a  fact  accorded  grave  signifLFDQFHE\VRPHRI%XFKDQDQ¶VFULWLFVDV
they  listened  to  his  inaugural  address.  He  noted  with  approval  that  Congress,  through  
the  Kansas-Nebraska  Act,  had  left  the  people  free  to  deal  with  the  institution  of  
slavery  as  they  saw  fit,  subject  only  to  the  Constitution.  Admittedly,  a  minor  problem  
UHPDLQHGXQUHVROYHG³$GLIIHUHQFHRIRSLQLRQKDVDULVHQLQUHJDUGWRWKHSRLQWRI
time  when  the  people  of  a  territory  shall  decide  this  question  for  themselves.  This  is,  
happily,  a  matter  of  but  little  practical  importance.  Besides,  it  is  a  judicial  question  
which  legitimately  belongs  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  before  whom  it  
is  now  pending,  and  will,  it  is  understood,  be  speedily  and  finally  settled.  To  their  
decision,  in  common  with  all  good  citizens,  I  shall  cheerfully  submit,  whatever  this  
PD\EH´$PRUHGLVLQJHQXRXVVWDWHPHQWKDVVHOGRPDSSHDUHGLQDQLQDXJXUDO
address.  Buchanan  not  only  knew  what  the  Court  was  about  to  decide  in  the  Dred  
Scott  case,  but  it  is  fair  to  say  that  he  had  a  hand  in  forging  the  Court  majority  that  
endorsed  that  decision.  
Mr.  Chief  Justice  Taney  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court.  
«The  question  is  simply  this:  Can  a  negro,  whose  ancestors  were  imported  into  
this  country,  and  sold  as  slaves,  become  a  member  of  the  political  community  formed  
and  brought  into  existence  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  as  such  
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become  entitled  to  all  the  rights,  and  privileges,  and  immunities,  guaranteed  by  that  
instrument  to  the  citizen?  One  of  which  rights  is  the  privilege  of  suing  in  a  court  of  
the  United  States  in  the  cases  specified  in  the  Constitution«  
We  think«  [that  Negroes]«  are  not  included,  and  were  not  intended  to  be  
LQFOXGHGXQGHUWKHZRUG³FLWL]HQV´LQWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQDQGFDQWKHUHIRUHFODLPQRQH
of  the  rights  and  privileges  which  that  instrument  provides  for  and  secures  to  citizens  
of  the  United  States.  On  the  contrary,  they  were  at  that  time  considered  as  a  
subordinate  and  inferior  class  of  beings,  who  had  been  subjugated  by  the  dominant  
race,  and,  whether  emancipated  or  not,  yet  remained  subject  to  their  authority,  and  
had  no  rights  or  privileges  but  such  as  those  who  held  the  power  and  the  Government  
might  choose  to  grant  them.  
It  is  not  the  province  of  the  court  to  decide  upon  the  justice  or  injustice,  the  policy  
or  impolicy,  of  these  laws.  The  decision  of  that  question  belonged  to  the  political  or  
law-making  power;;  to  those  who  formed  the  sovereignty  and  framed  the  Constitution.  
The  duty  of  the  court  is,  to  interpret  the  instrument  they  have  framed,  with  the  best  
lights  we  can  obtain  on  the  subject,  and  to  administer  it  as  we  find  it,  according  to  its  
true  intent  and  meaning  when  it  was  adopted«  
The  question  then  arises,  whether  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution,  in  relation  to  
the  personal  rights  and  privileges  to  which  the  citizen  of  a  State  should  be  entitled,  
embraced  the  negro  African  race,  at  that  time  in  this  country,  or  who  might  afterwards  
be  imported,  who  had  then  or  should  afterwards  be  made  free  in  any  State;;  and  to  put  
it  in  the  power  of  a  single  State  to  make  him  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  and  endow  
him  with  the  full  rights  of  citizenship  in  every  other  State  without  their  consent?  Does  
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  act  upon  him  whenever  he  shall  be  made  free  
under  the  laws  of  a  State,  and  raised  there  to  the  rank  of  a  citizen,  and  immediately  
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clothe  him  with  all  the  privileges  of  a  citizen  in  every  other  State,  and  in  its  own  
courts?  
The  court  thinks  the  affirmative  of  these  propositions  cannot  be  maintained.  And  
if  it  cannot,  the  plaintiff  in  error  could  not  be  a  citizen  of  the  State  of  Missouri,  within  
the  meaning  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and,  consequently,  was  not  
entitled  to  sue  in  its  courts«  
In  the  opinion  of  the  court,  the  legislation  and  histories  of  the  times,  and  the  
language  used  in  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  show,  that  neither  the  class  of  
persons  who  had  been  imported  as  slaves,  nor  their  descendants,  whether  they  had  
become  free  or  not,  were  then  acknowledged  as  a  part  of  the  people,  nor  intended  to  
be  included  in  the  general  words  used  in  that  memorable  instrument«  
They  had  for  more  than  a  century  before  been  regarded  as  beings  of  an  inferior  
order,  and  altogether  unfit  to  associate  with  the  white  race,  either  in  social  or  political  
relations;;  and  so  far  inferior,  that  they  had  no  rights  which  the  white  man  was  bound  
to  respect;;  and  that  the  negro  might  justly  and  lawfully  be  reduced  to  slavery  for  his  
benefit.  He  was  bought  and  sold,  and  treated  as  an  ordinary  article  of  merchandise  and  
traffic,  whenever  a  profit  could  be  made  by  it.  This  opinion  was  at  that  time  fixed  and  
universal  in  the  civilized  portion  of  the  white  race.  It  was  regarded  as  an  axiom  in  
morals  as  well  as  in  politics,  which  no  one  thought  of  disputing,  or  supposed  to  be  
open  to  dispute;;  and  men  in  every  grade  and  position  in  society  daily  and  habitually  
acted  upon  it  in  their  private  pursuits,  as  well  as  in  matters  of  public  concern,  without  
doubting  for  a  moment  the  correctness  of  this  opinion«  
The  only  two  provisions  [of  the  Constitution]  which  point  to  them  [slaves]  and  
include  them  [Article  I,  Section  9,  and  Article  IV,  Section  2],  treat  them  as  property,  
and  make  it  the  duty  of  the  Government  to  protect  it;;  no  other  power,  in  relation  to  
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this  race,  is  to  be  found  in  the  Constitution;;  and  as  it  is  a  Government  of  special,  
delegated,  powers,  no  authority  beyond  these  two  provisions  can  be  constitutionally  
exercised.  The  Government  of  the  United  States  had  no  right  to  interfere  for  any  other  
purpose  but  that  of  protecting  the  rights  of  the  owner,  leaving  it  altogether  with  the  
several  States  to  deal  with  this  race,  whether  emancipated  or  not,  as  each  State  may  
think  justice,  humanity,  and  the  interests  and  safety  of  society,  require.  The  States  
evidently  intended  to  reserve  this  power  exclusively  to  themselves.  
No  one,  we  presume,  supposes  that  any  change  in  public  opinion  or  feeling,  in  
relation  to  this  unfortunate  race,  in  the  civilized  nations  of  Europe  or  in  this  country,  
should  induce  the  court  to  give  to  the  words  of  the  Constitution  a  more  liberal  
construction  in  their  favor  than  they  were  intended  to  bear  when  the  instrument  was  
framed  and  adopted.  Such  an  argument  would  be  altogether  inadmissible  in  any  
tribunal  called  on  to  interpret  it.  If  any  of  its  provisions  are  deemed  unjust,  there  is  a  
mode  prescribed  in  the  instrument  itself  by  which  it  may  be  amended;;  but  while  it  
remains  unaltered,  it  must  be  construed  now  as  it  was  understood  at  the  time  of  its  
adoption.  It  is  not  only  the  same  in  words,  but  the  same  in  meaning,  and  delegates  the  
same  powers  to  the  Government,  and  reserves  and  secures  the  same  rights  and  
privileges  to  the  citizen;;  and  as  long  as  it  continues  to  exist  in  its  present  form,  it  
speaks  not  only  in  the  same  words,  but  with  the  same  meaning  and  intent  with  which  
it  spoke  when  it  came  from  the  hands  of  its  framers,  and  was  voted  on  and  adopted  by  
the  people  of  the  United  States.  Any  other  rule  of  construction  would  abrogate  the  
judicial  character  of  this  court,  and  make  it  the  mere  reflex  of  the  popular  opinion  of  
the  day«  
What  the  construction  was  at  that  time,  we  think  can  hardly  admit  of  doubt.  We  
have  the  language  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence  and  of  the  Articles  of  
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Confederation,  in  addition  to  the  plain  words  of  the  Constitution  itself;;  we  have  the  
legislation  of  the  different  States,  before,  about  the  time,  and  since,  the  Constitution  
was  adopted;;  we  have  the  legislation  of  Congress,  from  the  time  of  its  adoption  to  a  
recent  period;;  and  we  have  the  constant  and  uniform  action  of  the  Executive  
Department,  all  concurring  together,  and  leading  to  the  same  result.  And  if  anything  in  
relation  to  the  construction  of  the  Constitution  can  be  regarded  as  settled,  it  is  that  
ZKLFKZHQRZJLYHWRWKHZRUG³FLWL]HQ´DQGWKHZRUG³3HRSOH´«  
The  act  of  Congress,  upon  which  the  plaintiff  relies,  declares  that  slavery  and  
involuntary  servitude,  except  as  a  punishment  for  crime,  shall  be  forever  prohibited  in  
all  that  part  of  the  territory  ceded  by  France,  under  the  name  of  Louisiana,  which  lies  
north  of  thirty-six  degrees  thirty  minutes  north  latitude,  and  not  included  within  the  
limits  of  Missouri.  And  the«  inquiry  is,  whether  Congress  was  authorized  to  pass  this  
law  under  any  of  the  powers  granted  to  it  by  the  Constitution;;  for  if  the  authority  is  
not  given  by  that  instrument,  it  is  the  duty  of  this  court  to  declare  it  void  and  
inoperative,  and  incapable  of  conferring  freedom  upon  any  one  who  is  held  as  a  slave  
under  the  laws  of  any  one  of  the  States.  
The  counsel  for  the  plaintiff  has  laid  much  stress  upon  that  article  in  the  
&RQVWLWXWLRQZKLFKFRQIHUVRQ&RQJUHVVWKHSRZHU³WRGLVSRVHRIDQGPDNHDOO
needful  rules  and  regulations  respecting  the  territory  or  other  property  belonging  to  
WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´EXWLQWKHMXGJPHQWRIWKHFRXUWWKDWSURYLVLRQKDVQREHDULQJRQ
the  present  controversy,  and  the  power  there  given,  whatever  it  may  be,  is  confined,  
and  was  intended  to  be  confined,  to  the  territory  which  at  that  time  belonged  to,  or  
was  claimed  by  the  United  States,  and  was  within  their  boundaries  as  settled  by  the  
treaty  with  Great  Britain,  and  can  have  no  influence  upon  a  territory  afterwards  
acquired  from  a  foreign  Government.  It  was  a  special  provision  for  a  known  and  

Stephens  and  Scheb  1-128  

particular  territory,  and  to  meet  a  present  emergency,  and  nothing  more.  
«The  powers  of  the  Government  and  the  rights  and  privileges  of  the  citizen  are  
regulated  and  plainly  defined  by  the  Constitution  itself.  And  when  the  Territory  
becomes  a  part  of  the  United  States,  the  Federal  Government  enters  into  possession  in  
the  character  impressed  upon  it  by  those  who  created  it.  It  enters  upon  it  with  its  
powers  over  the  citizen  strictly  defined,  and  limited  by  the  Constitution,  from  which  it  
derives  its  own  existence,  and  by  virtue  of  which  alone  it  continues  to  exist  and  act  as  
a  Government  and  sovereignty.  It  has  no  power  of  any  kind  beyond  it;;  and  it  cannot,  
when  it  enters  a  Territory  of  the  United  States,  put  off  its  character  and  assume  
discretionary  or  despotic  powers  which  the  Constitution  has  denied  to  it.  It  cannot  
create  for  itself  a  new  character  separated  from  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  and  
the  duties  it  owes  them  under  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution.  The  Territory  being  a  
part  of  the  United  States,  the  Government  and  the  citizen  both  enter  it  under  the  
authority  of  the  Constitution,  with  their  respective  rights  defined  and  marked  out;;  and  
the  Federal  Government  can  exercise  no  power  over  his  person  or  property,  beyond  
what  that  instrument  confers,  nor  lawfully  deny  any  right  which  it  has  reserved«  
«[A]n  Act  of  Congress  which  deprives  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  of  his  liberty  
or  property,  merely  because  he  came  himself  or  brought  his  property  into  a  particular  
Territory  of  the  United  States,  and  who  had  committed  no  offense  against  the  laws,  
could  hardly  be  dignified  with  the  name  of  due  process  of  law.  
The  powers  over  person  and  property  of  which  we  speak  are  not  only  not  granted  
to  Congress,  but  are  in  express  terms  denied,  and  they  are  forbidden  to  exercise  them.  
And  this  prohibition  is  not  confined  to  the  States,  but  the  words  are  general,  and  
extend  to  the  whole  territory  over  which  the  Constitution  gives  it  power  to  legislate,  
including  those  portions  of  it  remaining  under  Territorial  Government,  as  well  as  that  
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covered  by  States.  It  is  a  total  absence  of  power  everywhere  within  the  dominion  of  
the  United  States,  and  places  the  citizens  of  a  Territory,  so  far  as  these  rights  are  
concerned,  on  the  same  footing  with  citizens  of  the  States  and  guards  them  as  firmly  
and  plainly  against  any  inroads  which  the  General  Government  might  attempt,  under  
the  plea  of  implied  or  incidental  powers.  And  if  Congress  itself  cannot  do  this²if  it  is  
beyond  the  powers  conferred  on  the  Federal  Government²it  will  be  admitted,  we  
presume,  that  it  could  not  authorize  a  Territorial  Government  to  exercise  them.  It  
would  confer  no  power  on  any  local  Government,  established  by  its  authority,  to  
violate  provisions  of  the  Constitution«  
Upon  these  considerations,  it  is  the  opinion  of  the  court  that  the  act  of  Congress  
which  prohibited  a  citizen  from  holding  and  owning  property  of  this  kind  in  the  
territory  of  the  United  States  north  of  the  line  therein  mentioned,  is  not  warranted  by  
the  Constitution,  and  is  therefore  void;;  and  that  neither  Dred  Scott  himself,  nor  any  of  
his  family,  were  made  free  by  being  carried  into  this  territory;;  even  if  they  had  been  
carried  there  by  the  owner,  with  the  intention  of  becoming  a  permanent  resident«  
  
Mr.  Justice  Curtis,  joined  by  Mr.  Justice  McLean,  dissenting.  
I  dissent  from  the  opinion  pronounced  by  the  Chief  Justice,  and  from  the  judgment  
which  the  majority  of  the  court  think  it  proper  to  render  in  this  case«  
To  determine  whether  any  free  persons,  descended  from  Africans  held  in  slavery,  
were  citizens  of  the  United  States  under  the  Confederation,  and  consequently  at  the  
time  of  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  it  is  only  necessary  to  
know  whether  any  such  persons  were  citizens  of  either  of  the  States  under  the  
Confederation,  at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution.  
Of  this  there  can  be  no  doubt.  At  the  time  of  the  ratification  of  the  Articles  of  

Stephens  and  Scheb  1-130  

Confederation,  all  free  native-born  inhabitants  of  the  States  of  New  Hampshire,  
Massachusetts,  New  York,  New  Jersey,  and  North  Carolina,  though  descended  from  
African  slaves,  were  not  only  citizens  of  those  States,  but  such  of  them  as  had  the  
other  necessary  qualifications  possessed  the  franchise  of  electors,  on  equal  terms  with  
other  citizens«  
I  dissent,  therefore,  from  that  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  majority  of  the  court,  in  
which  it  is  held  that  a  person  of  African  descent  cannot  be  a  citizen  of  the  United  
States;;  and  I  regret  I  must  go  further,  and  dissent  both  from  what  I  deem  their  
assumption  of  authority  to  examine  the  constitutionality  of  the  act  of  Congress  
commonly  called  the  Missouri  Compromise  act,  and  the  grounds  and  conclusions  
announced  in  their  opinion.  
Having  first  decided  that  they  were  bound  to  consider  the  sufficiency  of  the  plea  
to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Circuit  Court,  and  having  decided  that  this  plea  showed  that  
the  Circuit  Court  had  no  jurisdiction,  and  consequently  that  this  is  a  case  to  which  the  
judicial  power  of  the  United  States  does  not  extend,  they  have  gone  on  to  examine  the  
merits  of  the  case  as  they  appear  on  the  trial  before  the  court  and  jury,  on  the  issues  
joined  on  the  pleas  in  bar,  and  so  have  reached  the  question  of  the  power  of  Congress  
to  pass  the  act  of  1820.  On  so  grave  a  subject  as  this,  I  feel  obliged  to  say  that,  in  my  
opinion,  such  an  exertion  of  judicial  power  transcends  the  limits  of  the  authority  of  
the  court«  
  
Case  
EX  PARTE  MCCARDLE  
7  Wall.  (74  U.S.)  506;;  19  L.Ed.  264  (1869)    
Vote:  8±0  
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In  the  wake  of  the  Civil  War,  Congress  chose  to  rely  on  military  rule  as  the  most  
HIIHFWLYHPHDQVWR³UHFRQVWUXFW´WKH6RXWK$VSDUWRIWKLVUHJLPHWKH5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ
Acts  authorized  military  commissions  to  try  civilians  who  interfered  with  the  program.  
William  H.  McCardle,  editor  of  the  Vicksburg  Times,  published  a  series  of  editorials  
that  was  highly  critical  of  Reconstruction  and  of  the  military  government  that  ruled  
Mississippi.  He  was  subsequently  arrested  and  held  for  trial  by  a  military  commission  
on  the  charge  of  sedition.  McCardle  sought  release  by  filing  a  habeas  corpus  petition  
LQIHGHUDOFLUFXLWFRXUW6KRUWO\EHIRUH0F&DUGOH¶VFDVHDURVHWKH&RQJUHVVKDG
authorized  the  circuit  courts  to  hear  habeas  corpus  cases  involving  anyone  held  by  
state  authorities  in  violation  of  the  U.S.  Constitution  or  federal  statutes.  The  act  
included  the  right  to  appeal  a  circuit  court  denial  of  habeas  corpus  to  the  Supreme  
Court.  McCardle  lost  his  bid  for  release  in  the  circuit  court  and  exercised  his  option  
to  appeal.  After  the  case  was  argued  in  the  Supreme  Court,  but  before  a  decision  on  
the  constitutionality  of  the  Reconstruction  Acts  was  reached,  the  Congress  amended  
the  law  to  remove  the  6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VDSSHOODWHMXULVGLFWLRQLQKDEHDVFRUSXVFDVHV
Quite  obviously,  Congress  was  attempting  to  prevent  the  Supreme  Court  from  ruling  
on  the  constitutionality  of  the  Reconstruction  Acts.  
Mr.  Chief  Justice  Chase  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court.  
This  cause  came  here  by  appeal  from  the  Circuit  Court  for  the  Southern  District  of  
Mississippi.  A  Petition  for  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  was  preferred  in  that  court  by  
[McCardle],  alleging  unlawful  restraint  by  military  force.  
The  writ  was  issued  and  a  return  was  made  by  the  military  commander,  admitting  
the  restraint,  but  denying  that  it  was  unlawful.  
It  appeared  that  the  petitioner  was  not  in  the  military  service  of  the  United  States,  
but  was  held  in  custody  by  military  authority,  for  trial  before  a  military  commission,  
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upon  charges  founded  upon  the  publication  of  articles  alleged  to  be  incendiary  and  
libelous,  in  a  newspaper  of  which  he  was  editor.  
Upon  the  hearing,  [McCardle]  was  remanded  to  military  custody;;  but  upon  his  
prayer,  an  appeal  was  allowed  him  to  this  court,  and  upon  filing  the  usual  appeal  bond  
for  costs,  he  was  admitted  to  bail«  
Subsequently«  the  case  was  argued  very  thoroughly  and  ably  upon  the  merits,  
and  was  taken  under  advisement.  While  it  was  held,  and  before  conference  in  regard  
to  the  decision  proper  to  be  made,  an  act  was  passed  by  Congress,«  returned,  with  
objections  by  the  President,  and  repassed  by  the  constitutional  majority,  which,  it  is  
insisted,  takes  from  this  court  jurisdiction  of  the  appeal.  
The  second  section  of  this  act  ZDVDVIROORZV³$QGEHLWIXUWKHUHQDFWHGWKDWVR
much  of  the  Act  approved  February  5,  1867,«  as  authorized  an  appeal  from  the  
judgment  of  the  circuit  court  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,«  is  hereby  
UHSHDOHG´  
The  attention  of  the  court  was  directed  to  this  statute  at  the  last  term,  but  counsel  
having  expressed  a  desire  to  be  heard  in  argument  upon  its  effect,  and  the  Chief  
Justice  being  detained  from  his  place  here  by  his  duties  in  the  Court  of  Impeachment,  
the  cause  was  continued  under  advisement.  
At  this  term  we  have  heard  arguments  upon  the  effect  of  the  repealing  act,  and  
will  now  dispose  of  the  case.  
The  first  question  necessarily  is  that  of  jurisdiction;;  for,  if  the  act«  takes  away  
the  jurisdiction  defined  by  the  Act  of  February,  1867,  it  is  useless,  if  not  improper,  to  
enter  into  any  discussion  of  other  questions.  
It  is  quite  true,  as  was  argued  by  the  counsel  for  [McCardle],  that  the  appellate  
jurisdiction  of  this  court  is  not  derived  from  acts  of  Congress.  It  is,  strictly  speaking,  
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coQIHUUHGE\WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ%XWLWLVFRQIHUUHG³ZLWKVXFKH[FHSWLRQVDQGXQGHU
VXFKUHJXODWLRQVDV&RQJUHVVVKDOOPDNH´«  
The  exception  to  appellate  jurisdiction  in  the  case  before  us«  is  not  an  inference  
from  the  affirmation  of  other  appellate  jurisdiction.  It  is  made  in  terms.  The  provision  
of  the  act  of  1867,  affirming  the  appellate  jurisdiction  of  this  court  in  cases  of  habeas  
corpus  is  expressly  repealed.  It  is  hardly  possible  to  imagine  a  plainer  instance  of  
positive  exception.  
We  are  not  at  liberty  to  inquire  into  the  motives  of  the  legislature.  We  can  only  
examine  into  its  power  under  the  Constitution;;  and  the  power  to  make  exceptions  to  
the  appellate  jurisdiction  of  this  court  is  given  by  express  words.  
What,  then,  is  the  effect  of  the  repealing  act  upon  the  case  before  us?  We  cannot  
doubt  as  to  this.  Without  jurisdiction  the  court  cannot  proceed  at  all  in  any  cause.  
Jurisdiction  is  power  to  declare  the  law,  and  when  it  ceases  to  exist,  the  only  function  
remaining  to  the  court  is  that  of  announcing  the  fact  and  dismissing  the  cause.  And  
this  is  not  less  clear  upon  authority  than  upon  principle.  
Several  cases  were  cited  by  the  counsel  for  [McCardle]  in  support  of  the  position  
that  jurisdiction  of  this  case  is  not  affected  by  the  repealing  act.  But  none  of  them,  in  
our  judgment,  afford  any  support  to  it.  They  are  all  cases  of  the  exercise  of  judicial  
power  by  the  legislature,  or  of  legislative  interference  with  courts  in  the  exercising  of  
continuing  jurisdiction«  
On  the  other  hand,  the  general  rule,  supported  by  the  best  elementary  writers«  is,  
WKDW³ZKHQDQDFWRIWKHOHJLVODWXUHLVUHSHDOHGLWPXVWEHFRQVLGHUHGH[FHSWDVWR
WUDQVDFWLRQVSDVWDQGFORVHGDVLILWQHYHUH[LVWHG´$QGWKHHIIHFWRIUHSHDOLQJDFWV
upon  suits  under  acts  repealed,  has  been  determined  by  the  adjudications  of  this  
court«  
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It  is  quite  clear,  therefore,  that  this  court  cannot  proceed  to  pronounce  judgment  in  
this  case,  for  it  has  no  longer  jurisdiction  of  the  appeal;;  and  judicial  duty  is  not  less  
fitly  performed  by  declining  ungranted  jurisdiction  than  in  exercising  firmly  that  
which  the  Constitution  and  the  laws  confer.  
Counsel  seem  to  have  supposed,  if  effect  be  given  to  the  repealing  act  in  question,  
that  the  whole  appellate  power  of  the  court,  in  cases  of  habeas  corpus,  is  denied.  But  
this  is  an  error.  The  act  of  1868  does  not  except  from  that  jurisdiction  any  cases  but  
appeals  from  Circuit  Courts  under  the  act  of  1867.  It  does  not  affect  the  jurisdiction  
which  was  previously  exercised«  
The  appeal  of  [McCardle]  must  be  dismissed  for  want  of  jurisdiction.  
  
Case  
COOPER  V.  AARON  
358  U.S.  1;;  78  S.Ct.  1401;;  3  L.Ed.  2d  5  (1958)    
Vote:  9±0  
In  this  case  the  Supreme  Court  responds  to  the  efforts  of  state  officials  to  block  the  
court-ordered  desegregation  of  Central  High  School  in  Little  Rock,  Arkansas,  in  
1957.  
Opinion  of  the  Court  by  The  Chief  Justice,  Mr.  Justice  Black,  Mr.  Justice  
Frankfurter,  Mr.  Justice  Douglas,  Mr.  Justice  Burton,  Mr.  Justice  Clark,  Mr.  
Justice  Harlan,  Mr.  Justice  Brennan,  and  Mr.  Justice  Whittaker.  
As  this  case  reaches  us  it  raises  questions  of  the  highest  importance  to  the  
maintenance  of  our  federal  system  of  government.  It  necessarily  involves  a  claim  by  
the  Governor  and  Legislature  of  a  State  that  there  is  no  duty  on  state  officials  to  obey  
federal  court  orderVUHVWLQJRQWKLV&RXUW¶VFRQVLGHUHGLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH8QLWHG
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States  Constitution.  Specifically  it  involves  actions  by  the  Governor  and  Legislature  
of  Arkansas  upon  the  premise  that  they  are  not  bound  by  our  holding  in  Brown  v.  
Board  of  Education  [1954]«  That  holding  was  that  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  
forbids  States  to  use  their  governmental  powers  to  bar  children  on  racial  grounds  from  
attending  schools  where  there  is  state  participation  through  any  arrangement,  
management  funds  or  property.  We  are  urged  to  uphold  a  suspension  of  the  Little  
5RFN6FKRRO%RDUG¶VSODQWRGRDZD\ZLWKVHJUHJDWHGSXEOLFVFKRROVLQ/LWWOH5RFN
until  state  laws  and  efforts  to  upset  and  nullify  our  holding  in  Brown  v.  Board  of  
Education  have  been  further  challenged  and  tested  in  the  courts.  We  reject  these  
contentions«  
While  the  School  Board  was«  going  forward  with  its  preparation  for  
desegregating  the  Little  Rock  school  system,  other  state  authorities,  in  contrast,  were  
actively  pursuing  a  program  designed  to  perpetuate  in  Arkansas  the  system  of  racial  
segregation  which  this  Court  had  held  violated  the  Fourteenth  Amendment«  
The  School  Board  and  the  Superintendent  of  Schools  nevertheless  continued  with  
preparations  to  carry  out  the  first  stage  of  the  desegregation  program.  Nine  Negro  
children  were  scheduled  for  admission  in  September  1957  to  Central  High  School«  
On  September  2,  1957,  the  day  before  these  Negro  students  were  to  enter  Central  
High,  the  school  authorities  were  met  with  drastic  opposing  action  on  the  part  of  the  
Governor  of  Arkansas  who  dispatched  units  of  the  Arkansas  National  Guard  to  the  
&HQWUDO+LJKVFKRROJURXQGVDQGSODFHGWKHVFKRRO³RIIOLPLWV´WRFRORUHGVWXGHQWV
$VIRXQGE\WKH'LVWULFW&RXUWLQVXEVHTXHQWSURFHHGLQJVWKH*RYHUQRU¶VDFWLRQKDG
not  been  requested  by  the  school  authorities,  and  was  entirely  unheralded«  
7KH*RYHUQRU¶VDFWLRQFDXVHGWKH6FKRRO%RDUGWRUHTXHVWWKH1HJURVWXGHQWVRQ
6HSWHPEHUQRWWRDWWHQGWKHKLJKVFKRRO³XQWLOWKHOHJDOGLOHPPDZDVVROYHG´7KH
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next  day,  September  3,  1957,  the  Board  petitioned  the  District  Court  for  instructions,  
DQGWKHFRXUWDIWHUDKHDULQJIRXQGWKDWWKH%RDUG¶VUHTXHVWRIWKH1HJURVWXGHQWVWR
stay  away  from  the  high  school  had  been  made  because  of  the  stationing  of  the  
military  guards  by  the  state  authorities.  The  court  determined  that  this  was  not  a  
reason  for  departing  from  the  approved  plan,  and  ordered  the  School  Board  and  
Superintendent  to  proceed  with  it.  
On  the  morning  of  the  next  day,  September  4,  1957,  the  Negro  children  attempted  
to  enter  the  high  school  but«  >WKH@1DWLRQDO*XDUG³DFWLQJSXUVXDQWWRWKH
*RYHUQRU¶VRUGHUVWRRGVKRXOGHUWRVKRXOGHUDWWKHVFKRROJURXQGVDQGWKHUHE\
forcibly  prevented  the  9  Negro  students«  IURPHQWHULQJ´DVWKH\FRQWLQXHGWRGR
every  school  day  during  the  following  three  weeks«  
«After  hearings,«  WKH'LVWULFW&RXUWIRXQGWKDWWKH6FKRRO%RDUG¶VSODQKDG
been  obstructed  by  the  Governor  through  the  use  of  National  Guard  troops,  and  
granted  a  preliminary  injunction«  enjoining  the  Governor  and  the  officers  of  the  
Guard  from  preventing  the  attendance  of  Negro  children  at  Central  High  School,  and  
from  otherwise  obstructing  or  interfering  with  the  orders  of  the  court  in  connection  
with  the  plan«  The  National  Guard  was  then  withdrawn  from  the  school.  
The  next  school  day  was  Monday,  September  23,  1957.  The  Negro  children  
entered  the  high  school  that  morning  under  the  protection  of  the  Little  Rock  Police  
Department  and  members  of  the  Arkansas  State  Police.  But  the  officers  caused  the  
children  to  be  removed  from  the  school  during  the  morning  because  they  had  
difficulty  controlling  a  large  and  demonstrating  crowd  which  had  gathered  at  the  high  
school«  On  September  25,  however,  the  President  of  the  United  States  dispatched  
federal  troops  to  Central  High  School  and  admission  of  the  Negro  students  to  the  
school  was  thereby  effected«  
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We  come  now  to  the  aspect  of  the  proceedings  presently  before  us«  [T]he  School  
Board  and  the  Superintendent  of  Schools  filed  a  petition  in  the  District  Court  seeking  
a  postponement  of  their  program  for  desegregation.  Their  position  in  essence  was  that  
because  of  extreme  public  hostility,  which  they  stated  had  been  engendered  largely  by  
the  official  attitudes  and  actions  of  the  Governor  and  the  Legislature,  the  maintenance  
of  a  sound  educational  program  at  Central  High  School,  with  the  Negro  students  in  
attendance,  would  be  impossible.  The  Board  therefore  proposed  that  the  Negro  
students  already  admitted  to  the  school  be  withdrawn  and  sent  to  segregated  schools,  
and  that  all  further  steps  to  carry  out  the  BoaUG¶VGHVHJUHJDWLRQSURJUDPEHSRVWSRQHG
for  a  period  later  suggested  by  the  Board  to  be  two  and  one  half  years«  
One  may  well  sympathize  with  the  position  of  the  Board  in  the  face  of  the  
frustrating  conditions  which  have  confronted  it,  but,  regardless  of  thH%RDUG¶VJRRG
faith,  the  actions  of  the  other  state  agencies  responsible  for  those  conditions  compel  us  
WRUHMHFWWKH%RDUG¶VOHJDOSRVLWLRQ+DG&HQWUDO+LJK6FKRROEHHQXQGHUWKHGLUHFW
management  of  the  State  itself,  it  could  hardly  be  suggested  that  those  immediately  in  
charge  of  the  school  should  be  heard  to  assert  their  own  good  faith  as  a  legal  excuse  
for  delay  in  implementing  the  constitutional  rights  of  these  respondents,  when  
vindication  of  those  rights  were  rendered  difficult  or  impossible  by  the  actions  of  
other  state  officials.  The  situation  here  is  in  no  different  posture  because  the  members  
of  the  School  Board  and  the  Superintendent  of  Schools  are  local  officials;;  from  the  
point  of  view  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  they  stand  in  this  litigation  as  the  agents  
of  the  State.  
The  constitutional  rights  of  respondents  are  not  to  be  sacrificed  or  yielded  to  the  
violence  and  disorder  which  have  followed  upon  the  actions  of  the  Governor  and  
Legislature«  Thus  law  and  order  are  not  here  to  be  preserved  by  depriving  the  Negro  
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children  of  their  constitutional  rights.  The  record  before  us  clearly  established  that  the  
JURZWKRIWKH%RDUG¶VGLIILFXOWLHVWRDPDJQLWXGHEH\RQGLWVXQDLGHGSRZHUWRFRQWURO
is  the  product  of  state  action«  
The  controlling  legal  principles  are  plain.  The  command  of  the  Fourteenth  
$PHQGPHQWLVWKDWQR³6WDWH´VKDOOGHQ\WRDQ\SHUVRQZLWKLQLWVMXULVGLFWLRQWKH
equal  protection  of  the  laws«  [T]he  prohibitions  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  
extend  to  all  actions  of  the  State  denying  equal  protection  of  the  laws;;  whatever  the  
agency  of  the  State  taking  the  action«  In  short,  the  constitutional  rights  of  children  
not  to  be  discriminated  against  in  school  admission  on  grounds  of  race  or  color  
declared  by  this  Court  in  the  Brown  case  can  neither  be  nullified  openly  and  directly  
by  state  legislators  or  state  executive  or  judicial  officers,  nor  nullified  indirectly  by  
WKHPWKURXJKHYDVLYHVFKHPHVIRUVHJUHJDWLRQZKHWKHUDWWHPSWHG³LQJHQLRXVO\RU
LQJHQXRXVO\´«  
What  has  been  said,  in  the  light  of  the  facts  developed,  is  enough  to  dispose  of  the  
case.  However,  we  should  answer  the  premise  of  the  actions  of  the  Governor  and  
Legislature  that  they  are  not  bound  by  our  holding  in  the  Brown  case.  It  is  necessary  
only  to  recall  some  basic  constitutional  propositions  which  are  settled  doctrine.  
$UWLFOH9,RIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQPDNHVWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQWKH³VXSUHPH/DZRIWKH
/DQG´«  Chief  Justice  Marshall«  declared  in  Marbury  v.  Madison:«  ³,WLV
emphatically  the  province  and  duty  of  the  judicial  department  to  sa\ZKDWWKHODZLV´
This  decision  declared  the  basic  principle  that  the  federal  judiciary  is  supreme  in  the  
exposition  of  the  law  of  the  Constitution,  and  that  principle  has  ever  since  been  
respected  by  this  Court  and  the  Country  as  a  permanent  and  indispensable  feature  of  
our  constitutional  system.  It  follows  that  the  interpretation  of  the  Fourteenth  
Amendment  enunciated  by  this  Court  in  the  Brown  Case  is  the  supreme  law  of  the  
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ODQGDQG$UW9,RIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQPDNHVLWRIELQGLQJHIIHFWRQWKH6WDWHV³any  
7KLQJLQWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQRU/DZVRIDQ\6WDWHWRWKH&RQWUDU\QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJ´
Every  state  legislator  and  executive  and  judicial  officer  is  solemnly  committed  by  
RDWKWDNHQSXUVXDQWWR$UW9,FO³WRVXSSRUWWKLV&RQVWLWXWLRQ´«  
No  state  legislator  or  executive  or  judicial  officer  can  war  against  the  Constitution  
without  violating  his  undertaking  to  support  it.  Chief  Justice  Marshall  spoke  for  a  
XQDQLPRXV&RXUWLQVD\LQJWKDW³,IWKHOHJLVODWXUHVRIWKHVHYHUDOVWDWHVPD\DWZLOO
annul  the  judgments  of  the  courts  of  the  United  States,  and  destroy  the  rights  acquired  
under  those  judgments,  the  Constitution  itself  becomes  a  solemn  mockery«´«  A  
Governor  who  asserts  a  power  to  nullify  a  federal  court  order  is  similarly  restrained«  
It  is,  of  course,  quite  true  that  the  responsibility  for  public  education  is  primarily  
the  concern  of  the  States,  but  it  is  equally  true  that  such  responsibilities,  like  all  other  
state  activity,  must  be  exercised  consistently  with  federal  constitutional  requirements  
as  they  apply  to  state  action«  State  support  of  segregated  schools  through  any  
arrangement,  management,  funds,  or  property  cannot  be  squared  with  the  
$PHQGPHQW¶VFRPPDQGWKDWQR6WDWHVKDOOGHQ\WRDQ\SHUVRQZLWKLQLWVMXULVGLFWLRQ
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws«  The  basic  decision  in  Brown  was  unanimously  
reached  by  this  Court«  Since  the  first  Brown  opinion  three  new  Justices  have  come  
to  the  Court.  They  are  at  one  with  the  Justices  still  on  the  Court  who  participated  in  
that  basic  decision  as  to  its  correctness,  and  that  decision  is  now  unanimously  
reaffirmed.  The  principles  announced  in  that  decision  and  the  obedience  of  the  States  
to  them,  according  to  the  command  of  the  Constitution,  are  indispensable  for  the  
protection  of  the  freedoms  guaranteed  by  our  fundamental  charter  for  all  of  us.  Our  
constitutional  ideal  of  equal  justice  under  law  is  thus  made  a  living  truth.  
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Mr.  Justice  Frankfurter,  concurring«  
Case  
BAKER  V.  CARR  
369  U.S.  186;;  82  S.Ct.  691;;  7  L.Ed.  2d  663  (1962)    
Vote:  6±2  
7KHWHUP³DSSRUWLRQPHQW´refers  to  the  way  in  which  legislative  districts  are  drawn.  
Malapportionment  exists  to  the  extent  that  numbers  of  voters  are  unequal  across  
legislative  districts.  In  a  malapportioned  system,  voters  in  the  more  populous  districts  
are  underrepresented,  while  voters  in  the  less  populous  districts  are  overrepresented  
in  the  legislature  (see  Chapter  8,  Volume  II  for  a  discussion  of  the  apportionment  
issue).  In  the  middle  of  the  twentieth  century,  critics  of  malapportionment  turned  to  
the  courts  for  relief.  In  Colegrove  v.  Green  (1946)  the  Supreme  Court  dismissed  a  
lawsuit  directed  against  the  malapportionment  of  congressional  districts  in  Illinois.  In  
KLVSOXUDOLW\RSLQLRQ-XVWLFH)HOL[)UDQNIXUWHUDUJXHGWKDW³GXHUHJDUGIRUWKH
Constitution  as  a  viable  system  SUHFOXGHVMXGLFLDOFRUUHFWLRQ´RIWKHSUREOHP,Q
)UDQNIXUWHU¶VYLHZ³>W@KHUHPHG\IRUXQIDLUQHVVLQGLVWULFWLQJLVWRVHFXUH6WDWH
OHJLVODWXUHVWKDWZLOODSSRUWLRQSURSHUO\RUWRLQYRNHWKHDPSOHSRZHUVRI&RQJUHVV´
In  what  became  the  most  frequently  quoted  language  from  the  opinion,  Frankfurter  
DGPRQLVKHGFRXUWVQRWWRHQWHUWKH³SROLWLFDOWKLFNHW´RIUHDSSRUWLRQPHQW  
Sixteen  years  after  Colegrove  v.  Green,  the  Supreme  Court  reconsidered  Justice  
)UDQNIXUWHU¶VDGPRQLWLRQLQWKHODQGPDUNFDVHRIBaker  v.  Carr.  The  case  began  
when  voters  residing  in  Chattanooga,  Knoxville,  Memphis,  and  Nashville  brought  a  
federal  class  action  challenging  the  apportionment  of  the  Tennessee  General  
Assembly.  The  general  assembly  had  not  been  reapportioned  since  1901  and,  as  a  
result  of  population  growth  in  the  cities,  had  become  badly  malapportioned.  Plaintiffs  
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DUJXHGWKDWWKH\ZHUHEHLQJ³GHQLHGWKHHTXDOSURWHFWLRQRIWKHODZVDFFRUGHGWKHP
by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment«  E\YLUWXHRIWKHGHEDVHPHQWRIWKHLUYRWHV´$V
expected,  the  federal  district  court  dismissed  the  case  on  the  authority  of  Colegrove  v.  
Green.  The  plaintiffs  appealed.  
Mr.  Justice  Brennan  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court.  
«[Baker  et  al.]  seek  relief  in  order  to  protect  or  vindicate  an  interest  of  their  own,  
and  of  those  similarly  situated.  Their  constitutional  claim  is,  in  substance,  that  the  
1901  [Tennessee  apportionment]  statute  constitutes  arbitrary  and  capricious  state  
action,  offensive  to  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  in  its  irrational  disregard  of  the  
standDUGRIDSSRUWLRQPHQWSUHVFULEHGE\WKH6WDWH¶V&RQVWLWXWLRQRURIDQ\VWDQGDUG
effecting  a  gross  disproportion  of  representation  to  voting  population.  The  injury  
which  appellants  assert  is  that  this  classification  disfavors  the  voters  in  the  counties  in  
which  they  reside,  placing  them  in  a  position  of  constitutionally  unjustifiable  
inequality  vis-à-vis  voters  in  irrationally  favored  counties«  
In  holding  that  the  subject  matter  of  this  suit  was  not  justiciable,  the  District  Court  
relied  on  Colegrove  v.  Green«  We  understand  the  District  Court  to  have  read  the«  
case  as  compelling  the  conclusion  that  since  [Baker]  sought  to  have  a  legislative  
DSSRUWLRQPHQWKHOGXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO>KLV@VXLWSUHVHQWHGD³SROLWLFDOTXHVWLRQ´DQG
was  therefore  nonjusticiable.  We  hold  that  this  challenge  to  an  apportionment  presents  
QRQRQMXVWLFLDEOH³SROLWLFDOTXHVWLRQ´«  
:HKDYHVDLGWKDW³,QGHWHUPLQLQJZKHWKHUDTXHVWLRQIDOOVZLWKLQ>WKHSROLWLFDO
question]  category,  the  appropriateness  under  our  system  of  government  of  attributing  
finality  to  the  action  of  the  political  departments  and  also  the  lack  of  satisfactory  
FULWHULDIRUDMXGLFLDOGHWHUPLQDWLRQDUHGRPLQDQWFRQVLGHUDWLRQV´«The  
nonjusticiability  of  a  political  question  is  primarily  a  function  of  the  separation  of  
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powers.  0XFKFRQIXVLRQUHVXOWVIURPWKHFDSDFLW\RIWKH³SROLWLFDOTXHVWLRQ´ODEHOWR
obscure  the  need  for  case-by-case  inquiry.  Deciding  whether  a  matter  has  in  any  
measure  been  committed  by  the  Constitution  to  another  branch  of  government,  or  
whether  the  action  of  that  branch  exceeds  whatever  authority  has  been  committed,  is  
itself  a  delicate  exercise  in  constitutional  interpretation,  and  is  a  responsibility  of  this  
Court  as  ultimate  interpreter  of  the  Constitution.  To  demonstrate  this  requires  no  less  
than  to  analyze  representative  cases  and  to  infer  from  them  the  analytical  threads  that  
make  up  the  political  question  doctrine.  We  shall  then  show  that  none  of  those  threads  
catches  this  case.  
[Justice  Brennan  discusses  several  categories  of  cases  in  which  the  Court  has  
ODEHOHGSDUWLFXODUFRQWURYHUVLHVDV³SROLWLFDO´+HFRQFOXGHV@  
It  is  apparent  that  several  formulations  which  vary  slightly  according  to  the  
settings  in  which  the  questions  arise  may  describe  a  political  question,  although  each  
has  one  or  more  elements  which  identify  it  as  essentially  a  function  of  the  separation  
of  powers.  Prominent  on  the  surface  of  any  case  held  to  involve  a  political  question  is  
found  a  textually  demonstrable  constitutional  commitment  of  the  issue  to  a  coordinate  
political  department;;  or  a  lack  of  judicially  discoverable  and  manageable  standards  for  
resolving  it;;  or  the  impossibility  of  deciding  without  an  initial  policy  determination  of  
DNLQGFOHDUO\IRUQRQMXGLFLDOGLVFUHWLRQRUWKHLPSRVVLELOLW\RIDFRXUW¶VXQGHUWDNLQJ
independent  resolution  without  expressing  lack  of  the  respect  due  coordinate  branches  
of  government;;  or  an  unusual  need  for  unquestioning  adherence  to  a  political  decision  
already  made;;  or  the  potentiality  of  embarrassment  from  multifarious  pronouncements  
by  various  departments  on  one  question.  
Unless  one  of  these  formulations  is  inextricable  from  the  case  at  bar  there  should  
EHQRGLVPLVVDOIRUQRQMXVWLFLDELOLW\RQWKHJURXQGRIDSROLWLFDOTXHVWLRQ¶VSUHVHQFH
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7KHGRFWULQHRIZKLFKZHWUHDWLVRQHRI³SROLWLFDOTXHVWLRQV´QRWRQHRI³SROLWLFDO
FDVHV´7KHFRXUWVFDQQRWUHMHFWDV³QRODZVXLW´DERQDILGHFRQWURYHUV\DVWRZKHWKHU
VRPHDFWLRQGHQRPLQDWHG³SROLWLFDO´H[FHHGVFRQVWLWXWLRQDODXWKRULW\7KHFDVHVZH
have  reviewed  show  the  necessity  for  discriminating  inquiry  into  the  precise  facts  and  
posture  of  the  particular  case,  and  the  impossibility  of  resolution  by  any  semantic  
cataloging«  
We  come,  finally,  to  the  ultimate  inquiry  whether  our  precedents  as  to  what  
FRQVWLWXWHVDQRQMXVWLFLDEOH³SROLWLFDOTXHVWLRQ´EULQJWKHFDVHEHIRUHXVXQGHUWKH
umbrella  of  that  doctrine.  A  natural  beginning  is  to  note  whether  any  of  the  common  
characteristics  which  we  have  been  able  to  identify  and  label  descriptively  are  present.  
We  find  none:  The  question  here  is  the  consistency  of  state  action  with  the  Federal  
Constitution.  We  have  no  question  decided,  or  to  be  decided,  by  a  political  branch  of  
government  coequal  with  this  Court.  Nor  do  we  risk  embarrassment  of  our  
government  abroad,  or  grave  disturbance  at  home  if  we  take  issue  with  Tennessee  as  
to  the  constitutionality  of  her  action  here  challenged.  Nor  need  [Baker],  in  order  to  
succeed  in  this  action,  ask  the  Court  to  enter  upon  policy  determinations  for  which  
judicially  manageable  standards  are  lacking.  Judicial  standards  under  the  Equal  
Protection  Clause  are  well  developed  and  familiar,  and  it  has  been  open  to  courts  
since  the  enactment  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  determine,  if  on  the  particular  
facts  they  must,  that  a  discrimination  reflects  no  policy,  but  simply  arbitrary  and  
capricious  action.  
This  case  does,  in  one  sense,  involve  the  allocation  of  political  power  within  a  
State,  and  [Baker]  might  conceivably  have  added  a  claim  under  the  Guaranty  Clause.  
Of  course,  as  we  have  seen,  any  reliance  on  that  clause  would  be  futile.  But  because  
my  reliance  on  the  Guaranty  Clause  could  not  have  succeeded  it  does  not  follow  that  
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[Baker]  may  not  be  heard  on  the  equal  protection  claim  which  in  fact  [he  tenders].  
True,  it  must  be  clear  that  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  claim  is  not  so  enmeshed  with  
those  political  question  elements  which  render  Guaranty  Clause  claims  nonjusticiable  
as  actually  to  present  a  political  question  itself.  But  we  have  found  that  not  to  be  the  
case  here«  
«[I]n  Gomillion  v.  Lightfoot  [1960]«  we  applied  the  Fifteenth  Amendment  to  
strike  down  a  redrafting  of  municipal  boundaries  which  effected  a  discriminatory  
impairment  of  voting  rights,  in  face  of  what  a  majority  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  
thought  to  be  a  sweeping  commitment  to  state  legislatures  of  the  power  to  draw  and  
redraw  such  boundaries«  
«[To  the  argument]  that  Colegrove  v.  Green«  was  a  barrier  to  hearing  the  merits  
of  the  case,  the  Court  responded  that  Gomillion  ZDVOLIWHG³RXWRIWKHVR-called  
µSROLWLFDO¶DUHQDDQGLQWRWKHFRQYHQWLRQDOVSKHUHRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOOLWLJDWLRQ´EHFDXVH
here  was  discriminatory  treatment  of  a  racial  minority  violating  the  Fifteenth  
Amendment«  
:HFRQFOXGHWKDWWKHFRPSODLQW¶VDOOHJDWLRQVRIDGHQLDORIHTXDOSURWHFWLRQ
present  a  justiciable  constitutional  cause  of  action  upon  which  [Baker  is]  entitled  to  a  
trial  and  a  decision.  The  right  asserted  is  within  the  reach  of  judicial  protection  under  
the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  
The  judgment  of  the  District  Court  is  reversed  and  the  Cause  is  remanded  for  
further  proceedings  consistent  with  this  opinion.  
Reversed  and  remanded.  
  
Mr.  Justice  Whittaker  did  not  participate  in  the  decision  of  this  case.  
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Mr.  Justice  Douglas,  concurring«  
  
Mr.  Justice  Clark,  concurring«  
  
Mr.  Justice  Stewart,  concurring«  
  
Mr.  Justice  Frankfurter,  whom  Mr.  Justice  Harlan  joins,  dissenting.  
The  Court  today  reverses  a  uniform  course  of  decision  established  by  a  dozen  
cases«  The  impressive  body  of  rulings  thus  cast  aside  reflected  the  equally  uniform  
course  of  our  political  history  regarding  the  relationship  between  population  and  
legislative  representation²a  wholly  different  matter  from  denial  of  the  franchise  to  
individuals  because  of  race,  color,  religion,  or  sex.  Such  a  massive  repudiation  of  the  
experience  of  our  whole  past  in  asserting  destructively  novel  judicial  power  demands  
a  detailed  analysis  of  the  role  of  this  Court  in  our  constitutional  scheme.  Disregard  of  
LQKHUHQWOLPLWVLQWKHHIIHFWLYHH[HUFLVHRIWKH&RXUW¶V³MXGLFLDO3RZHU´QRWRQO\
presages  the  futility  of  judicial  intervention  in  the  essentially  political  conflict  of  
forces  by  which  the  relation  between  population  and  representation  has  time  out  of  
PLQGEHHQDQGQRZLVGHWHUPLQHG,WPD\ZHOOLPSDLUWKH&RXUW¶VSRVLWLRQDVWKH
XOWLPDWHRUJDQRI³WKHVXSUHPH/DZRIWKH/DQG´LQWKDWYDVWUDQJHRIOHJDO  problems,  
often  strongly  entangled  in  popular  feeling,  on  which  this  Court  must  pronounce.  
Dissenting  opinion  of  Mr.  Justice  Harlan,  whom  Mr.  Justice  Frankfurter  joins«  
Case  
RASUL  V.  BUSH  
542  U.S.  466;;  124  S.Ct.  2686;;  159  L.Ed.  2d  548  (2004)  
Vote:  6±3  
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On  November  13,  2001,  President  George  W.  Bush  signed  an  executive  order  
authorizing  the  creation  of  military  tribunals  for  the  detention  and  trial  of  foreign  
QDWLRQDOVDSSUHKHQGHGLQWKH³ZDUDJDLQVWWHUURULVP´7KHJRYHUQPHQWVXEVHTXHQWO\
incarcerated  more  WKDQVHYHQKXQGUHG³HQHP\DOLHQV´FDSWXUHGLQ$IJKDQLVWDQDQG
elsewhere  at  the  American  Naval  Base  at  Guantanamo  Bay,  Cuba.  Most  were  held  in  
solitary  confinement,  restricted  to  6  by  8  foot  cells  for  more  than  twenty-three  hours  a  
day.  Inmates  were  not  permitted  to  have  contact  with  anyone  outside  the  camp,  
including  lawyers  and  family  members,  nor  were  they  afforded  any  sort  of  judicial  or  
administrative  process  to  review  their  status.  
In  2002,  relatives  of  twelve  Kuwaiti  nationals  detained  at  Guantanamo  Bay  
filed  petitions  for  habeas  corpus  in  the  federal  district  court  for  the  District  of  
Columbia.  Their  petitions  asserted  that  these  detainees  were  not  enemy  combatants  
and  that  they  were  being  detained  without  due  process  of  law.  Plaintiffs  sought  an  
injunction  ordering  that  these  detainees  be  informed  of  any  charges  against  them  and  
requiring  that  they  be  permitted  to  consult  with  counsel  and  meet  with  their  families.  
The  federal  district  court  dismissed  the  case,  ruling  that  it  did  not  have  jurisdiction  to  
issue  writs  of  habeas  corpus  for  aliens  detained  outside  the  sovereign  territory  of  the  
United  States.  The  U.S.  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  D.C.  Circuit  affirmed.  It  based  its  
decision  primarily  on  Eisentrager  v.  United  States  (1950),  in  which  the  Supreme  
Court  held  that  nonresident  enemy  aliens  have  no  access  to  American  courts  during  
wartime.  
Justice  Stevens  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court.  
These  two  cases  present  the  narrow  but  important  question  whether  United  States  
courts  lack  jurisdiction  to  consider  challenges  to  the  legality  of  the  detention  of  
foreign  nationals  captured  abroad  in  connection  with  hostilities  and  incarcerated  at  the  
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Guantanamo  Bay  Naval  Base,  Cuba«  
&RQJUHVVKDVJUDQWHGIHGHUDOGLVWULFWFRXUWV³ZLWKLQWKHLUUHVSHFWLYHMXULVGLFWLRQV´
the  authority  to  hear  applications  for  habeas  corpus  by  any  person  who  claims  to  be  
KHOG³LQFXVWRG\LQYLRODWLRQRIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQRUODZVRUWUHDWLHVRIWKH8QLWHG
6WDWHV´7KHVWDWXWHWUDFHVLWVDQFHVWU\WRWKHILUVWJUDQWRIIHGHUDOFRXUWMXULVGLction:  
Section  14  of  the  Judiciary  Act  of  1789  authorized  federal  courts  to  issue  the  writ  of  
KDEHDVFRUSXVWRSULVRQHUV³LQFXVWRG\XQGHURUE\FRORXURIWKHDXWKRULW\RIWKH
8QLWHG6WDWHVRUFRPPLWWHGIRUWULDOEHIRUHVRPHFRXUWRIWKHVDPH´,Q
&RQJUHVVH[WHQGHGWKHSURWHFWLRQVRIWKHZULWWR³DOOFDVHVZKHUHDQ\SHUVRQPD\EH
restrained  of  his  or  her  liberty  in  violation  of  the  Constitution,  or  of  any  treaty  or  law  
RIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´«  
Consistent  with  the  historic  purpose  of  the  writ,  this  Court  has  recognized  the  
IHGHUDOFRXUWV¶SRZHUWRUHYLHZDSSOLFDWLRQVIRUKDEHDVUHOLHILQDZLGHYDULHW\RI
cases  involving  Executive  detention,  in  wartime  as  well  as  in  times  of  peace.  The  
Court  has,  for  example,  entertained  the  habeas  petitions  of  an  American  citizen  who  
plotted  an  attack  on  military  installations  during  the  Civil  War,  Ex  parte  Milligan  
(1866),  and  of  admitted  enemy  aliens  convicted  of  war  crimes  during  a  declared  war  
and  held  in  the  United  States,  Ex  parte  Quirin  (1942),  and  its  insular  possessions,  In  
re  Yamashita  (1946).  
The  question  now  before  us  is  whether  the  habeas  statute  confers  a  right  to  judicial  
review  of  the  legality  of  Executive  detention  of  aliens  in  a  territory  over  which  the  
United  States  exercises  plenary  and  exclusive  jurLVGLFWLRQEXWQRW³XOWLPDWH
VRYHUHLJQW\´«  
5HVSRQGHQWV¶SULPDU\VXEPLVVLRQLVWKDWWKHDQVZHUWRWKHMXULVGLFWLRQDOTXHVWLRQ
is  controlled  by  our  decision  in  Eisentrager.  In  that  case,  we  held  that  a  Federal  
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District  Court  lacked  authority  to  issue  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  to  21  German  citizens  
who  had  been  captured  by  U.S.  forces  in  China,  tried  and  convicted  of  war  crimes  by  
an  American  military  commission  headquartered  in  Nanking,  and  incarcerated  in  the  
Landsberg  Prison  in  occupied  Germany«  
Petitioners  in  these  cases  differ  from  the  Eisentrager  detainees  in  important  
respects:  They  are  not  nationals  of  countries  at  war  with  the  United  States,  and  they  
deny  that  they  have  engaged  in  or  plotted  acts  of  aggression  against  the  United  States;;  
they  have  never  been  afforded  access  to  any  tribunal,  much  less  charged  with  and  
convicted  of  wrongdoing;;  and  for  more  than  two  years  they  have  been  imprisoned  in  
territory  over  which  the  United  States  exercises  exclusive  jurisdiction  and  control«  
In  Braden  v.  30th  Judicial  Circuit  Court  of  Ky.  (1973),  this  Court  held«  that  the  
SULVRQHU¶VSUHVHQFHZLWKLQWKHWHUULWRULDOMXULVGLFWLRQRIWKHGLVWULFWFRXUWLVQRW³DQ
LQYDULDEOHSUHUHTXLVLWH´WRWKHH[HUFLVHRIGLVWULFWFRXUWMXULVGLFWLRQXQGHUWKHIHGHUDO
habeas  statute.  RatKHUEHFDXVH³WKHZULWRIKDEHDVFRUSXVGRHVQRWDFWXSRQWKH
prisoner  who  seeks  relief,  but  upon  the  person  who  holds  him  in  what  is  alleged  to  be  
XQODZIXOFXVWRG\´DGLVWULFWFRXUWDFWV³ZLWKLQ>LWV@UHVSHFWLYHMXULVGLFWLRQ´ZLWKLQWKH
meaning  of«  as  loQJDV³WKHFXVWRGLDQFDQEHUHDFKHGE\VHUYLFHRISURFHVV´«  
«[R]espondents  contend  that«  congressional  legislation  is  presumed  not  to  have  
extraterritorial  application  unless  such  intent  is  clearly  manifested.  Whatever  traction  
the  presumption  against  extraterritoriality  might  have  in  other  contexts,  it  certainly  
has  no  application  to  the  operation  of  the  habeas  statute  with  respect  to  persons  
GHWDLQHGZLWKLQ³WKHWHUULWRULDOMXULVGLFWLRQ´RIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV%\WKHH[SUHVVWHUPV
of  its  agreements  with  CXEDWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVH[HUFLVHV³FRPSOHWHMXULVGLFWLRQDQG
FRQWURO´RYHUWKH*XDQWDQDPR%D\1DYDO%DVHDQGPD\FRQWLQXHWRH[HUFLVHVXFK
control  permanently  if  it  so  chooses.  Respondents  themselves  concede  that  the  habeas  
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statute  would  create  federal-court  jurisdiction  over  the  claims  of  an  American  citizen  
held  at  the  base.  Considering  that  the  statute  draws  no  distinction  between  Americans  
and  aliens  held  in  federal  custody,  there  is  little  reason  to  think  that  Congress  intended  
the  geographical  coveragHRIWKHVWDWXWHWRYDU\GHSHQGLQJRQWKHGHWDLQHH¶V
citizenship.  Aliens  held  at  the  base,  no  less  than  American  citizens,  are  entitled  to  
LQYRNHWKHIHGHUDOFRXUWV¶DXWKRULW\«  
Application  of  the  habeas  statute  to  persons  detained  at  the  base  is  consistent  with  
the  historical  reach  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus.  At  common  law,  courts  exercised  
habeas  jurisdiction  over  the  claims  of  aliens  detained  within  sovereign  territory  of  the  
realm  as  well  as  the  claims  of  persons  detained  in  the  so-FDOOHG³H[HPSW
jurisGLFWLRQV´ZKHUHRUGLQDU\ZULWVGLGQRWUXQDQGDOORWKHUGRPLQLRQVXQGHUWKH
VRYHUHLJQ¶VFRQWURO$V/RUG0DQVILHOGZURWHLQHYHQLIDWHUULWRU\ZDV³QRSDUW
RIWKHUHDOP´WKHUHZDV³QRGRXEW´DVWRWKHFRXUW¶VSRZHUWRLVVXHZULWVRIKDEHDV
corpuVLIWKHWHUULWRU\ZDV³XQGHUWKHVXEMHFWLRQRIWKH&URZQ´/DWHUFDVHVFRQILUPHG
that  the  reach  of  the  writ  depended  not  on  formal  notions  of  territorial  sovereignty,  but  
UDWKHURQWKHSUDFWLFDOTXHVWLRQRI³WKHH[DFWH[WHQWDQGQDWXUHRIWKHMXULVGLFWLRQ  or  
GRPLQLRQH[HUFLVHGLQIDFWE\WKH&URZQ´  
In  the  end,  the  answer  to  the  question  presented  is  clear.  Petitioners  contend  that  
they  are  being  held  in  federal  custody  in  violation  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States.  No  
SDUW\TXHVWLRQVWKH'LVWULFW&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQRYHUSHWLWLRQHUV¶FXVWRGLDQV>7KH
habeas  corpus  statute]  by  its  terms,  requires  nothing  more.  We  therefore  hold  that  [it]  
FRQIHUVRQWKH'LVWULFW&RXUWMXULVGLFWLRQWRKHDUSHWLWLRQHUV¶KDEHDVFRUSXVFKDOOHQJHV
to  the  legality  of  their  detention  at  the  Guantanamo  Bay  Naval  Base«  
Whether  and  what  further  proceedings  may  become  necessary  after  respondents  
PDNHWKHLUUHVSRQVHWRWKHPHULWVRISHWLWLRQHUV¶FODLPVDUHPDWWHUVWKDWZHQHHGQRW
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address  now.  What  is  presently  at  stake  is  only  whether  the  federal  courts  have  
MXULVGLFWLRQWRGHWHUPLQHWKHOHJDOLW\RIWKH([HFXWLYH¶VSRWHQWLDOO\LQGHILQLWH
detention  of  individuals  who  claim  to  be  wholly  innocent  of  wrongdoing.  Answering  
that  question  in  the  affirmative,  we  reverse  the  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  and  
UHPDQGIRUWKH'LVWULFW&RXUWWRFRQVLGHULQWKHILUVWLQVWDQFHWKHPHULWVRISHWLWLRQHUV¶
claims«  
  
Justice  Kennedy,  concurring  in  the  judgment.  
The  Court  is  correct,  in  my  view,  to  conclude  that  federal  courts  have  jurisdiction  
to  consider  challenges  to  the  legality  of  the  detention  of  foreign  nationals  held  at  the  
Guantanamo  Bay  Naval  Base  in  Cuba.  While  I  reach  the  same  conclusion,  my  
analysis  follows  a  different  course«  In  my  view,  the  correct  course  is  to  follow  the  
framework  of  Eisentrager«  
The  decision  in  Eisentrager  indicates  that  there  is  a  realm  of  political  authority  
over  military  affairs  where  the  judicial  power  may  not  enter.  The  existence  of  this  
realm  acknowledges  the  power  of  the  President  as  Commander  in  Chief,  and  the  joint  
role  of  the  President  and  the  Congress,  in  the  conduct  of  military  affairs.  A  faithful  
application  of  Eisentrager,  then,  requires  an  initial  inquiry  into  the  general  
circumstances  of  the  detention  to  determine  whether  the  Court  has  the  authority  to  
entertain  the  petition  and  to  grant  relief  after  considering  all  of  the  facts  presented.  A  
necessary  corollary  of  Eisentrager  is  that  there  are  circumstances  in  which  the  courts  
maintain  the  power  and  the  responsibility  to  protect  persons  from  unlawful  detention  
even  where  military  affairs  are  implicated.  
The  facts  here  are  distinguishable  from  those  in  Eisentrager  in  two  critical  ways,  
leading  to  the  conclusion  that  a  federal  court  may  entertain  the  petitions.  First,  
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Guantanamo  Bay  is  in  every  practical  respect  a  United  States  territory,  and  it  is  one  
far  removed  from  any  hostilities.  
The  opinion  of  the  Court  well  explains  the  history  of  its  possession  by  the  United  
States.  In  a  formal  sense,  the  United  States  leases  the  Bay;;  the  1903  lease  agreement  
states  that  &XEDUHWDLQV³XOWLPDWHVRYHUHLJQW\´RYHULW$WWKHVDPHWLPHWKLVOHDVHLV
no  ordinary  lease.  Its  term  is  indefinite  and  at  the  discretion  of  the  United  States.  
What  matters  is  the  unchallenged  and  indefinite  control  that  the  United  States  has  
long  exercised  over  Guantanamo  Bay.  From  a  practical  perspective,  the  indefinite  
lease  of  Guantanamo  Bay  has  produced  a  place  that  belongs  to  the  United  States,  
H[WHQGLQJWKH³LPSOLHGSURWHFWLRQ´RIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVWRLW  
The  second  critical  set  of  facts  is  that  the  detainees  at  Guantanamo  Bay  are  being  
held  indefinitely,  and  without  benefit  of  any  legal  proceeding  to  determine  their  
status.  In  Eisentrager,  the  prisoners  were  tried  and  convicted  by  a  military  
commission  of  violating  the  laws  of  war  and  were  sentenced  to  prison  terms.  Having  
DOUHDG\EHHQVXEMHFWWRSURFHGXUHVHVWDEOLVKLQJWKHLUVWDWXVWKH\FRXOGQRWMXVWLI\³D
OLPLWHGRSHQLQJRIRXUFRXUWV´WRVKRZWKDWWKH\ZHUH³RIIULHQGO\SHUVRQDO
GLVSRVLWLRQ´DQGQRWHQHP\DOLHQV,QGHILQLWHGHWHQWLRQZLWKRXWWrial  or  other  
proceeding  presents  altogether  different  considerations.  It  allows  friends  and  foes  
alike  to  remain  in  detention.  It  suggests  a  weaker  case  of  military  necessity  and  much  
greater  alignment  with  the  traditional  function  of  habeas  corpus.  Perhaps,  where  
detainees  are  taken  from  a  zone  of  hostilities,  detention  without  proceedings  or  trial  
would  be  justified  by  military  necessity  for  a  matter  of  weeks;;  but  as  the  period  of  
detention  stretches  from  months  to  years,  the  case  for  continued  detention  to  meet  
military  exigencies  becomes  weaker.  
In  light  of  the  status  of  Guantanamo  Bay  and  the  indefinite  pretrial  detention  of  
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the  detainees,  I  would  hold  that  federal  court  jurisdiction  is  permitted  in  these  cases.  
This  approach  would  avoid  creating  automatic  statutory  authority  to  adjudicate  the  
claims  of  persons  located  outside  the  United  States,  and  remains  true  to  the  reasoning  
of  Eisentrager«  
  
Justice  Scalia,  with  whom  the  Chief  Justice  and  Justice  Thomas  join,  dissenting.  
The  Court  today  holds  that  the  habeas  [corpus]  statute  extends  to  aliens  detained  
by  the  United  States  military  overseas,  outside  the  sovereign  borders  of  the  United  
States  and  beyond  the  territorial  jurisdictions  of  all  its  courts.  This  is  not  only  a  novel  
holding;;  it  contradicts  a  half-century-old  precedent  on  which  the  military  undoubtedly  
UHOLHG7KH&RXUW¶VFRQWHQWLRQWKDWEisentrager  was  somehow  negated  by  Braden²a  
decision  that  dealt  with  a  different  issue  and  did  not  so  much  as  mention  
Eisentrager²is  implausible  in  the  extreme.  This  is  an  irresponsible  overturning  of  
settled  law  in  a  matter  of  extreme  importance  to  our  forces  currently  in  the  field.  I  
ZRXOGOHDYHLWWR&RQJUHVVWRFKDQJH>WKHODZ@DQGGLVVHQWIURPWKH&RXUW¶V
unprecedented  holding«  
«7RGD\¶VRSLQLRQDQGWRGD\¶s  opinion  alone,  overrules  Eisentrager;;  WRGD\¶V
RSLQLRQDQGWRGD\¶VRSLQLRQDORQHH[WHQGVWKHKDEHDVVWDWXWHIRUWKHILUVWWLPHWR
aliens  held  beyond  the  sovereign  territory  of  the  United  States  and  beyond  the  
territorial  jurisdiction  of  its  courts.  No  reasons  are  given  for  this  result;;  no  
acknowledgment  of  its  consequences  made.  By  spurious  reliance  on  Braden  the  Court  
evades  explaining  why  stare  decisis  can  be  disregarded,  and  why  Eisentrager  was  
wrong.  Normally,  we  consider  the  interests  of  those  who  have  relied  on  our  decisions.  
Today,  the  Court  springs  a  trap  on  the  Executive,  subjecting  Guantanamo  Bay  to  the  
oversight  of  the  federal  courts  even  though  it  has  never  before  been  thought  to  be  
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within  their  jurisdiction²and  thus  making  it  a  foolish  place  to  have  housed  alien  
wartime  detainees«  
Departure  from  our  rule  of  stare  decisis  in  statutory  cases  is  always  extraordinary;;  
it  ought  to  be  unthinkable  when  the  departure  has  a  potentially  harmful  effect  upon  
WKH1DWLRQ¶VFRQGXFWRIDZDU7KH&RPPDQGHUin  Chief  and  his  subordinates  had  
every  reason  to  expect  that  the  internment  of  combatants  at  Guantanamo  Bay  would  
not  have  the  consequence  of  bringing  the  cumbersome  machinery  of  our  domestic  
courts  into  military  affairs.  
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